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I. INTRODUCTION
t was with considerable trepidation that I accepted the task of
assembling this year's "Recent Developments" paper. As the
length of this paper suggests, it has been a busy year for aviation
law just within our nation's courts, and I have not even ad-
dressed legislative and international developments such as the
IATA Accords with Intercarrier Agreement and the Family
Assistance Act, both of which stand to radically alter the land-
scape of aviation law and liability for years to come.
In the course of preparing this paper, the tremendous scope
of "aviation law" was once again made plain. I would not dare
be so bold as to suggest that I have mastered any of the topics
herein, and, as noted, I am indebted to my colleagues for their
outstanding efforts in bringing this paper to fruition. I hope I
have avoided most editorial biases. Nonetheless, many of the
cases and language quoted and paraphrased in this paper may
be bad memories best left undisturbed to some of you, while
others may find reviewing these same authorities a most pleas-
ant diversion. Obviously, this largely depends on your back-
ground and on which side of the "v." you are typically to be
found. I hope all readers will forgive what may seem like a brut-
ish .handling of their cases. Sorting out what to cover and to
what extent was not easy, and no doubt some will feel neglected
and others, dissected. I thank the Board of this Symposium and
the Staff at SMU for the honor of presenting this paper.
II. GENERAL LEGAL ISSUES
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Numerous cases arose out of the crash of American Eagle
Flight 3379 near Morrisville, North Carolina in 1994. One of
these actions, recently decided, involved the issue of personal
jurisdiction over three out-of-state corporations.' In Josefson, Jet-
stream Aircraft Limited, Jetstream Aircraft, Inc., and British
Aerospace P.L.C. were joined as defendants. The plaintiff al-
leged that these defendants had manufactured and leased the
accident aircraft to Flagship Airlines and further alleged that
the manuals that accompanied the aircraft contained mislead-
ing information that contributed to the accident. 2 The plaintiff
I SeeJosefson v. Flagship Airlines, Inc., 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,146 (M.D.N.C.
1997).
2 See id. at 18,148.
1998]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
argued that sufficient contacts between the defendants and
North Carolina were established because the defendants pro-
vided product support in North Carolina, sent parts to North
Carolina, and knew that the aircraft would likely travel to North
Carolina.' The defendants argued that these facts were insuffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction because the defendants were not reg-
istered or qualified to do business in the state, had no registered
agents there, maintained no personnel in the state, and had not
consented to suit in North Carolina.4
The court initially examined the North Carolina long-arm
statute, which provided for a liberal exercise of personal juris-
diction.5 The statute permitted jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant who had caused injury within the state if " [p] roducts,
materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the
defendant were used or consumed, within th [e] State..... The
district court noted that the North Carolina long-arm statute ex-
tended to the full jurisdictional limit permissible under federal
due process law and proceeded to analyze the question under
the federal "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial
justice" tests. The district court held that jurisdiction over the
defendants would not be constitutional because the defendants'
only contacts with the state (the occasional delivery of parts and
one visit by a technical representative), were wholly unrelated to
the plaintiffs claim.8 The entire claim consisted of allegations
of deficiencies in the aircraft's manual, and the plaintiff failed to
establish any direct contact between the defendants and the
state of North Carolina on that issue.
The plaintiff also argued that the foreseeability that the air-
craft would move through the stream of commerce into North
Carolina subjected the manufacturer to jurisdiction. The court
noted that this "stream of commerce" theory had been expressly
rejected in the circuit.' Hence, the mere foreseeability that the
aircraft might travel and potentially crash in North Carolina did
not provide constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts to es-
tablish personal jurisdiction over defendants in that state.
-1 See id. at 18,147.
4 See id. at 18,146-47.
5 See id. at 18,147.
6 Id.
7 See id.
8 See id. at 18,148.
I See id.
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B. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activity ex-
ception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)1 0 was
examined in Seisay v. Compagnie Nationale Air France.1 The plain-
tiff Tinga Seisay, former General Counsel of Sierra Leone to the
United States, alleged that he was wrongfully denied permission
to board an Air France flight from Paris to New York due to
irregularities in his transportation documents.
Although the plaintiff was a permanent resident of the United
States, the plaintiff boarded his scheduled Air France flight to
Paris from Ghana under a Sierra Leone passport. Upon arrival
in Paris, the plaintiff was scheduled to transfer to an Air France
flight to New York. In lieu of a Green Card, the plaintiff offered
an Immigration and Naturalization Service document entitled
"Notice of Interview."1' 2 Air France determined that this docu-
ment was not a proper travel document and that the plaintiff
lacked the necessary documentation to enter the United States.
On that basis, Seisay was denied boarding. The plaintiff alleged
that Air France's failure to transport him to New York consti-
tuted a breach of contract. He also alleged that he had been
falsely imprisoned by virtue of Air France's actions.13
Air France moved for summary judgment on two grounds:
1) Air France's tariff expressly exonerated Air France from
liability for refusing to transport passengers with inadequate
travel documents; and
2) the plaintiffs tort claims were barred pursuant to the
FSIA.
In opposing Air France's motion, the plaintiff sought leave to
amend the complaint to add additional causes of action related
to warranty, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, negligence, and
civil rights violations. All of the proposed additional causes of
action related to the same transaction and occurrence that was
the subject of the initial complaint.
In defense of the breach of contract claim, Air France sought
to rely on its tariffs on file with the Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT). The court noted that tariffs on file with DOT form
part of the contract of carriage between the passenger and the
10 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994).
11 No. 95 Civ. 7660 (JFK), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11009 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
1997).
12 See id. at *3.
13 See id. at *4.
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airline." Rule 45 of Air France's tariffs specifically requires pas-
sengers to comply with all necessary laws, rules, and regulations
related to obtaining the necessary documents for international
travel. The rule further provides that the "[c] arrier is not liable
to the passenger for any loss or expense due to the passenger's
failure to obtain the required documents, whether or not the
carrier provides carriage to passenger."1 5
Because it was undisputed that Air France refused to board
the plaintiff due to deficiencies in his travel documents, and it
was solely the plaintiff's obligation to obtain these documents,
Air France's motion for summary judgment on the breach of
contract count was granted. 6
Resolving the plaintiffs claim for false imprisonment re-
quired an examination of the commercial activity exception to
foreign sovereign immunity, specifically the requirement that a
plaintiff's injury be "based upon" a commercial activity carried
out by the sovereign. 7 It was undisputed that the majority of Air
France's shares were owned by the Republic of France and that
Air France accordingly was entitled to foreign sovereign immu-
nity status under the FSIA."
The plaintiff alleged that his injury was "based upon" Air
France's activity in the United States, which consisted of selling
him his ticket in New York, where Air France operated a ticket
office. Air France did not contest either of these facts but coun-
tered that the plaintiffs claim was based upon activity wholly
unrelated to the New York commercial activity. The court
agreed with Air France.' 9
In Nelson, the Supreme Court distinguished claims based
upon a commercial activity and those merely having a connec-
tion with the commercial activity.20 Plaintiff Nelson had been
recruited by the Saudi Arabian government to work in a Saudi
hospital. He alleged that he was tortured by Saudi police after
repeatedly advising hospital officials of safety hazards posed by
14 See id. at *9 (citing North Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, 579 F.2d
229, 233 (2d Cir. 1978)); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401,
1403 (2d Cir. 1969).
15 Id. at *8-9.
- See id. at *10 (citing Khalessilzadeh v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 19 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 18,413 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (other citations omitted)).
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2) (1994).
19 See Seisay, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11009, at *15-17 (citing Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993)).
20 See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 353.
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the hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide systems. The Court
held that Nelson's claims were not based upon Saudi Arabia's
recruitment in the United States (the commercial activity) but
rather the actions of Saudi police in Saudi Arabia.21 Accord-
ingly, the Court found that the plaintiff's tort claims did not fall
within the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, and thus,
the Court lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction. 22
Applying the reasoning of Nelson, the Southern District of
New York held that any alleged confinement performed by Air
France related to commercial activities in Paris, not those that
occurred in New York.23 As such, the court held that it was in-
sufficient to establish merely that commercial activity eventually
led to the injurious conduct. Rather, the plaintiff was required
to establish that the elements of his cause of action were "based
upon" the commercial activity. Because the elements of the
plaintiff's false imprisonment claim could be established inde-
pendently of Air France's commercial activities in New York, the
court held that the commercial activity exception to foreign sov-
ereign immunity did not apply; therefore, the court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs false imprisonment
claim.24
All of the causes of action the plaintiff sought to add to his
complaint via his proposed amendment related to the same
transaction and occurrence as the false imprisonment claim.
Accordingly, the court held that the proposed amendments
"would be futile" because none of these claims could be based
upon Air France's commercial activity in New York.25 Leave to
amend was denied, and Air France's motion for summary judg-
ment was granted in all respects.2 6
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In a recent case, the Southern District of New York granted
the defendant airline's motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens. In Tiwari v. BWIA International,27 the plaintiff, a pas-
senger on a BWIA flight from Guyana to New York, was arrested
21 See id. at 357-58.
22 See id. at 358-63.
23 See Seisay, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11009, at *17.
24 See id. at * 18.
25 Id. at *19.
26 See id. at *19-20.
27 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,429 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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for possession of cocaine in her baggage. 28 After the plaintiff
checked her bags, she was stopped by police officers who had
recovered a toothpaste tube filled with cocaine from her lug-
gage. 29 The plaintiff denied that the toothpaste tube or cocaine
belonged to her, and the charges against her were ultimately
dismissed. Having been arrested and jailed in Guyana for ap-
proximately two weeks during the criminal proceedings, she
brought an action in New York against the airline alleging negli-
gent handling of her luggage and seeking damages for psycho-
logical harm."'
The court first noted that a plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed unless the balance of public and private in-
terests strongly favors the defendant.3' The private interests
considered by the court included ease of access to proof, availa-
bility of witnesses, and other practical matters.3 2 The private in-
terests weighed heavily against New York as a convenient forum
because the physical evidence and the likely witnesses were all
located in Guyana. The witnesses could not be compelled to
testify in New York, and the Guyana police retained custody of
the physical evidence. 33
The public interest considerations included the relation be-
tween the locality and the controversy.34 New York had no rela-
tion to the incidents leading to the litigation, and the court
found that the plaintiff's New York residency was insufficient to
mandate retaining the action in New York. Thus, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action and re-
quired the defendant to agree to submit to jurisdiction before
the Guyana court.3 5
D. LIMITATIONS
An instructive analysis of the statute of limitations applicable
to claims under the Federal Air Carriers Access Act (ACAA) 36
can be found in Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.3 ' The case in-
28 See id. at 18,430.
29 See id.
30 See id.
"I See id. at 18,431.




3 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994).
37 558 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1997).
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volved, among other claims, an alleged violation of the ACAA,
which prohibits discrimination against the disabled in air trans-
portation. The plaintiff, suffering from a connective tissue dis-
order and physical weakness, alleged that Northwest Airlines
personnel refused to assist her in loading and unloading her
carry-on baggage, which resulted in injuries to her shoulders
and arms. She brought suit in Minnesota more than two years
after the incident.
Defendant Northwest Airlines moved to dismiss the action on
the ground that the applicable statute of limitations was one
year and that the plaintiffs claim was untimely. The ACAA did
not provide a statute of limitations for the plaintiff's claim.
The court noted that federal time limitations are to be judi-
cially crafted from an analogous statute of limitations in the law
of the forum state when the federal statute provides no limita-
tions period.38 The defendant argued that the most closely
analogous statute was the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA), which prohibits discriminatory practices affecting the
disabled, among others. The plaintiff argued that Minnesota's
six-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions should
apply. She relied on several United States Supreme Court deci-
sions that modified the federal borrowing approach for viola-
tions of certain federal civil rights statutes." Those cases
analogized certain discrimination causes of action to personal
injury actions and permitted federal courts to apply state tort
limitations in certain cases.
The Minnesota court reasoned, however, that the Supreme
Court's decisions with respect to section 1983 discrimination
causes of action should not be extended to every federal civil
rights statute. 40 The Court noted that section 1983 applied to
numerous potential causes of action and a variety of remedies,
making an analogy to state law difficult and justifying resort to
state personal injury limitations. 41 The ACAA statute, however,
applies specifically to discrimination against the disabled in air
38 See id. at 738.
39 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (stating that personal injury limita-
tions period of state may be applied to civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (explaining that where numerous
state personal injury limitations periods exist, court may use general limitations
period); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (comparing discrimi-
nation to injury to individual fights, akin to personal injury).
4o See Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 73942.
41 See id.
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transportation and thus could be closely analogized to the
MHRA.
The court held that the applicable ACAA statute of limitations
was the one-year statute of limitations under the MHRA and that
the plaintiffs claim was time-barred.42
E. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
In the wake of the TWA Flight 800 accident, numerous cases
were filed across the nation in both state and federal courts. By
motion to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, defend-
ant Trans World Airlines (TWA) sought transfer and consolida-
tion of all federal cases to the Southern District of New York for
coordinated pretrial proceedings.43 Although the accident oc-
curred off the coast of Long Island and thus arguably in the
Eastern District of New York, TWA took the position that the
accident occurred over the Atlantic Ocean and thus did not oc-
cur "in" any district." TWA therefore argued for transfer to the
Southern District of New York, which was in proximity to the
airport from which the plane departed as well as the crash site
and was a more convenient location than Eastern Long Island
for the many foreign and out-of-state plaintiffs because of the
Southern District location in downtown New York City. The
Panel agreed with the position of TWA and consolidated the
actions in the Southern District, noting that the court "in Man-
hattan provides the most convenient and accessible forum for
participants" in "this litigation that is truly international in
scope."45
F. CHOICE OF LAW
In In re Aircrash Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, the
Northern District of Illinois addressed the question of which
state's law of damages should be applied to the plaintiffs'
claims.46 In a previous decision, the district court had held that
Indiana law applied to the compensatory damages of five of the
plaintiffs in this consolidated action, all residents of Indiana.47
42 See id. at 742.
43 See In re Air Crash Disaster off Long Island, New York on July 17, 1997, MDL
Docket No. 1161 (Feb. 19, 1997).
44 Defendant Boeing Company sought consolidation in the Eastern District.
See id. at 1.
45 Id. at 2.
46 948 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
47 See id. at 749.
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The defendants therefore sought a ruling in this case that Indi-
ana law should govern the damage claims of all the other dece-
dents and plaintiffs.48 At issue were compensatory damage
claims for pre-impact fear and terror, such causes of action be-
ing unavailable under the law of Indiana. a9 Many of the remain-
ing plaintiffs' decedents were residents of Illinois, which permits
recovery for pre-death mental distress.50 Thus, the plaintiffs ar-
gued for the application of Illinois law, the law of Texas (the
American Airlines defendant's principal place of business), or
the creation of a new "federal common law." 5'
In determining which state's choice of law principles to apply,
the district court distinguished between those cases in which ju-
risdiction was based on diversity and those cases in which juris-
diction was based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). Turning first to the FSIA cases, the court noted that
there was no Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent on
the issue of choice of law rules in an FSIA case. Reviewing other
precedent, the court noted that the Second Circuit looked to
the choice of law rule in the forum state, and the Ninth Circuit
looked to federal common law or the "most significant relation-
ship test" for FSIA cases.5
The district court did not resolve this conflict, reasoning that
under either choice of law approach the result would be the
same. Most of the forum states for the actions at bar applied the
Second Restatement, that is the most significant relationship
test, which did not differ from the federal common law test. 4
The court held that the most significant relationship test ap-
plied to the FSIA cases.55
In analyzing the choice of law rules applicable to the diversity
cases, the court noted that the choice of law rules of the forum
state should apply, resulting in application of the rules of the
transferor courtY.5  There were only two cases in which jurisdic-
tion was based on diversity. In the case originating from North
48 See id.
49 See id. at 750.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 750-51.
52 See id. at 752-53.
53 See id. at 753.
54 There was one exception, the state of New York, which applies a complex
governmental interest analysis stemming from Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d
484 (N.Y. 1972).
55 See In Re Aircrash Near Roselawn, 948 F. Supp. at 753.
56 See id. at 754.
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Carolina, the district court held that North Carolina's choice of
law rule was the lex loci delicti rule, or the place of wrong.57 The
court held that the injury was the last element of the tort at issue
and therefore applied Indiana substantive law to that plaintiff's
claims as the law of the state where the accident occurred.
58
In the diversity case originating from Oklahoma, the court
found that Oklahoma applied the most significant relationship
test.59 Thus, that test applied to all the FSIA cases and the
Oklahoma diversity case.
The court then analyzed the application of the most signifi-
cant relationship test to the facts. The most significant relation-
ship test requires consideration of four factors: (1) place of
injury; (2) place of wrongful conduct; (3) domicile of the par-
ties; and (4) place where the parties' relationship was cen-
tered.6" The American Airlines defendants argued that the
place of injury should be applied under that test, and the plain-
tiffs argued that the state of domicile of the plaintiffs' decedents
has the greatest interest. 61
The court reviewed much of the existing authority on the ap-
plication of the most significant relationship test and found that
the plaintiff's domicile is generally considered to have the great-
est interest in ensuring that its residents are appropriately com-
pensated for their injuries.62 The court noted that the place of
injury, the Indiana crash site, was somewhat fortuitous and that
none of the plaintiffs or defendants were Indiana residents.63
The court also noted that applying the law of the plaintiff's dom-
icile fostered predictability and the protection of the plaintiffs
justified expectations. Thus, the substantive law of the dece-
dents' domiciles was applied to the claims for compensatory
damages for pre-impact fear.64
Interestingly, the choice of law problem arose again in the
Roselawn air crash litigation when the issue of punitive damages
came before the court.65 In that related decision, the Northern
District of Illinois was presented with the question of what law to
57 See id.
58 See id. at 755.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 756.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 757.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 757-58.
65 See id. at 747.
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apply to the plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages against the
airline defendants.66 Once again, the Northern District of Illi-
nois applied the most significant relationship test to determine
which substantive law should apply.67 The court analyzed the
conflicts of law issue by considering two factors: (1) the defend-
ant's principal place of business and (2) the place where the
misconduct occurred. The court noted that the state of the
place of injury could be considered as a "tiebreaker."6s
As to the airline defendants (the owners and operators of the
aircraft), the plaintiffs argued that the law of Texas, the airline's
principal place of business, should apply. The defendants ar-
gued that some of the alleged misconduct took place in other
states and that the law of the place of injury should be applied as
a tiebreaker. The district court found that most of the relevant
conduct took place in Texas, and the conduct that took place
elsewhere was outweighed by the significant contacts between
the flight and Texas.69 The crew was trained in Texas, the oper-
ations and flight manuals were created in Texas, the flight was
dispatched from Texas, and weather and flight conditions infor-
mation was provided by American Airlines in Texas. Accord-
ingly, the court applied the law of Texas, which permitted the
plaintiffs' punitive damages claims.
As to the aircraft defendants (the aircraft manufacturers), the
plaintiffs also sought application of Texas law to their damages
claims even though these defendants were domiciled in France.
The court found that the most significant conduct at issue, the
designing, testing, and manufacture of the aircraft, occurred in
France, which was also the principal place of business of the de-
fendants. Thus, the district court held that the substantive law
of France should apply to the punitive damages claims against
these defendants and that French civil law did not recognize pu-
nitive damages.70
G. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In Hillary v. Trans World Airlines, the court was presented with
an interesting set of facts that raised issues related to resjudicata
and statutes of limitations. 7' The plaintiff was allegedly injured
- See id. at 750.
67 See id. at 751-52.
68 See id. at 757.
69 See id. at 756.
70 See id.
71 123 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 1997).
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when a TWA employee dropped a case containing a metal type-
writer on the plaintiffs head, causing numerous injuries. 2 The
plaintiff initially filed an action in the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana, which had diversity jurisdiction. 73 TWA moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs claim was
time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations.74 The plain-
tiff opposed the motion and moved in the alternative for a vol-
untary dismissal without prejudice. 5
While these motions were pending, the plaintiff filed a second
suit in the Eastern District of Missouri where the applicable stat-
ute of limitations was five years.7 6 Then, the Louisiana district
court granted TWA's motion to dismiss and denied the plain-
tiffs motion for voluntary withdrawal. 77 That decision was up-
held by the Fifth Circuit.78
Later, in the Missouri action, TWA's motion for summary
judgment on the ground of res judicata was granted by the dis-
trict court.79 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the preclusive effect of the district court's ruling in
Louisiana should be determined based on state law because the
circuit court was sitting in diversity.8 Noting its disagreement
with the majority of circuits on this issue, the Eighth Circuit
agreed that Louisiana state law applied.8 Nonetheless, the
court found that the second action was barred because it arose
out of the same transaction or occurrence and because Louisi-
ana law gave preclusive effect to dismissals based on statutes of
limitation.82
The plaintiff also argued that her claim should not be barred
because Louisiana law provided a safeguard for litigants that
precluded the application of resjudicata in "exceptional circum-
stances."8 The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs attorney's
failure to apprise himself of the Louisiana statute of limitations
before filing the first action did not constitute the exceptional





77 See id. at 1042-43.




82 See id. at 1043-44.
8s See id. at 1044.
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circumstances required.84 The court also held that the decisions
of the Louisiana district court and the Fifth Circuit not to grant
the plaintiffs motion for voluntary withdrawal were unreview-
able by the Eighth Circuit.8 5
In Salley v. USAir, Inc., the Eastern District of New York held a
finding of the Workers Compensation Board to have a preclu-
sive effect on the same issue raised in civil litigation. 6 In that
case, the plaintiff, traveling aboard a USAir flight on business,
was struck on the left side of the head and neck by a bag, which
fell from the overhead compartment.8 7 The plaintiff filed a
workers compensation claim and was awarded lost wages by the
Workers Compensation Board. Approximately six months after
the incident, the plaintiff developed multiple sclerosis and at-
tempted to add a claim for these damages to the Workers Com-
pensation proceeding. 8 Expert testimony differed on whether
the onset of the disease was related to the injury aboard the air-
craft, and the Board found against the plaintiff on the issue.
The plaintiff appealed to the Board Panel, which affirmed the
decision. 9
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a civil suit against USAir, and
USAir moved for partial summary judgment on the multiple
sclerosis claim on the grounds of collateral estoppel.90 Plaintiff
requested that the court hold its decision in abeyance pending a
reopening of the Workers Compensation Panel decision.9 This
motion was granted, and the plaintiff was examined by an in-
dependent physician appointed by the Workers Compensation
Board. The physician determined that the injury and the onset
of the disease were unrelated.92 At the compensation hearing,
plaintiff's counsel attempted to completely withdraw the Work-
ers Compensation claim in an attempt to avoid the preclusive
effect of collateral estoppel." The Workers Compensation
Panel held that the plaintiff's appeal of the original Workers
Compensation Board decision could be withdrawn, but such ac-
84 See id. at 1045.
85 See id.
86 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,329 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
87 See id. at 18,330.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 18,330-31.
91 See id. at 18,332.
92 See id. at 18,333.
93 See id.
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tion did not affect the underlying decision of the initial Workers
Compensation Board proceeding.9"
The district court in the civil action held that the finding of
the Workers Compensation Board that the plaintiff's injury
aboard USAir was unrelated to her multiple sclerosis was bind-
ing on that issue.9" In its opinion, the Eastern District of New
York harshly criticized the plaintiffs counsel's tactics and
granted USAir's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from litigating her
claim for damages based on the multiple sclerosis.96 The court
held that the administrative determination of the Workers Com-
pensation Board presented the plaintiff (having chosen that fo-
rum and presented substantial evidence therein) with a full and
fair opportunity to litigate that claim.97
In Parmater v. Amcord, Inc., the principle of res judicata was
applied to prevent a separate action on behalf of the same dece-
dent to be litigated in a new forum.96 The case involved a pri-
vate aircraft accident in which the pilot, his wife, and three
children were killed.99 The decedents were residents of Iowa,
and an Iowa court appointed Norwest Bank of Des Moines as
executor of the estate of Nancy Champion. 100 A wrongful death
action was filed in Iowa court on behalf of the decedent and
ended in a court-approved final settlement.1"'
Subsequently, the Iowa court appointed the decedent's
mother as "special administrator" of the estates of Nancy Cham-
pion and her three children for the purpose of pursuing claims
on behalf of the decedents in Alabama.10 2 The Alabama court
held that both suits were brought on behalf of the same dece-
94 See id.
95 See id. at 18,334.
96 The court stated that the plaintiff's counsel's attempt to withdraw the Work-
ers Compensation claim only after the independent physician's opinion went
against plaintiff's theory was "a crafty and unjustifiable attempt to circumvent the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in order to grasp for a third opportunity to litigate
this issue .... Id. at 18,334.
97 See id. at 18,332.
98 No. 1940862, 1997 Ala. LEXIS 125 (Ala. May 2, 1997).
99 See id. at *1.
100 See id.
101 See id. at *1-2.
102 See id. at *3.
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dent and arose out of the same nucleus of facts. 10 3 Thus, the
second suit was precluded by the principle of res judicata. 10 4
H. EVIDENCE
In a recent decision by the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, the court granted a qualified privi-
lege to safety data collected by pilots and the airline industry. 10 5
In Cali, the plaintiffs demanded discovery of documents pre-
pared pursuant to the American Airlines Safety Action Partner-
ship (ASAP) program. The ASAP Program is a voluntary pilot
self-reporting initiative designed to encourage pilots to report
incidents and possible violations of Federal Aviation Regula-
tions. 106 Created in 1994 by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, the Allied Pilots Association, and American Airlines, the
program was designed to collect data with respect to pilot diffi-
culties, including possible deviations from safety regulations.107
The information obtained was used to identify areas of concern,
which were addressed by the issuance of pilot advisories, proce-
dural changes, and individual skill enhancement recommenda-
tions to prevent further incidents. 8 The airlines argued that
the guarantee of confidentiality in this reporting system created
a strong incentive for pilots to bring possible problems to the
attention of American Airlines, the pilots' union, and the
FAA. 10 9
In the wake of the crash at the Cali airport, the plaintiffs
sought discovery of these internal safety audit documents.
American Airlines sought protection of the ASAP materials, ar-
guing that the documents either fell within the "self-critical anal-
ysis" privilege or that the court should recognize a new
common-law privilege for materials created as part of the ASAP
program." 0
The Southern District of Florida held that the ASAP docu-
ments did not fall within the self-critical analysis privilege, a doc-
trine sometimes applied to protect physician peer-reviews or
1o3 See id. at *5-6.
104 See id. at *7-8.
105 See In re Air Crash Near Cali, Columbia on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. 1529
(S.D. Fla. 1997).




110 See id. at 1532.
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internal corporate evaluations of compliance with environmen-
tal regulations."' While the self-critical analysis privilege had
been recognized in some courts, other courts had rejected the
doctrine in similar circumstances. 1 2 In cases where the privi-
lege is recognized, however, it has typically applied only to pro-
tect documents prepared for purely internal reviews. 1 3 The
information gathered from American Airlines' pilots was shared
with the FAA and the APA. Thus, the Southern District of Flor-
ida found that the self-critical analysis privilege did not attach." 4
However, the court found compelling reasons to recognize a
limited federal common law privilege for the ASAP materials. 15
Applying the principles enunciated in the United States
Supreme Court decision Jaffee v. Redmond,' the court ex-
amined and balanced four factors: the private interests, the pub-
lic interests, any potential evidentiary benefit from the denial of
a privilege, and the recognition of the privilege in the state
courts. 1 7 The court noted that the private interests, those of
the FAA, American Airlines, and its pilots, weighed heavily in
favor of finding a privilege. All of them had an interest in the
reported violations so that apparent problems could be ad-
dressed with proper training, new procedures, and advice to pi-
lots." 8 The court held that the public interest also weighed in
favor of the creation of a privilege. The public's interest in im-
proving the safety of air travel was served by the program, the
efficacy of which depended largely on the guarantee of confi-
dentiality." 9 As to the third factor, the evidentiary benefit from
the denial of the privilege, the court found that the benefit
would probably be minimal because the very evidence sought
would probably be unavailable absent the privilege. 20 Finally,
as to the fourth factor, the court noted that the application of
11 See id. (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970);
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994)) (addi-
tional citations omitted).
112 See Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1532 (citing Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D.
177 (S.D. Iowa 1993)); Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446 (D. Md. 1984)
(for criticism of the doctrine).
11" See Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1532.
14 See id. at 1533.
115 See id.
11 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
117 See Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1533.
1 See id. at 1533-34.
119 See id. at 1534.
120 See id. at 1534-35.
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the self-critical analysis privilege in analogous contexts showed
that the privilege was recognized to a degree in the state courts,
and the court stated that this was a factor that should be given
some weight.1 21
Thus, the court recognized a new federal common law privi-
lege that protects documents created as part of the ASAP safety
audit program.122 The privilege, however, is not absolute but is
a qualified privilege, which can be overcome if a plaintiff meets
the burden of showing "the importance of the inquiry for which
the privileged information is sought; the relevance of that infor-
mation to its inquiry; and the difficulty of obtaining the desired
information through alternative means."2 Even upon such a
showing, however, disclosure of ASAP documents will not be re-
quired unless a court determines that the "[p]laintiffs' interests
overcome the powerful interests that weigh in favor of preserv-
ing the confidentiality of the ASAP documents." 12' Thus, the
court placed a heavy burden on a plaintiff to overcome the pre-
sumption of privilege for the ASAP documents.
In Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,1 25 the Fourth Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict against Cessna Aircraft, finding no error in the Mid-
dle District of North Carolina's decision to admit evidence of
prior accidents at trial. 126 The case involved the in-flight break-
up of a Cessna Model 210 in which the pilot and two passengers
were killed. 127 At trial, in an attempt to prove that a design de-
fect in the tail of the aircraft caused the accident, the plaintiff
introduced evidence of other accidents involving the same
Cessna model. 128 Cessna argued that the pilot, certified only as
a VFR pilot, 129 negligently flew into the clouds, became disori-
ented, and lost control of the plane. 3 ° The jury found for the
plaintiff, the pilot's surviving spouse.
On appeal, Cessna argued that the plaintiff failed to show that
the prior accidents were sufficiently similar to the Ridge acci-
121 See id. at 1535.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 1536 (citing In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d
1488, 1522 (1lth Cir. 1986)).
124 Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1537.
125 117 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1997).
126 See id. at 128.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 A VFR (Visual Flight Rules) pilot may not fly in certain weather conditions
where visibility is limited. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (1995).
130 See Ridge, 117 F.3d at 128.
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dent and that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. 3 1 The
Fourth Circuit stated that any dissimilarities in the incidents
went to the issue of weight, not admissibility. 32 The court also
held that the district court did not err in holding that the evi-
dence was not prejudicial. 13 3 The Fourth Circuit noted that the
evidence of prior accidents was probative on the issue of notice
to Cessna, and Cessna had the opportunity to rebut or discredit
the plaintiff's evidence. 34
Cessna also sought review of the district court's refusal to in-
struct the jury on the law of negligence per se.'3 5 Cessna argued
that the VFR pilot put himself in an instrument flight situation
for which he was not trained in violation of regulations and that
this constituted negligence per se. 136 The court found that the
regulations at issue provided only general guidelines and stan-
dards of conduct and were therefore insufficient to establish a
particular duty, the violation of which would constitute negli-
gence per se. 13 7 The Fourth Circuit also found that the ques-
tions submitted to the jury in a special verdict form sufficiently
covered the question of the pilot's negligence. 138
In another recent case involving evidence of negligence, the
Second Circuit reversed several evidentiary rulings of the East-
ern District of NewYork. 3 9 The case involved an elderly passen-
ger who was knocked down and seriously injured at the baggage
retrieval area of LaGuardia Airport, New York City. 140 The
plaintiff alleged that Delta Air Lines negligently failed to take
measures to control crowds at the baggage carousel or to pro-
vide a means for the elderly or disabled to retrieve their luggage
safely. 4 ' The district court restricted the testimony of both the
plaintiff and Delta personnel as to the crowded and dangerous
conditions at the time of the accident by ruling that the testi-
131 See id. at 129.





17 See id. at 130-31.
138 See id. at 131. Thejury verdict form required the jury to decide whether the
pilot was negligent in flying the plane in bad weather and whether he was negli-
gent in failing to follow certain emergency procedures.
139 See Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997).
140 See id. at 78.
141 See id.
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mony was irrelevant.'42 In addition, the district court held that
the plaintiff could not establish a negligence cause of action be-
cause there was no evidence of prior accidents, and such evi-
dence was necessary for the plaintiff to show that the accident
was foreseeable and that Delta had therefore breached its duty
of reasonable care.143 Finally, the district court excluded the
plaintiffs expert as unqualified.'44 The district court granted
judgment in favor of Delta as a matter of law. 145
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, finding that
the lower court's ruling on several issues was in error. 146 The
Second Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs testi-
mony and that of Delta personnel as to the conditions at the
baggage carousel prevented the introduction of probative evi-
dence.' 47 Testimony about the crowded and dangerous condi-
tions at the baggage carousel were relevant to showing that the
defendant could reasonably have taken precautionary measures
to reduce the dangers apart from altering the baggage delivery
system itself. The court further held that the absence of evi-
dence of prior accidents was not fatal to the plaintiff's claim.
While such evidence would certainly be relevant, the plaintiff
could have established negligence and probable cause through
other means. 148 Finally, the Second Circuit held that the exclu-
sion of the plaintiffs expert as unqualified was in error. 149 The
district court had refused to qualify plaintiffs expert because he
had no expertise in the field of airline terminal or baggage
claim area design. 50 The plaintiff's expert held a Masters de-
gree in mechanical engineering with expertise in the area of the
interaction between machines and people. 15' The Second Cir-
cuit held this expertise to be sufficient, noting that it would be
unlikely to find an expert in airport terminal design who did not
work for the airline industry. The requirement of that degree of
specificity to qualify as an expert was tantamount to permitting
the industry indirectly to set its own standards, the Second Cir-
142 See id. at 79.
143 See id. at 78.
144 See id. at 79.
145 See id. at 78.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 80.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 82.
151 See id.
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cuit reasoned.'52 Thus, the Second Circuit vacated the district
court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.153
Machline v. National Helicopter Corp. of America,154 addresses the
extent to which the plaintiff, the Administrator of the estate of a
wealthy entrepreneur, could recover alleged non-salary lost fu-
ture earnings.
Machline arose out of the August 12, 1994, crash of a
chartered helicopter en route to Atlantic City, New Jersey.1"
Matias Machline, his wife, and the helicopter pilot all perished
in the accident. Matias Machline was the majority shareholder
and founder of Sharp S.A., which sold and manufactured Sharp
products in Brazil. The ad damnum in the complaint was $200
million, and the level of damages initially alleged by the plain-
tiff's economist exceeded $4 billion. The issue before the court
was the extent the plaintiff could recover for lost prospective
inheritance attributable to the lost future earning of the dece-
dent. Defendants moved to exclude the report of the plaintiffs
economist on various legal grounds, including that the alleged
losses were speculative as a matter of law and that the alleged
lost future income was actually corporate profits not personal to
the decedent.
The court ruled that New York law applied and broke down
the plaintiff's theories of recovery into four categories:
1. Claim for lost comparable salary;
2. Claim for lost virtual salary;
3. Claim for lost income from specific entrepreneurial ven-
tures; and
4. Lifetime wealth projection.156
The plaintiff argued that Machline was undercompensated
for his services, that the salaries of similar entrepreneurs should
be utilized as a basis for determining the true value of the dece-
dent's services, and that this loss should form the basis for deter-
mining the lost income to the estate. The court disallowed this
theory of recovery on the ground that only the actual compensa-
tion of the decedent was relevant, stating that "[w]hat decedent
could have fairly received as salary is not as relevant or appropri-
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 26 Av. Cas. (CCH) 15,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
155 Id. at 15,258.
156 See id. at 15,261.
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ate to the instant inquiry regarding what he did in fact
receive."157
"Virtual Salary" was proffered by plaintiff as an alternative
method of proving the true value of Machline's services to his
companies. The plaintiff argued that the true value of dece-
dent's value to his company, that is, what Machline would have
"put into" the company, would have resulted in increased share
values and that decedent's demise had resulted in a loss of share
value. The court ruled that losses and gains in corporate profits
were not personal to the decedent and excluded this theory of
recovery.158
The third theory of recovery, entrepreneurial ventures, was
also excluded. The plaintiff argued that the decedent was on
the verge of consummating lucrative transactions from, inter
alia, future telecommunications joint ventures, including pro-
posed bids for cellular phone service contracts in newly-priva-
tized regions. The court ruled that the early stages of the
proposed ventures and the difficulty of ascribing any future
profits of these ventures to Machline personally rendered them
too speculative to go to the jury.159
Finally, turning to alleged lost accumulations of wealth, the
court ruled that this theory was inadmissible in its current form,
but permitted the plaintiff an opportunity to resubmit his claims
under certain guidelines. Among these guidelines were the re-
quirements that such alleged accumulations be personal to the
decedent, not the product of passive investments that would be
passed on to the heirs, and that it be based upon non-specula-
tive projections discounted to present value. The plaintiffs
economist had, effectively, taken a beginning (1961) and end-
point (1994) measure of Machline's net worth and performed a
straight line extrapolation based upon this alleged rate of ac-
cumulation to project Machline's earnings to age seventy-five.
(Machline was sixty-one at the time of the accident.) The court
ruled that this method was "unduly speculative and broad in
scope. 1 61 "Obviously if the Decedent's wealth peaked sometime
prior to his demise and was declining at the date of death, one
cannot appropriately ask the jury to project future growth."1 6 1
The court ruled that if the plaintiff could show a "consistent in-
1 Id. at T 15,262.
158 See id. at 15,263-64.
159 See id. at 15,264.
-~ Id. at 15,266.
161 Id.
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cremental increase in Machline's net worth for the fifteen years
preceding his death" and if such growth was personal to Mach-
line and satisfied other standard requirements for lost accumu-
lations such as those outlined above, such evidence would be
permitted to go to the jury. 62
Although not an aviation case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner has
implications on appeal for all cases involving expert testimony
and Daubert-like evidentiary motions - no strangers to aviation
cases. 63 Joiner was a product liability case in which the plaintiff
alleged that work exposure to certain products and chemicals,
including PCBs, had promoted his small cell lung cancer."'
The district court ruled that the scientific evidence introduced
to prove causation did not pass muster under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'65 Because the plaintiff could not prove
his case absent this evidence, the court granted summary judg-
ment for defendant. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and applied
a "particularly stringent standard of review" in light of the pref-
erence of admitting evidence.'6 6
General Electric argued that the Eleventh Circuit had com-
mitted reversible error in applying this higher standard rather
than the "abuse of discretion" standard of review. Joiner argued
that the circuit had not in fact deviated from the "abuse of dis-
cretion" standard, but had simply conducted a more careful
analysis under this standard.
The Supreme Court held that the abuse of discretion stan-
dard applied to the gatekeeper role of the district court under
Daubert and reversed the ruling of the court of appeals. 167 A
court may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing
and disallowing evidence and thus shift its standard of review.'68
The Court also rejected the argument that the standard should
shift when the evidentiary ruling proved to be outcome determi-
native. 69 In so ruling the Court distinguished between the re-
view of facts on a summary judgment motion, in which all
disputed facts are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and
162 Id.
163 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
164 See id. at 516.
165 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
166 Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 539 (11th Cir. 1996).
167 See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518.
1 -; See id.
169 See id. at 517.
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evidentiary rulings. 170 The latter are not factual in nature and
remain reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard
notwithstanding their ultimate role in the grant of summary
judgment. 17' The Supreme Court further ruled that the district
court's decision withstood analysis under the abuse of discretion
standard and reversed the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit.17 2
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp.173 and Barnett v. La Societe
Anonyme Turbomeca France,174 commonly referred to as the
Turbomeca cases, involved huge compensatory and punitive
damage awards arising from a May 27, 1993, accident involving a
single engine helicopter on a medevac flight.
On May 27, 1993, Sherry Letz was involved in a automobile
accident in Bethany, Missouri. She was treated in a local hospi-
tal and scheduled for air transfer for treatment by specialists.
The "medevac" helicopter flight departed Kansas City at 6:00
a.m. and crashed after an engine failure at approximately 6:25
a.m. over Cameron, Missouri. The helicopter was powered by a
Arriel 1B engine that had a TU 76 modified nozzle guide vane.
The engine had been manufactured by Turbomeca, S.A. (TSA)
and installed in the helicopter by Turbomeca Engine Corpora-
tion (TEC). The nozzle guide vain directs airflow between the
first and second stage turbine disc blades in the engine. A crack
in the TU 76 modified nozzle (the Nozzle) caused the engine
failure that resulted in the accident.175
The court of appeals in Letz noted that TSA knew of a crack-
ing problem in the TU 76 nozzle in June 1985 after an in-flight
failure in the Congo, a second in-flight failure that occurred in
April 1986, and by the summer of 1986, "the highest ranking
officers of TSA knew that the TU 76 cracking problem had the
potential to cause in-flight shutdowns."1 76
In 1987 and 1988, as a result of reported failures in the Noz-
zle, Turbomeca was actively engaged in a search for a replace-
ment design. In 1988 two replacement designs were certified by
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See id. Justice Stevens dissented in this aspect of the Court's ruling. See id.
at 521-23.
173 No. WD 51446, 1997 WL 727544 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997).
174 963 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
175 See id. at 645.
176 Letz, 1997 WL 727544, at *2.
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French aviation authorities. Meanwhile, the Nozzle problems
and shut-downs caused by the Nozzle continued to occur both
in the United States and abroad. TSA records showed that six
in-flight engine stoppages caused by Nozzle failures had been
reported, beginning in 1989. By early 1991 replacement nozzles
were available. However, Turbomeca opted only to recommend
that the Nozzle be replaced at the next regularly-scheduled over-
haul of the engine rather than issue an immediate recall of the
Nozzle. A series of service letters were sent to the owners of
helicopters with the Nozzle installed advising of the availability
of the replacement and that the operators of the engine should
check for abnormal noises during engine shutdown and per-
form inspections of the engine modules if these noises were de-
tected. None of these bulletins reported that Nozzle failures
had caused in-flight shutdowns. After the availability of the re-
placement nozzles, several additional in-flight shutdowns caused
by cracks in the Nozzle occurred worldwide.
The appellate court in Letz held that the defense had failed to
preserve the issue of the appropriateness of submitting punitive
damages issues (technically, in Missouri, "Aggravating Circum-
stances" damages) for appeal by not moving for a directed ver-
dict on that issue at the close of evidence. v However, this did
not foreclose "Plain Error Review." This standard of review re-
quired the court to view all evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
verdict.
Missouri's wrongful death statute allows the trier of fact to
consider "the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending
the death. .. -178 These aggravating circumstances damages (al-
ternatively referred to herein as punitive damages) are intended
to punish the wrongdoer. 1 9 In order to reach the jury, plaintiff
must introduce evidence of willful misconduct, wantonness,
recklessness, or indifference to the consequences on the part of
the defendant.
The court found sufficient evidence of knowledge of the dan-
ger posed by the Nozzle to warrant the award of aggravating cir-
cumstances damages. 8 ° Among the evidence adduced at trial
were reports of prior failures, "comprehensive technical papers"
177 Id. at *3-4.
1v8 Mo. RFv. STAT. § 537.090 (1994).
179 See Letz, 1997 WL 727544, at *4.
19o See id. at *6.
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circulated at the highest levels with TEC and TSA describing the
Nozzle problems, records of cracks in the Nozzle discovered by
TEC mechanics beginning in 1987, and at least ten incidents of
engine failure and loss of power prior to the fatal accident in-
volving Ms. Letz. 8' The court concluded that the plaintiff had
introduced substantial evidence of Turbomeca's knowledge of
Nozzle failures and that TSA and TEC had "manifested indiffer-
ence to or consciously disregarded the safety of others.' '1 82
Sufficient evidence, therefore, was offered by the Letzes to
show TSA and TEC's knowledge of the defective part; the dan-
ger it posed in the Arriel 1B gas turbine engine; and the wanton-
ness, recklessness, and indifference to the consequences of
selling and failing to recall a defective engine part manifested by
the companies. Manifest injustice, therefore, did not result
from submission to the jury of the issue of aggravating
circumstances. 18 3
Among the other holdings of the appellate court in Letz were
that counsel for Turbomeca had failed to preserve their due
process argument related to the punitive damages instruction to
the jury,'84 that defendant had waived its objection to the intro-
duction of a photograph of the decedent's tombstone subse-
quently withdrawn from evidence by the court, 185 that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in denying a mistrial for the
temporary introduction of this photograph,""b and that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of
cost savings to Turbomeca of not recalling the Nozzle. 8 7
The court of appeals also ruled that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in admitting into evidence faxes sent by
TSA to the FAA after the accident outlining previous Nozzle fail-
ures.' Although these facsimiles were sent to the FAA after the
accident, the court ruled that they were nonetheless relevant on
the issue of aggravating circumstances damages because they re-
lated to the conduct and knowledge of TEC prior to the acci-




184 Id. at *7.
185 Id. at *10.
186 Id. at *12.
187 Id. at *15.
188 Id. at *16.
189 See id.
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respect to Nozzle failures prior to the accident was relevant to
the plaintiff's claim for aggravating circumstances damages, the
court ruled them properly admitted.O0
However, in reviewing the lump sum award of $70 million, the
court found it to be excessive as matter of law. 9 ' A remittitur is
warranted under Missouri law when "the verdict is excessive be-
cause the amount of the verdict exceeds fair and reasonable
compensation for plaintiffs injuries and damages. ' 192
The jury had returned a $70 million lump sum verdict without
differentiating between the punitive and compensatory ele-
ments. Thus, the court had to determine appropriate levels for
both types of damages in order to determine whether the over-
all sum was excessive. After reviewing several comparable
awards and decisions, the appellate court held that the maxi-
mum sustainable compensatory award for the death of Ms. Letz
was $2.5 million. 193 Thus, $67.5 million of the jury's award was
designated as punitive in nature.
Having calculated the extent of the punitive award, the court
examined several issues relevant to the award, such as the de-
gree of the wrongful conduct, the defendant's character and af-
fluence, the age and health of the injured party, awards given in
comparable circumstances, and the superior opportunity of the
jury to appraise the damages.'94 The court in Letz had little diffi-
culty in agreeing that an award in the millions of dollars range
for punitive damages was not unreasonable. The conduct cited
by the court that warranted "a substantial punitive damages
award" against TSA and TEC included their knowledge of the
propensity for the Nozzle to fail in flight and that it had caused
accidents, their failure to warn of the danger posed by the fail-
ure and to recall the Nozzle or mandate its replacement, and
the lengthening of the overhaul period for the engine, thus ex-
tending the period of time in which the Nozzle could remain in
use. 
195
In ultimately calling for remittitur, the court appeared to have
been most swayed by the ratio of the compensatory to punitive
damages and its comparison of "similar cases." '9 The court
190 See id.
l, See id. at *20.
192 Id. at *18 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.068 (1994)).
1)9 See id. at *19.
194 See id. at *20-21.
195 Id. at *21.
196 See id. at *23.
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concluded that the award of $67.5 million was "grossly" exces-
sive. 19 7 The punitive damages were ordered remitted to $26.5
million or retried.198
Similar issues were addressed in Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme
Turbomeca France.'99 Barnett was the pilot of the helicopter. The
jury awarded the estate of Barnett $175 million in compensatory
and $175 million in punitive damages, which was later reduced
by the trial court to $25 million in compensatory and $87.5 mil-
lion in punitive damages.
As in Letz, the court first examined and upheld several eviden-
tiary rulings of the trial court200 and ultimately ordered a new
trial or remittitur on the issue of damages. For example, in one
such ruling the court held that an internal memorandum and a
French Airworthiness Directive published after the accident
were admissible. Although subsequent remedial measures are
inadmissible in a negligence case, they are admissible in Mis-
souri in a strict product liability action. Because both actions
were pleaded, the court ruled that these documents were prop-
erly admitted although a limiting instruction would have been
appropriate if requested.2 1 The court also rejected the defend-
ants' argument that it had been improper to introduce evidence
of the defendants' gross yearly sales as part of the proof of de-
fendants' net worth for purposes of assessing punitive damages.
Under Missouri law, evidence of worth or financial condition
was a relevant consideration and could, the court ruled, be
weighed by the jury.20 2
With respect to damages, both parties agreed that the eco-
nomic loss attributable to Barentt's death was approximately
$650,000. Thus, over $24.3 million of the compensatory dam-
ages award was deemed by the court to have been for non-eco-
nomic damages.20 3 After examining the family circumstances of
Barnett, the suffering of the decedent, and the losses to the five
individual plaintiffs, the appellate court reduced the compensa-
tory award to $3.5 million.
197 See id.
198 See id.
- 963 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
200 Barnett also included an instructive chart outlining the critical events and
communications relating to the Nozzle. Id. at 646-51.
201 See id. at 651-52.
202 See id. at 655.
203 See id. at 658.
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After upholding the propriety of sending the punitive dam-
ages case to the jury, the court in Barnett ruled that the amount
of punitive damages should be remitted to $26.5 million or re-
tried. 2°4 This reduction was based on an analysis similar to that
applied in LeIz. 20 5 The court then considered whether a credit
should be applied to the punitive award based upon the award
in Letz.206 The applicable statute permitted the reduction of a
punitive damages award when the defendant had already been
required to pay punitive damages in another case for the same
conduct. Counsel for Barnett argued that because the Letzjudg-
ment had not been paid, no credit was permissible under the
applicable statute. 20 7 The court noted that the credit statute did
not provide guidance in a situation involving closely spaced tri-
als and verdicts relating to the same accident simultaneously on
appeal. 20 8 While reversing the trial court's decision granting a
credit, the court compromised in keeping with the "spirit" of the
statutory credit law by ordering a remittitur of punitive damages
identical to that of Letz for a punitive award in the amount of
$26.5 million.20 9
III. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS IN WARSAW
CONVENTION CARRIAGE
A. EXCLUSMTY
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable
for death or bodily injuries suffered by passengers while on
board the aircraft or during the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking. 21° Many courts are in agree-
ment that Article 17 creates a substantive cause of action for
wrongful death or personal injuries.
However, courts are in disagreement over the question of
whether the cause of action created by Article 17 is exclusive. As
described below, both federal and state courts have entered the
fray in the past year. At the center of the dispute is the language
2)4 Id.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 667-68.
207 See Mo. Riv. STAr. § 510.263(4) (1994).
208 See Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 667.
20 See id. at 668.
210 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1998) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
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of Article 24, which provides that "any action for damages, how-
ever well-founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions
and limits set out in this Convention." 211 Depending upon
which court is addressing the issue, the above language demon-
strates the exclusivity or the non-exclusivity of the Convention's
cause of action.
The plaintiff in Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. twisted her ankle
while attempting to reach her seat at the end of an aisle aboard
the first leg of a Delta flight from the United States to Europe.21 2
Her path was blocked by the reclined seat of a passenger in the
preceding row whom she wished not to disturb (because of his
confrontation with another passenger earlier during the flight).
The plaintiff filed an action in a Texas state court alleging
only state law negligence claims against the airline. The airline
removed the action in part on the basis of federal question juris-
diction (under the Warsaw Convention) to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas. The district
court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand and granted sum-
mary judgment in Delta's favor on all claims on the ground that
Potter had failed to prove that her injury was caused by an "acci-
dent" under the terms of the Convention.213 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this
ruling, specifically holding that the incident of a rude man
blocking an aisle is not an "accident" within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention.2 14
The Fifth Circuit next concluded that Mrs. Potter could not
pursue a separate remedy under state law even though the War-
saw Convention provided her with no remedy whatsoever.1 5
The court reasoned that the primary goal of the Warsaw Con-
vention is to foster uniformity in the law governing air carrier
liability, and this goal would be frustrated were plaintiffs like
Mrs. Potter allowed to assert state law claims against carriers,
even where an "accident" under Article 17 had not taken
place.216 The dangers of allowing plaintiffs recourse to state law
included the specter of plaintiffs "forum-shop [ping] forjurisdic-
tions with friendly substantive laws on recovery of damages for
personal injury," which would clearly "undermine the Conven-
211 Id. art. 24.
212 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996).
213 See id. at 883.
214 See id. at 883-84.
215 See id. at 887.
216 See id. at 884.
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tion's goal of uniformity."2 17 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, held:
"[A]rticle 17 of the Convention creates the exclusive cause of
action and the exclusive remedy for all international transporta-
tion of persons performed by aircraft for hire," and the Court
affirmed the dismissal below of Mrs. Potter's claims.218
The plaintiff in the case of Lavandenz De Estenssoro v. American
Jet, S.A. 219 brought wrongful death and survival claims against
the airline in California state court for damages arising out of
the death of a passenger in an airplane crash near Quito, Ecua-
dor. The plaintiffs' claims fell within the scope of Article 1 of
the Convention, although they were plead exclusively under
state law. The defendants removed the action to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California on the
basis of the Warsaw Convention. The issue before that court on
plaintiff's motion to remand was the same as in Potter Does the
Warsaw Convention create an exclusive cause of action which
preempts state law claims and provides removal jurisdiction?
While noting the split of authority on this issue, the De Estenssoro
court determined that the language of Article 24(1) of the Con-
vention is "unambiguous" in allowing injured plaintiffs recourse
to state law.22" The court reasoned that the inclusion of the
words "any action, however founded," in particular, in Article 24
provides evidence that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention
intended to create a set of conditions and limitations applicable
to "all the various causes of action created by local law .... ,221
Because the court found the Warsaw Convention was not exclu-
sive and, furthermore, the plaintiffs complaint raised only state
law claims, the court remanded the case to a California state
court due to a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. How-
ever, the district court also noted that, in accordance with the
language of Article 24, the plaintiff's state law claims remained
subject to the Convention's provisions relating to limited-
liability.222
The case of Air Express International, Inc. v. Aerovias De Mexico
S.A. was also remanded back to state court after the district
court ruled the plaintiffs breach of contract and negligence
217 Id. at 886.
218 Id.
219 944 F. Supp. 813 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
220 Id. at 817.
221 Id. (citing Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 921 (2d
Cir. 1978)).
222 See De Estenssoro, 944 F. Supp. at 944.
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claims under Florida state law were not preempted by the Con-
vention.2"' The plaintiff in this case was a corporation that
brought suit in a Florida state court to recover for cargo that the
carrier allegedly lost somewhere en route from Florida to Mex-
ico. The state court held that Article 1 of the Convention cover-
ing all international transportation of baggage performed by
aircraft for hire applied.224
The airline removed the action to federal district court on the
ground that the Convention created the exclusive cause of ac-
tion for the corporation's injuries and thereby preempted the
corporation's carefully pleaded state law claims. The district
court disagreed. The district court noted that the majority of
federal judges from the Southern District of Florida had de-
cided against the Convention's exclusivity, and it followed their
decisions to conclude that the Convention caps the amount of
damages recoverable under either federal or state law but does
not prevent a plaintiff from bringing claims under state law.225
The Illinois appellate court in Koehler v. Scandinavian Airlines
Systems ruled that contract-based claims by passengers are pre-
empted by the Warsaw Convention, while noncontractual claims
are not.226 While traveling from Chicago to Germany, the
Koehlers were detained and arrested by Scandinavian Airlines in
Copenhagen, Denmark, for refusing to pay an extra fare for
bringing their pet dog aboard the flight. They sued in Illinois
state court and alleged only state law claims, including breach of
contract, false arrest, defamation, and emotional distress.
In the lower court, the parties argued over whether the Con-
vention applied and which of its provisions determined the an-
swer to this question. The Koehlers argued that a court must
first look to Article 17 to decide that question and that, since the
incident causing their injuries did not occur "on board the air-
craft or in the course of . . . embarking or disembarking" (as
described in Article 17), the Convention simply did not apply.2 2 7
The lower court rejected this argument and agreed, instead,
with the airline that the proper order of inquiries was, first,
whether the Koehlers were engaged in international transporta-
tion within the meaning of Article 1 and, if so, then whether
223 977 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 674 N.E.2d 112, 118 (Il. App. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 677 N.E.2d 966
(1997).
227 Id. at 115.
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they sued in the proper forum under Article 28. Since the
Koehlers were injured during international transportation, the
lower court held Article 1 applied. The lower court next
granted the airline's motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed all of the Koehlers' claims based on the fact that they
had brought suit in the wrong forum under Article 28.
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
lower court's decision .2 The court affirmed the grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Scandinavian Airlines on the
Koehlers' breach of contract claim because this claim fell within
the scope of, and was preempted by, Article 1 of the Convention
covering contract claims. The appellate court reversed the
grant of summary judgment on the Koehlers' remaining claims,
because those claims were "not the type of injuries the Conven-
tion was intended to cover. 229
In support of this conclusion, the appellate court quoted a
delegate from Italy during the drafting of the Convention. In
response to a suggestion that the Convention be amended to
include a provision covering a carrier's total nonperformance of
the contract of carriage, the Italian delegate is reported to have
stated that such an amendment was unnecessary because "the
injured party [in such case] has a remedy under the law of his or
her home country. '' 23°1 The appellate court, reasoned based on
the above comment, that the Koehlers similarly should be al-
lowed a remedy under their home country's laws because no
provision of the Convention covered their tort claims.23'
In Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
from that of the Potter court on the issue of exclusivity. 23 2 The
plaintiff in Tseng was subjected to a security search including a
body search by El Al after she gave unsatisfactory responses as to
why she was traveling to Israel. The search proved to be unnec-
essary. The plaintiff filed suit alleging mental anguish and emo-
tional distress.
The Second Circuit held that the district court had erred in
holding that the security search was an "accident" within the
228 See id. at 118.
22'.) Id. at 117.
2-30 Id. at 117 (quoting Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 444 (7th Cir.
1987)).
231 See Koehler, 674 N.E.2d. at 11.
2 2 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998).
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meaning of Article 17 of the Convention.233 Because El Al was
not liable to Ms. Tseng under the Convention, the next issue
was whether Ms. Tseng could bring state law claims for false im-
prisonment and assault against the airline. The Second Circuit
permitted her to do so.234
First, the court reasoned that the text and drafting history of
the Convention indicate that the Convention was not intended
to preclude state law causes of action where its provisions do not
apply.23 In addition, a ruling contrary to the one reached
would have meant "carriers [could] . . . escape liability for their
negligence-or even their intentional torts .... -236 The court
reasoned that denying plaintiffs recourse to state law in cases
where the Convention is inapplicable would have the undesir-
able effect of deterring airlines from taking measures to prevent
passenger injuries of the kind Ms. Tseng allegedly suffered.237
B. INJURIES AND EVENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
CONVENTION
Under Article 17 an air carrier is liable for passenger injuries
that are caused by an "accident" during international air trans-
portation or during the course of embarking or disembark-
ing.2 3 8 However, not all injuries or events qualify as accidents
under Article 17. The term "accident" is not defined in the
Convention, but in Air France v. Saks the United States Supreme
Court defined the term to mean "an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger. '23 9 Much
of the case law arising out of Article 17 attempts to construe and
apply the above definition.
The definition of "accident" was at issue in the case of Krys v.
Lufthansa German Airlines,24 where a passenger traveling from
Miami to Frankfurt, Germany, began to feel physically ill a few
hours into the flight. The Lufthansa crew responded by request-
ing any qualified medical personnel aboard the flight to ex-
amine the passenger. A physician did so and indicated that the
233 See id. at 103.
234 See id. at 104.
235 See id.
236 Id. at 106-07.
237 See id. at 108.
238 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, § 17.
239 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
240 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
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passenger's symptoms were "nothing to worry about. '241
Although the plane's flight-path kept it close to many airports
along the East Coast during the early hours of the ten-hour
flight, the flight crew continued the flight and did not make an
unscheduled landing based, ostensibly, on the physician's opin-
ion. The flight landed in Germany over five hours later when
the plaintiff was rushed to a hospital, and the doctors concluded
he had in fact suffered a heart attack.
The plaintiff filed suit in federal court in Florida alleging that
the crewmembers' negligence in responding to his symptoms
aggravated his medical condition. The key legal issue before the
district court was whether the events giving rise to the plaintiffs
injuries constituted an "accident" under the Convention. The
district court ruled that the events during the flight did not con-
stitute an "accident." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this ruling. 242
An important question was how to define the relevant "event"
for purposes of analyzing whether an "accident" had taken
place. Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the airline's argument that the relevant "event" was the
crewmembers' alleged negligence.243 Instead, it was concluded
that the relevant "event" was actually the airline's act of continu-
ing the flight to its scheduled destination. Described in such a
way, the "event" was in no way "unusual or unexpected" under
Saks so as to fall within the scope of the Convention. 244
Because the Convention did not apply in Krys, the case pro-
ceeded as a common-law negligence action, in which damages
were no longer limited to $75,000. The district court found the
airline acted negligently when it failed to monitor indepen-
dently and evaluate the medical condition of the passenger and
awarded compensatory damages of $1.8 million to Mr. Krys and
$600,000 to Mrs. Krys for her derivative injuries. The verdicts
were sustained on appeal. The airline argued to no avail in the
lower court that it reasonably relied upon the physician's diag-
nosis that the passenger was not in danger. While calling the
241 Id. at 1517.
242 See id. at 1522.
243 A flight crew's negligence would qualify under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in AirFrance v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985), as an "unusual or unexpected"
event that is "external to the passenger." Hence, under the airline's theory, the
Warsaw Convention would have applied and the airline would be entitled to avail
itself of the limited liability provisions of the Convention.
244 See id. at 1522.
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question a "close" one, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately found
support for the ruling from plaintiffs expert, a captain familiar
with aviation industry standards, who testified that the airline's
conduct was substandard.245
As noted above, the plaintiff in the case of Tseng v. El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. was subjected to a security search by the airline af-
ter she gave unsatisfactory responses as to why she was traveling
to Israel.246 The Second Circuit concluded that the security
search conducted by the airline was not an "accident" within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Convention. 247
First, a security search is not an "unusual or unexpected
event," and airline passengers are presumed to expect security
searches as a characteristic risk of air travel.248 In addition, se-
curity searches are part of normal airline procedures and are
mandated by many governments including the Federal Aviation
Administration. 24 9 Finally, the Second Circuit reasoned that
"[t] he Convention does not aim to derogate from the efforts of
international air carriers to prevent violence and terrorism, ef-
forts which are widely recognized and encouraged in the law."2 50
C. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
The case of Saavedra v. Korean Airlines Co. originated from the
crash of Korean Air Lines Flight KE007 over the Sea ofJapan on
September 1, 1983.21 A consolidated liability trial ordered by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation had earlier estab-
lished KAL's liability, including the airline's "willful miscon-
duct," in connection with the airplane crash.252 Once the
common liability issues were decided, the victim's relatives pur-
sued individual actions for damages in different jurisdiction.
The plaintiff in this case filed suit in federal court in Califor-
nia seeking damages under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) 253 and the Warsaw Convention for the death of multi-
245 See id. at 1537.
246 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
247 See id. at 104.
248 See id. at 103.
249 See id.
250 Id.
251 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 584 (1996).
252 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
253 Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, ch. 111, § 6, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1994).
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pie decedents in the crash. After a trial, the jury awarded consid-
erable damages including: (1) with respect to the first decedent,
$200,000 for loss of support, $150,000 for survivors' grief, and
$1,500,000 for the decedent's predeath pain and suffering; and
(2) with respect to the second decedent, $1,813,391 for loss of
support, $115,140 for past and future services and inheritance,
$526,000 for survivors' grief, $16,500 for funeral and memorial
expenses, and $100,000 for the decedent's predeath pain and
suffering. No damages were allowed for loss of society.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit accepted KAL's argument that the jury's awards for survi-
vors' grief and predeath pain and suffering-which are forms of
nonpecuniary damages-were improper in light of the Supreme
Court case of Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,254 which arose
from the same accident. In Zichermnan, the United States
Supreme Court held that damages may not be recovered di-
rectly under the Warsaw Convention and, instead, must be de-
termined by reference to the applicable domestic law.255
DOHSA was the applicable domestic law for cases arising out of
the Korean Air Lines disaster, which occurred over international
waters.
Because the damages for survivors' grief awarded by the lower
court were not recoverable directly under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, DOHSA would have to provide support for the awards.
However, by its terms, DOHSA precludes awards for nonpecu-
niary damages. Accordingly, the awards for survivors' grief were
vacated.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Saavedra decided that nonpecu-
niary damages for the decedents' predeath pain and suffering
are also prohibited under DOHSA.256 Although some courts in
the past have allowed such damages to be recovered by supple-
menting DOHSA with general maritime law, the Ninth Circuit
expressly disapproved of this practice and stated: "We . . .de-
cline Saavedra's invitation to circumvent Congressional wisdom
by allowing [predeath pain and suffering] damages that DOHSA
precludes." 257 Thus, the juries' awards for damages for predeath
pain and suffering were also vacated. The verdict in both ac-
tions was collectively reduced by approximately $2,276,000.
254 516 U.S. 217.
255 See id. at 230-31.
256 See Saavedra, 93 F.3d. at 553.
257 Id. at 554
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The case of Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. also arose from the
crash of Korean Air Lines Flight KE007 over the Sea ofJapan.258
As in Saavedra, what damages are recoverable under the Conven-
tion was at issue. The Dooley district court, granting summary
judgment in favor of the airline, ruled that, in light of Zicherman,
nonpecuniary damages in the form of predeath pain and suffer-
ing were simply not allowed in a wrongful death action under
DOHSA as brought by the plaintiffs. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this ruling.25 9
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that DOHSA can be supple-
mented by the general maritime law, which allows for the recov-
ery of predeath pain and suffering damages. As did the Ninth
Circuit in Saavedra, discussed infra, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
argument. First, the D.C. Circuit relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in the case of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,260
where the Supreme Court instructed the lower federal courts
"not to extend the general maritime law to areas in which Con-
gress has already legislated. ' 26 ' Another reason the Dooley Court
disfavored supplementing DOHSA was that the result would be
to rewrite the statute: DOHSA, by its terms, only allows the sur-
viving, dependent relatives of the decedent to recover damages,
but it is well-settled that damages for predeath pain and suffer-
ing are for the benefit of the decedent. 262 In light of the
Zicherman and Higginbotham cases, the D.C. Circuit refused to al-
ter the statutory class of beneficiaries in the manner suggested
by plaintiffs.263
In Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co.,264 the D.C. Circuit decided it
could not consider Korean Airlines' (KAL) claim that damages
for predeath pain and suffering were unavailable as a matter of
law in three KAL Flight KE007 damages cases. KAL failed to
challenge the propriety of these awards in its initial appellate
brief. However, the court considered as timely KAL's argument
that the evidence was insufficient to support the amount of the
awards in two of the cases, which totaled $300,000. The court
affirmed the award in each case based upon the evidence
presented at trial, showing that the KAL Flight KE007 passen-
258 117 F.3d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997), affd, 118 S. Ct. 1890 (1998).
259 See id. at 1485.
260 436 U.S. 618, 622-26 (1978).
261 Dooley, 117 F.3d at 1481.
262 See id. at 1482-83.
263 See id.
2-64 127 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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gers remained conscious until the plane hit the water and prob-
ably suffered all the while due in part to the effects of a rapid
decrease in cabin air pressure.
However, the D.C. Circuit vacated the awards totaling over $1
million for loss of society damages in the three cases before it. It
noted that the Supreme Court in Zicherman expressly ruled that
such damages were not available under DOHSA. 265 In addition,
the D.C. Circuit made a number of noteworthy damages rulings
in each of the three cases before it in Oldham. In the first case,
the court reversed the damages awards to the surviving relatives
after ruling that the relatives were not shown to have been finan-
cially dependent upon the decedent as required by DOHSA.266
In the second case, the court, in part, struck the award of $1.3
million for lost inheritance due to the lower court's failure to
deduct $450,000 from the calculation of the decedent's income,
which figure represented the amount of the jury's award for loss
of support, financial contributions and gifts to the three surviv-
ing children of the deceased parents. 267 The issue of the proper
amount of the award for lost inheritance was remanded to the
lower court for further consideration. In this second case, the
court also vacated awards for lost parental guidance for two chil-
dren on the ground that they were adults.268
Finally, in the third case, the court affirmed the lower court's
directed verdict, holding that the surviving spouse of the dece-
dent failed to adequately prove he suffered any damages in the
form of lost support.269 The court also affirmed the jury's award
of $63,016 for the loss of net accumulated assets to the estate of
the deceased.2 v°
The differing positions adopted by the courts in Gray v. Lock-
heed Aeronautical Systems Co. 271' has caused a split in the circuits as
to the availability of damages for predeath pain and suffering in
a DOHSA case. On June 15, 1998, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and re-
manded to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration.27 2
265 See id. at 50.
266 See id. at 50-51.
267 See id. at 54.
268 See id. at 55-56.
269 See id. at 57.
270 See id. at 58.
272 125 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1997).
272 See Lockhead Aeronautical System v. Gray, 118 S. Ct. 2317 (1998).
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The case of In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn Indiana on Oct.
31, 1994, (Roselawn V), arose from the crash of American Eagle
Flight 4184 in which all 68 passengers aboard the aircraft per-
ished.27 3 At least six of those passengers were traveling from
points outside the United States to Indiana, and thus were en-
gaged in international air transportation. The Warsaw Conven-
tion applied to the claims brought on behalf of those
passengers.
In In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on Oct. 31,
1994, (Roselawn IV), a case arising out of the same air crash
disaster, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois ruled that the applicability of the Warsaw Con-
vention would not affect the question of what law governed the
damage claims in some passengers' cases, including the numer-
ous pending claims for pre-impact pain and suffering.27 The
court noted that the Warsaw Convention had no bearing on
what law applied to these claims because the Supreme Court in
Zicherman had previously decided that courts in Warsaw cases
must apply "the law that would govern in the absence of the
Warsaw Convention" on questions related to damages.275 In
most of the cases before the Roselawn IV court, the applicable
law was held to be that of the domicile of the deceased
passengers.
In Roselawn V, the airline defendants sought to revisit the issue
raised in Roselawn V concerning whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion affected the availability of damages. 276 The airline defend-
ants argued that the case law interpreting the Warsaw
Convention prohibited any recovery for the pre-impact fear.
The district court in Roselawn V, however, declined to overrule
its prior ruling.277 The court looked in part to Eastern Airlines,
Inc., v. Floyd,278 where the Supreme Court held that carriers can-
not be liable under the Warsaw Convention to passengers who
do not suffer "death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of
injury."279 Nothing in Floyd required a denial of recovery for the
decedents' pre-impact fear and terror in the Roselawn cases,
273 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
274 948 F. Supp. 747, 752 (N.D. I1. 1996).
275 Id. (quoting Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636).
276 Roselawn V, 954 F. Supp. at 176.
277 Id.
278 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
279 Roselawn V, 954 F. Supp. at 177 (quoting /oyd, 499 U.S. at 552).
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where each of the decedents suffered the physical injury of
death.
The district court in Roselawn V also rejected the airline's ar-
gument that inequities might result from its decision to allow
pre-impact damages.28 0 The airline defendants pointed out that
inequities would result if the "happenstance of getting scratched
on the way down the evacuation slide.., enable [d] one passen-
ger to obtain a substantially greater recovery than that of an un-
scratched co-passenger who was equally terrified by the plane
crash. ''281 While noting the possibility of such inequity, the
court was ultimately swayed by the Supreme Court's statement
in Zicherman, that damages "is not an area in which the imposi-
tion of uniformity was found feasible. 282
The case of Hunt v. TACA International Airlines, Inc. 28 3 arose
when TACA Airlines Flight 110 made an emergency landing in
Mexico after one of its engines failed over the Gulf of Mexico.
Mr. Hunt, a passenger, allegedly suffered head and back injuries
while on board the flight and died months afterwards from a
brain condition known as Creutzfeld-Jakob disease. Three years
prior to this incident, Mr. Hunt had suffered post-traumatic
stress syndrome after another TACA Airlines flight on which he
was traveling crashed at Guatemala City.
Mrs. Hunt sued the airline for the wrongful death of her hus-
band, claiming that the second accident resulted from negli-
gence of a TACA airlines mechanic, who left a socket from a
socket wrench in the engine while performing repairs during a
stopover. Mrs. Hunt alleged that the airline was legally responsi-
ble for her husband's death under the following chain of events:
(1) the second accident caused Mr. Hunt to suffer physical inju-
ries to his head and back; (2) those physical injuries exacer-
bated his post-traumatic stress disorder suffered in the previous
TACA Airlines accident; (3) this trauma caused him to suffer a
brain injury; and (4) this brain injury led to the onset of the
fatal Creutzfeld-Jakob disease.284
Mrs. Hunt claimed a myriad of damages for herself and on
behalf of the decedent. The damages sought on behalf of the
decedent included past and future medical expenses, lost wages,
280 Id. at 179.
281 Id. (quotingJack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 668 (N.D.
Cal. 1994)).
2812 Roselawn V, 954 F. Supp. at 177 (quoting Zicherman, 116 S. Ct. at 636).
2113 No. 96-3064, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18370 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1997).
284 See id. at *3-4.
AVIATION LIABILITY LAW
physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of ability to en-
joy life, loss of ability to pursue happiness, fear of flying, and
emotional disturbance. For her own damages, she claimed loss
of Mr. Hunt's society, loss of his consortium, and loss of his
services.
The airline first countered that Mrs. Hunt's claims were pre-
empted by the Convention. On this point, the district court
agreed and cited the precedent of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Potter v. Delta Airlines.28 Because the Warsaw Conven-
tion applied, the airline next argued that, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd,286 Mrs. Hunt was pre-
cluded from recovering damages for purely psychological inju-
ries suffered by Mr. Hunt.
However, the district court was not convinced that the airline
was entitled to summary judgment on this issue because Mr.
Hunt did not suffer "purely psychological injuries," which
clearly would have been precluded under Floyd, but, rather, Mrs.
Hunt claimed that Mr. Hunt first suffered physical injuries dur-
ing the flight which, in turn, led to his mental trauma.287 Under
this particular chain of events, the Floyd decision did not pre-
clude a recovery for any mental injuries Mr. Hunt may have
suffered.
Finally, the court in Hunt dismissed Mrs. Hunt's punitive dam-
ages claim on the ground that such damages are not recoverable
under the Warsaw Convention. 288
D. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
Certainly among the most publicized aviation cases of the year
(at least as of this submission) was the September 11 decision of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida in In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on December 20,
1995.289 In that decision, authored by District Judge Stanley
Marcus, the court kept the issue of willful misconduct from the
jury and ruled that the evidence garnered by plaintiffs in pre-
trial discovery proved plaintiffs were entitled to summary judg-
ment on this issue as a matter of law. In the words of the court,
"[s] imply put, no reasonable jury could find that the acts of the
285 See id. at *6.
286 449 U.S. 530 (1991).
287 See Hunt, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18370, at *8-9.
288 Id. at *9-10.
289 985 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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pilots of Flight 965-and in particular the pilots' decision to
continue their descent at night from a grievously off course posi-
tion in mountainous terrain-amounted to anything less than
willful misconduct." 29" The court continued, "even giving the
Defendant every benefit of the doubt, and drawing every reason-
able inference in its favor, the record cannot fairly be read to
support any other result. 29'
On December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965, a Boe-
ing 757 en route to Cali, collided with terrain while off course
on its approach to Bonilla Aragon Airport, Cali, Colombia. One
hundred fifty-one passengers died in the accident along with the
six-person cabin crew and the two pilots. Four passengers sur-
vived. The principal acts of the flight crew alleged to constitute
willful misconduct were:
1) The pilots' alleged violation of American Airlines' policy
and federal aviation regulations by continuing the descent of
the aircraft when the plane was known to be off course;
2) The pilots' alleged attempts to deviate from their flight
plan to fly a shorter approach into Cali in violation of American
Airlines' policy;
3) The pilots' alleged failure to identify a navigational way-
point before entering it into the flight management computer;
and
4) The pilots' alleged failure to follow ATC instructions.
American Airlines did not seriously contest that the pilots had
made mistakes, but argued that the mistakes made did not rise
to the level of willful misconduct. Further, even if negligent,
the pilots acts were superseded by the negligent acts of Honey-
well, the manufacturer of the flight management computer
(FMC), and Jeppesen-Sandersen, the producer of the naviga-
tional database used in conjunction with the flight management
computer.
A critical issue in the analysis of the conduct of the cockpit
crew was their interface with the FMC. The Boeing 757 that was
operated as Flight 965 is commonly referred to as a "glass cock-
pit" aircraft. In other words, many of the traditional analog
flight instruments have been replaced by computerized controls
and digitized flight displays. Not only is the display of the instru-
ments different, but information received from various naviga-
tional aids can be interpreted by the FMC and displayed on the
1M9 Id. at 1109.
291 Id.
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electronic horizontal situation indictor (EHSI), which provides
a graphical representation of the aircraft's position. In "L-NAV"
mode, the pilots can simply program in a particular approach or
arrival route, and the aircraft will automatically fly hands-off. In
an alternative mode, the FMC and EHSI can be used as visual
guides for the pilots' manual operation of the aircraft. Ameri-
can Airlines Flight 965 was originally scheduled to land on Run-
way 1 at Cali Airport but was later routed to Runway 19. Cali
Airport lies in a valley approximately forty-three miles long and
twelve miles wide surrounded by mountains. The approaches to
Runways 1 and 19 are designed to keep the aircraft in the center
of the valley and away from mountainous terrain.
Some of the most critical pieces of evidence offered by the
plaintiffs in proving their claim of willful misconduct were
American Airlines' own internal operating procedures and
training materials. American Airlines provided extensive gui-
dance and admonitions to pilots operating in South America.
Among the more critical internal regulations were those cau-
tioning pilots in South America not to rely upon ATC to route
the aircraft safely around dangerous mountainous terrain.
American Airlines' South American operating guidelines
stressed the criticality of maintaining situational awareness and
always knowing the position of the aircraft in this geographic
area. Other guidelines provided by American's Pilot Reference
Guide for Latin America addressed the importance of verifying
position utilizing all available means, including the direct "raw"
data from navigational aids and cross-checking with en route
charts and approach plates. Specifically, pilots in Latin America
were required to "cross-check every available indication and
know where you are before you accept a descent."292
Another specific rule (Rule #1) promulgated by American
Airlines prior to the accident required that pilots take responsi-
bility for the safety of the aircraft, even when coordinating and
communicating with Latin American air traffic controllers. The
elaborating text of this rule advised pilots that controllers in
Latin America perform more of an advisory function than those
in the United States and cannot be relied upon to assure ade-
quate clearance from terrain. For example, pursuant to Rule #1
even if given a direct clearance from ATC, crews were instructed
to reject this clearance unless they were operating in visual flight
-2 Id. at 1113 (citation omitted).
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rules, "and the sun is shining. ''293 Absent these conditions, pur-
suant to Rule #2, American crews were required to insist upon
completing only published approaches and departures into
Latin American airports. American Airlines Rule #3 prohibited
pilots in Latin America from descending unless they knew the
exact position of the aircraft and the safe minimum altitude for
their geographic location.
The preceding "rules" and other internal operating proce-
dures of American Airlines provided the backdrop for the
court's finding of willful misconduct because it was the continu-
ation of the flight in apparent violation of these procedures that
formed the primary basis for the ultimate ruling of the court.294
The critical conduct of the flight crew that was ultimately held
to constitute willful misconduct was the alleged decision of the
crew to continue their descent below 15,000 feet while they were
held to have known the aircraft to be off course and not on the
published approach route.295
Four "waypoints" were critical to the approach of Flight 965
into Cali Airport: the northernmost navaid, the Tulua VOR
(Identifier ULQ); a fix known as D21 CLO; an NDB beacon
known as a Rozo; and the Cali VOR (Identifier CLO). The Cali
VOR is the closest of these navaids, located nine miles south of
the airport. Tulua is the furthest, located approximately forty-
three miles to the north of Cali VOR. The Rozo NDB is located
approximately twelve miles to the north of the Cali VOR.
The approach route established by ATC for Flight 965 is
known as the Rozo 1 STAR (Standard Terminal Arrival Route)
and VOR DME approach to Runway 19. The Rozo 1 STAR be-
gins at the Tulua VOR, ending at the Rozo NDB. The VOR
DME approach to landing essentially extends and compliments
the Rozo 1 STAR.
The first miscommunication that set into motion the events
leading to the accident occurred when the crew of Flight 965
sought permission to fly directly to the Rozo NDB, bypassing the
Tulua VOR that marks the beginning of the Rozo 1 STAR ap-
proach. The Colombian air traffic controller cleared the air-
293 Id. at 1114.
294 The court did make note of several other facts that were potentially negli-
gent that also could, in combination, rise to the level of willful misconduct. How-
ever, constrained by the summary judgment standard, the court limited its
analysis to the issues over which reasonable minds could not differ as to the reck-
lessness, or willful misconduct, of the airline. See id. at 1144-45.
295 See id. at 1145.
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craft direct to Rozo; however, it was disputed whether "direct" in
the parlance of Colombian ATC meant an uninterrupted course
to Rozo or a course via the published approach, which would
have required the aircraft to first overfly Tulua. In any event,
the crew of Flight 965 assumed that they had been given permis-
sion to fly direct to Rozo and attempted to program the flight
management computer to accomplish this task. Unfortunately,
upon entering the designator "R," the crew inadvertently en-
tered into the computer a beacon known as a Romeo, located
132 miles to the northeast of the aircraft in the vicinity of Bo-
gota. Upon entering this identifier, the FMC commanded the
aircraft to turn to the left toward the east and mountainous ter-
rain. The valley for the approach to Cali is oriented in a north/
south direction. Apparently, it was undisputed that the flight
crew failed to verify that the correct waypoint had been entered
in the FMC. Eventually, the crew manually tuned the Rozo NDB
on another navaid and then attempted to fly to the Tulua VOR,
consistent with the published approach.
The aircraft descended approximately 5000 feet from the
time of the initial incorrect designation of Romeo to the crew's
decision to fly to Tulua. The crew then considered flying di-
rectly to the Cali VOR but never entered this command into the
FMC. At this point, the aircraft was correcting for the initial
incorrect left turn to Romeo and was proceeding west, back to-
ward the valley approach to the runway. The position of the
aircraft at this time was approximately thirty-eight miles north of
Cali at an altitude of 10,000 feet. The crew had difficulty recon-
ciling their position with the bearing to Tulua VOR indicated on
their instruments. The crew then abandoned its efforts to ap-
proach Tulua and altered course direct to Rozo, apparently in
response to what they interpreted to be an ATC authorization to
do so. ATC later instructed the aircraft to "report at five thou-
sand on a final to One One, Runway One Niner. '' 29 6 The crew
apparently interpreted this as authorization to descend to 5000
feet. While continuing their descent, and still ten miles east of
the approach airway to Runway 19, the aircraft impacted near
the summit of El Deluvio, a mountain peak on the east side of
the valley. The pilots had continued their descent until an auto-
matic warning sounded from the ground proximity warning sys-
tem. Although the plaintiffs alleged that numerous actions on
the part of the flight crew either standing alone or cumulatively
296 See id. at 1121.
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amounted to willful misconduct, the focus of the court's deci-
sion was the decision of the flight crew to continue the descent
of the aircraft despite the fact that they had allegedly lost situa-
tional awareness and were not certain of the precise position of
the aircraft.9 v Thus, even accepting American Airlines' argu-
ment that air traffic control had authorized a descent to 5000
feet, the court ruled that the crew was required to reject this
authorization unless they were certain of their aircraft's position
on the published approach route.298
A threshold issue for the court in Cali was the appropriateness
of a grant of summary judgment under the circumstances. The
court noted that it was not aware of a single case in which sum-
mary judgment had been granted in favor of a plaintiff finding
willful misconduct as a matter of law. 299 After the usual refer-
ences to the appropriate summary judgment standard 00
notwithstanding the absence of any precedent for such a ruling,
the court nonetheless determined that any case subject to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, be adjudicated upon a summary judgment mo-
tion O' The court rejected the notion that "if no reasonable
juror could disagree that a defendant's employees engaged in
willful misconduct, a plaintiff nevertheless must be compelled to
take his claim to trial. ' 0 2
Some courts have held that proof of willful misconduct re-
quires a determination as to the state of mind of the defendant.
As such, these issues should, arguably, be left to the trier of
fact.3 0 3 What made the Cali case "unique," according to the
court, was not only the pervasiveness of the pilots' misconduct,
but what it characterized as express admissions by American Air-
lines relating to this misconduct.3 0 4 The standard for willful mis-
conduct in the Eleventh Circuit was established by Butler v.
Aeromexico. 305 Under the test established in Butler, a party may
prove willful misconduct by establishing the intentional per-
297 See id. at 1129.
298 See id. at 1134.
2'9 See id. at 1123.
300 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
301 See Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1123.
302 Id.
303 See In re Hijacking of Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi Int'l
Airport, Pakistan on Sept. 5, 1986, 713 F. Supp. 1483, 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
404 Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1124.
305 774 F.2d 429 (l1th Cir. 1985).
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formance of an act with either (1) knowledge that the act will
probably result in injury or damage, (2) reckless disregard of
the consequences of the act, or (3) a deliberate purpose not to
be discharged from a duty related to safety.30 6
The court in Cali noted that the so-called objective and sub-
jective tests relating to willful misconduct were, in fact, inextrica-
bly interwoven because even a "subjective" state of mind could
be established by objective circumstantial evidence. 7 Circum-
stantial evidence of a subjective state of mind, the court noted,
did not differ materially from objective proof of willful miscon-
duct.30 8 According to the court, even the subjective standard ad-
vocated by American Airlines and adopted by the D.C. Circuit in
Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France3°9 nonetheless permitted
proof of the "subjective" state of mind of an actor by circumstan-
tial evidence. 310
Ultimately, the court's decision regarding whether to conduct
an objective or subjective analysis of reckless disregard hinged
upon an interpretation of the three Butler factors noted
above.311 Because, according to the court, imposing a subjective
requirement on element two would effectively render element
one superfluous, this element had to be analyzed under an ob-
jective standard. 12 The court in Cali also noted, among other
things, the practical difficulties of proving a subjective state of
mind in instances of pilot error where the responsible pilots
have perished.3 13 Accordingly, the court held that a plaintiff
may prove willful misconduct under the reckless disregard stan-
dard by proving that "the defendant's conduct amounted to an
extreme deviation from the standard of care under circum-
stances where the danger of likely harm was plain and obvious,
even if the defendant's employees (because they deliberately
blinded themselves, deluded themselves, or simply 'fell asleep') -
never fully apprehended the danger created by their con-
duct." 14 Apparently, wanting to cover all the bases, the court
306 Id. at 430 (citing Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. v. Tuller, 292
F.2d 775, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
307 Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
308 See id. at 1126.
309 78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
310 See Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1129.
311 See id. at 1131.
312 See id. at 1132.
313 Id. at 1129.
314 Id.
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noted that even under a subjective standard, summary judgment
on the issue of willful misconduct was appropriate. 5
The court focused its factual analysis on the actions of Flight
965's crew relating to their decision to continue descending
notwithstanding the off course position of the aircraft. Accord-
ing to the court, "no other act so convincingly, and so
powerfully, supports the entry of summary judgment."3 6
According to American Airlines' flight manual and Federal
Aviation regulations, an aircraft on an instrument approach may
not descend below its last assigned altitude until established on
a published approach. In addition, American Airlines proce-
dures for Latin America prohibited an aircraft from descending,
even with ATC authorization, when the crew is not aware of the
geographic position of the aircraft.
First applying an "objective" standard of recklessness, the
court held that it was undisputed that American Airlines' policy
forbids pilots from continuing a descent if they are off a pub-
lished arrival route or unsure of their location.3 1 7 "No reason-
able jury could conclude that the pilots of Flight 965 complied
with either of these rules."313 A disputed portion of the CVR
transcript clearly suggests that air traffic control affirmatively
cleared Flight 965 to 5000 feet, and American Airlines argued
that this justified the continued descent of the aircraft. How-
ever, notwithstanding heated contention of this issue, the court
ultimately relegated this argument to irrelevancy by concluding
that regardless of the authorization from air traffic control, the
pilots of Flight 965 had an affirmative duty to reject any such
authorization when they knew themselves to be off course." 9
According to the court, Flight 965 continued to descend from
17,000 feet to almost 8000 feet from the initial incorrect "Ro-
meo" designation to ultimate impact, never abating this de-
scent.3 20 "There is simply no basis to describe this choice as a
minimal departure from the standard of care embodied in
American Airlines policy and the FAR's. It was an act of griev-




3 17 See id. at 1132.
318 Id.




Addressing the "critical" question of whether the flight crew
was aware of the danger of descending under their circum-
stances, the Cali court reviewed extensive flight data and re-
corded cockpit conversation and concluded that the flight crew
had numerous indicators in the cockpit that they were off
course. In addition, a comparison of the heading of the aircraft
after the incorrect designation of "Romeo" to those designated
on the published approach would also have confirmed the air-
craft to be off course. These indicators, combined with Ameri-
can Airlines' procedures relating to flight operations and,
particularly, operations in Latin America, led the court to con-
clude that the pilots, objectively, must have known of the preca-
rious predicament of being off course under the circumstances.
On the issue of objective recklessness, the court held:
In short, given the substantial number of clues indicating that
flight 965 was off course and well to the east of the airway, there
is simply nothing for a jury to decide on the issue of objective
recklessness. On this record, no reasonable juror could con-
clude that the pilots did not commit prolonged and extreme vio-
lations of multiple standards of care in the face of plain and
obvious dangers associated with landing amid rugged mountain-
ous terrain at the Cali airport. The flight plan, the charts ex-
amined by the pilots, the EHSI map and the instruments in the
cockpit made it altogether obvious that, once the left turn began,
the aircraft was no longer on the published route, and had not
yet rejoined the route for the duration of the flight. The plane's
continued descent under these circumstances, at night, amid
high terrain that the pilots knew posed potentially grave danger
to incoming aircraft that drifted out of the valley, was reckless as
a matter of law.322
Notwithstanding the objective standard held applicable to
Eleventh Circuit determinations of willful misconduct, the court
also examined the "recklessness" of the pilots from a subjective
perspective. In brief, the court imputed to the pilots knowledge
of American Airlines' various procedures and precautions re-
lated to instrument approaches in Latin America and notice of
the various cockpit indications that would have shown that the
aircraft was off course throughout the continued descent.3 23
The court held: "No reasonable juror, even drawing all infer-
ences in favor of the Defendant, could accept the proposition
that the pilots never apprehended that the aircraft was pro-
322 Id. at 1138.
323 See id.
1998]
JOURNAL OF AR LAW AND COMMERCE
foundly off course while they knowingly and intentionally
elected to continue the descent. '32' The court placed extensive
reliance on a series of communications between the pilot, co-
pilot, and air traffic control that occurred between 21:38:54 and
21:40:56 on the CVR transcript. During this exchange, the crew
was apparently engaged in an effort to place the aircraft back on
the published approach. Reading this portion of the CVR tran-
script as a whole, the court concluded that no reasonable juror
could disagree that the flight crew knew not only that they were
off course, but "did not even know precisely where they were in
the sky." 12 5 Concluding its "subjective" analysis, the court held:
The critical, and ultimately fatal, error by the pilots of Flight 965
was their deliberate decision to continue to descend as they un-
dertook the task of restoring the aircraft to the published route.
And the test for subjective recklessness does not require proof
that the pilots intended to kill themselves or the passengers; it
simply requires a showing that the pilots recognized that their
intentional acts created a significant risk of harm.32 6
The court continued in its ultimate holding:
To summarize, no reasonable juror, presented with the record
before this Court, could find that the pilots' decision to continue
the aircraft's descent despite being significantly off course, at
night, in an area known for dangerous terrain, did not constitute
the intentional performance of an act "'with knowledge that
the ... act would probably result in injury or damage"' or an act
performed in "'reckless disregard of the consequences,"' as we
construe that phrase. The facts and inferences suggested by the
Defendant simply lack the measure of persuasiveness that might
permit a jury to enter a verdict for American Airlines, at [... ]
least with respect to this crucial issue. As a result, the Plaintiffs
are entitled to a determination that the pilots of Flight 965
demonstrated "willful misconduct" as that standard has been in-
terpreted by the binding precedent of this Circuit. 2 7
The court in Cali then reviewed American Airlines' arguments
relating to proximate cause. 328 American argued that the con-
duct of third parties, Jeppesen, Honeywell, or Colombian Air
324 Id. In supporting this conclusion, the district court pointed to various state-
ments made by American Airlines' witnesses and counsel in which, in the court's
view, it was conceded that descending off course, at night, in the Cali area, was a
willful and reckless act. See id. at 1138-42.
325 Id. at 1142.
326 Id. at 1143.
327 Id. at 1143-44.
328 See id. at 1150-51.
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Traffic Control constituted the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent, or, alternatively, an intervening superseding cause.
Although the court recognized that these defendants could have
contributed to the accident and that their conduct may consti-
tute additional proximate causes of the accident, it rejected
American's contention that the conduct of any of these entities
could have superseded the decision of the American Airlines'
crew to continue its descent while off course 9.3 2  Accordingly,
American was held unable to establish that any of the third par-
ties' conduct wholly superseded the "willful misconduct of the
pilots." 330
The last portion of the Cali decision addresses the liability
claims of the aircraft's cabin crew. The Warsaw Convention did
not apply to these claims. Accordingly, and not surprisingly, the
court concluded that American Airlines was liable to this class of
plaintiffs under a lesser negligence standard.3
The Ninth Circuit examined the issue of willful misconduct in
Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l, Ltd.3 32 Koirala concerned Thai Air-
ways International Flight TG-31 1, which crashed into a moun-
tainside while attempting to land at the airport in Kathmandu,
Nepal, causing the death of all 113 passengers. The Kathmandu
airport has the reputation of being one of the most difficult air-
ports in the world at which to land because it is surrounded by
mountains, and the air traffic controllers there have no radar.
The weather was poor on the night of the crash. When the crew
attempted to configure the plane for landing, they discovered
that the wing flaps did not extend properly, rendering a landing
too dangerous to attempt. The wing flaps later extended prop-
erly but by that time the plane was too far north and too high to
begin a descent toward the runway. The crew then made a re-
quest for clearance to turn left and fly to "Romeo Point," a navi-
gational position located approximately forty miles south of the
airport, from which a landing approach could be attempted.
The request was repeated numerous times but ignored by air
traffic controllers.
32 See id. at 1150.
330 Id.
331 The court held that Worker's Compensation was not a bar to the claims
because American had apparently not paid compensation death benefits to the
families of the cabin crew, which, under Florida law, the plaintiffs alleged, consti-
tuted a waiver of the employer's immunity from a common law suit. See id. at
1151.
332 126 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1997).
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A few minutes later, ATC authorized the aircraft six separate
times over the course of approximately seven minutes to head to
Romeo Point to attempt a landing approach. Instead of turning
180 degrees, the crew unknowingly turned the aircraft full circle
and continued heading north toward the mountains surround-
ing the airport. Despite the fact that all the navigational instru-
ments indicated the aircraft was heading north, the crew
continued to believe the plane was heading south toward Ro-
meo Point. Minutes later, the plane crashed into a mountain.
Wrongful death suits under the Warsaw Convention were
filed in California federal district court by the relatives of the
Flight TG-311 passengers. The district court applied United
States law33 3 to find that the Flight TG-311 crew had engaged in
"willful misconduct" in failing to monitor their navigational in-
struments which displayed a northerly course for six minutes
before impact.3 ' Applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review, 331 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.
33 6
Under the Ninth Circuit's formulation, "willful misconduct"
means, in part, a flight crew "intentional [ly] perform[ed] an
act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the prob-
able consequences."13 ' Here, although no evidence was
presented on the question of whether the flight crew did or did
not look at their instruments, the court of appeals determined
that the district court could have found from the evidence that
"frequently checking navigational instruments to verify heading
[was] a task so fundamental to basic flying safety, [that] the
sheer fact the crew for nearly six minutes did not realize they
were flying in the wrong direction indicates they must have ig-
33 Although the parties contested the application of United States maritime
law in the district court, they agreed on appeal that United States law applied.
Therefore, the court of appeals declined to review sua sponte the district court's
choice-of-law ruling, but the court did note that the Supreme Court's decision in
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996), which came down after
the district court's decision, may have affected the soundness of the district
court's choice-of-law analysis. See Koirala, 126 F.3d at 1208.
3.54 See Koirala, 126 F.3d at 1208.
335 The first question answered on appeal was the standard that applied to the
Court of Appeals's review of the lower court's willful misconduct finding. The
Court of Appeals held the clearly erroneous standard, not de novo review, applied
because it determined a finding of willful misconduct must inevitably be based
upon factual assessments of evidence, which trial courts are clearly in a better
position to make than appellate courts. See id. at 1210.
.3-% See id. at 1212.
337 Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1987) (cita-
tions omitted).
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nored this duty," thus implying their reckless disregard. 3 8 The
plaintiffs' expert, a captain, testified at trial that ignoring instru-
ments for over six minutes was "almost incomprehensible."339
His testimony further supported the determination that the
crew acted with reckless disregard. 40
However, numerous plaintiffs' claims were dismissed in
Koirala because the plaintiffs were not dependents of the dece-
dents, as required for recovery under the applicable United
States maritime law. The lower court permitted the estates of
the decedents who had no surviving beneficiaries to amend
their complaints to seek damages for lost future earnings of the
decedent, in accordance with United States maritime law. The
ninth circuit affirmed. 4'
Tavarez v. American Airlines, Inc. 342 concerned consolidated
cases arising from the recent evacuation of American Airlines
Flight 587 at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York on February
20, 1996. After boarding the flight, which was bound for the
Dominican Republic, the passengers were quickly evacuated
through emergency exits and down chutes to escape thick
smoke. Numerous passengers filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming they
were injured during the incident and that their injuries were
caused by the airline's willful misconduct in failing to provide
evacuation instructions in Spanish to the passengers of the
plane, the majority of whom were native Spanish-speakers.
Under the case law of the Second Circuit, "willful miscon-
duct" is determined by the totality of the circumstances.343 The
district court in this case ruled that willful misconduct was not
proven by the plaintiffs under the totality of the circum-
stances.344 First, minutes before the incident, the crew showed
passengers a safety video wholly in Spanish. Furthermore, at
least two flight attendants on board the aircraft spoke Spanish.
Although one flight attendant testified at his deposition that he
could not recall whether he gave instructions in Spanish during
338 Koirala, 126 F.3d at 1211.
339 Id. at 1211.
340 See id.
341 See id. at 1209, 1214.
342 No. 96 Civ. 2151 (JSR), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
1997).
343 See id. at *1-2 (citing In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988,
37 F.3d 804, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995)).
344 See id. at *4.
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the evacuation, he also stated that he commanded passengers
using body language, which was understood by all, for some of
the time during the evacuation. Under these circumstances,
and given the fact that numerous plaintiffs failed to show a
causal relationship between their injuries and the evacuation,
the court granted the airline's motion for partial summary judg-
ment limiting each passenger's recovery to a maximum of
$75,000 under the Convention.
E. CARGO AND BAGGAGE
Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable
for loss of, or damage to, checked baggage or any goods if the
occurrence which caused the damage took place during interna-
tional transportation by air.346 Just as the Convention estab-
lishes a limit on the amount of a carrier's liability for personal
injuries and death, Article 22 sets a per pound limit on the
amount of a carrier's liability for losses, damages, or delay of
baggage or goods. However, in order to avail itself of this limita-
tion, the carrier must comply with certain notice and other re-
quirements set forth principally in Articles 8 and 9. The cases
below describe the nature of these requirements and the effect
if the carrier fails to comply with them.
In the case of Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. United Air
Lines, Inc. the plaintiff was the insurer of two international ship-
ments of watches being transported by United Air Lines. 347 It
was alleged that nine cartons were missing. These cartons later
showed up at the home of a United Air Lines employee. Plain-
tiff filed suit under the Convention and state law. In one of its
affirmative defenses, United Air Lines alleged that its liability
was limited by the Convention. The airline moved for summary
adjudication on this affirmative defense.3"'
The plaintiff argued that the carrier was not entitled to avail
itself of the limited liability provisions of the Convention be-
cause it failed to comply with the requirements of Articles 8 and
9. Article 9 provides that an air carrier is not entitled to avail
itself of the Convention's limited liability provisions if the air
waybill does not comply with the notice requirements of Article
445 See id. at *5.
346 Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 18.
'47 933 F. Supp. 1527 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
-34S See id. at 1529.
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8.31 9 Under Article 8, the air waybill must state, among other
things, the applicability of the Warsaw Convention.5 In this
case, the federal district court held that Article 8's notice re-
quirements were satisfied because the front of the air waybill:
(1) notified plaintiff that the carrier's liability might be limited,
and (2) expressly incorporated the conditions on the reverse
side providing further details regarding the carrier's limited lia-
bility under the Convention.3 5 1 The plaintiffs other arguments
in the case were dismissed without merit, and United Air Lines'
motion for summary adjudication on its affirmative defense was
granted by the court. 52
In the case of General Electric Co. v. Circle Air Freight Corp.,3 53
General Electric (GE) contracted with Circle Air Freight Corp.
(CAC), a freight forwarder, to transport a shipment to England.
CAC in turn contracted with Air France to act as the direct car-
rier. When the shipment arrived damaged, GE filed suit seeking
damages from the direct carrier, Air France, and from the indi-
rect carrier, CAC. GE attempted to argue that CAC could not
avail itself of the limited liability provisions of the Convention
because the CAC air waybill violated Article 8 by listing only
CAC's address. Article 8 requires the waybill to state, among
other things, the name and address of the "first carrier."3 54 GE
argued that Air France, not CAC, was the first carrier and since
Air France's address was not listed on the waybill, the waybill was
thereby defective. The federal district court rejected this argu-
ment after noting that CAC was chronologically the first carrier
with whom a contract for the shipment of the goods was
made.
GE also argued that the agreed stopping place for the goods
was Paris, France, and that this layover was omitted from the
CAC air waybill, rendering the bill defective. The court rejected
this argument because the CAC air waybill incorporated by ref-
erence the Air France waybill, which in turn provided sufficient
notice of the stopover in Paris, France. 56
349 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 9.
350 See id. art. 8.
351 See Tokio, 933 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
352 See id. at 1535.
353 No. 92 Civ. 6333 (KMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3245 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,
1997).
354 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 8.
355 See Circle Air Freight, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3245, at *10-13.
356 See id. at *14-17.
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Finally, GE contended that CAC could not avail itself of the
Convention's limited liability provisions because CAC techni-
cally accepted the shipment prior to issuing a waybill in violation
of Article 9. In reality, CAC issued a waybill the morning after
GE handed over the shipment to CAC. Considering the pur-
pose of Article 9 and viewing other provisions of the Convention
and the Convention as a whole, the court did not read the lan-
guage of Article 9 so literally as to require that the waybill be
executed instantaneous [ly] at the time the shipment is handed
over to the carrier. 5 Among other reasons, the court indicated
that such a reading of the Convention would place "commer-
cially unfeasible restrictions on the behavior of shippers and car-
riers that ... neither would desire.
In the case of Feeney v. America West Airlines, the plaintiffs
purchased round-trip tickets for travel from Cabo San Lucas,
Mexico to Denver, Colorado, with a stopover in Phoenix, Ari-
zona.3 59 Aero California transported them to and from Cabo
San Lucas and Phoenix, while America West Airlines trans-
ported them to and from Phoenix and Denver. On the return
trip, the plaintiffs checked seven pieces of luggage with Aero
California, and received seven baggage claim checks listing Den-
ver as their final destination and also listing their connecting
flights with America West. When they arrived in Denver, the
plaintiffs received only six of the seven pieces of baggage.
After receiving $640 from America West for the lost baggage,
representing the carrier's maximum liability under the Conven-
tion, the plaintiffs filed suit in Colorado state court against
America West and sought over $5000 in damages. They argued
that they received improper notice regarding the carrier's lim-
ited liability, and therefore the Convention did not apply or
limit their claims. The appellate court, however, affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the notice requirement contained in Ar-
ticle 4 of the Convention was satisfied by language on the plain-
tiffs' tickets stating that the Convention may be applicable. 360
The plaintiffs next argued that America West was not entitled
to avail itself of the Convention's limitation on liability because
America West did not actually check their baggage. This argu-
ment was rejected by the appellate court, which affirmed the
357 See id. at *21.
3 See id. at *22.
359 948 P.2d 110 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
361 See id. at 111-13.
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trial court's ruling that America West was deemed to have
checked the plaintiffs' baggage by virtue of the fact that Aero
California actually checked the baggage, and the transportation
performed by America West and Aero California was "undi-
vided" for purposes of the Convention.36'
F. LIMITATIONS OF ACTION
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention provides for a two-year
statute of limitations for damages actions.36 2 Compliance with
this statute of limitations is generally a condition precedent to
filing suit under the Convention. Whether the Convention's
two-year statute of limitations should be tolled in accordance
with local procedures is the frequent subject of litigation in fed-
eral courts, as described in the cases below.
The plaintiff in New Pentax Film, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. was a film company that checked as baggage a motion pic-
ture that was to be shown at an upcoming film festival.363 The
film was temporarily lost en route from Italy to the United States
and arrived too late to be shown at the festival.
Shortly thereafter, the airline filed a petition for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The filing of
the petition imposed an automatic stay barring all debt collec-
tion efforts against the airline. Due to the airline's failure to
inform the film company of its bankruptcy, the film company
missed the deadline for filing a proof of claim with the bank-
ruptcy court. However, the airline entered into a stipulation
with the film company to lift the automatic stay and thereby pro-
vide the film company with the means to assert a claim for dam-
ages in connection with the delay in transporting the film. The
parties' stipulation was approved by the district court on Decem-
ber 17, 1993.364 On the same day, the plaintiff filed a complaint
seeking damages from the carrier for the temporary loss of the
film.
The carrier asserted numerous defenses in its answer, includ-
ing one that the plaintiffs action was time-barred by the Warsaw
Convention. Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention requires a
party to commence an action for damages within two years after
361 See id. at 113-14.
362 Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 29.
363 936 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
364 See id. at 145.
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the date on which the goods should have arrived. "65 In this case,
the film company's complaint was filed more than two years af-
ter the film was to be delivered. On the film company's motion
seeking summary judgment on the carrier's defense, the issue
before the court was whether the statute of limitations under the
Convention was tolled for the period during which the bank-
ruptcy stay was in effect, barring the film company from suing.
The court relied upon a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
that specifically addressed the issue at hand. This provision ex-
tends filing deadlines if they expire on a date during which an
automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code is in effect.366 Be-
cause the film company's deadline for filing suit under the Con-
vention expired on such a date, the court held that the
bankruptcy provision applied and that suit was timely com-
menced under the Convention because suit was filed immedi-
ately after the stay was lifted pursuant to the parties'
stipulation .367
The court rejected the airline's argument that the bankruptcy
provision was "inconsistent" with and therefore preempted by
the Warsaw Convention. The court noted that the bankruptcy
provision, a federal statute, and the Warsaw Convention, a fed-
eral treaty, were on "equal footing.3 6  Under the applicable
"last in time" rule, it was the bankruptcy provision (which was
enacted forty years after the Convention) that must prevail. 69
In addition, the airline's challenge of the adequacy of the plain-
tiffs written notice of damages was rejected by the court, while
the issue of whether the airline complied with the notice re-
quirements of Article 4 (so as to allow the airline to rely on the
Convention's limitation on liability) was deemed ill-suited for
resolution on the plaintiffs summary judgment motion. 7 °
In the case of Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a minor child
traveling aboard a Delta flight was burned when a flight attend-
ant placed a hot cloth, cup, and water near the child's ear.Y
The child's mother brought suit individually and on her daugh-
ter's behalf. The federal district court first held that plaintiffs'
365 Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 29.
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1994).
367 See TWA, 936 F. Supp. at 148.
368 See id. at 147.
369 See id.
370 See id. at 149-51.
371 938 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
AVIATION LIABILITY LAW
negligence claims were preempted by the Convention.372 The
next issue was whether the two-year statute of limitations in Arti-
cle 29 barred the suit, which was brought more than two years
after the incident aboard the aircraft.
The plaintiffs argued that, in accordance with New York state
law, the statute of limitations period under the Convention
should be tolled for the period during which the child was an
infant.3 73 The court noted that this argument applied only to
the minor's claims, not the mother's. The argument was rooted
in Article 29(2) of the Convention, which states: "The method
of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by
the law of the court to which the case is submitted. 3 74
Upon examining the legislative history of the Convention, the
court found it was the desire of the delegates to "remove ...
[Warsaw actions] from the uncertainty which would attach were
they to be subjected to the various tolling provisions of the laws
of the member states."375 The court concluded that the lan-
guage in Article 29(2) cited by plaintiffs was designed to allow
forum courts to apply local law simply to determine when an
action under the Convention was commenced, not to toll the
period of limitation. 76 The court also distinguished the plain-
tiffs' cited cases, Joseph v. Syrian Arab Airlines7 7 and Flanagan v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 both of which held that the Conven-
tion's two-year statute of limitations is subject to tolling. The
Fishman court noted that the courts in those cases did not con-
sult the legislative history of the Convention.3 79 Furthermore,
they did not consider the fact that allowing the statute of limita-
tions to be tolled would contravene the Convention's primary
goal of establishing uniformity in the law of air carriers' liabil-
ity.380 Accordingly, the court declined to follow those courts
and, instead, dismissed both of the Fishman plaintiffs' actions as
time-barred.383
372 See id. at 229-30.
373 See id. at 230; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 1990).
374 Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 29(2).
375 Fishman, 938 F. Supp. at 231 (quoting Kahn v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 82
A.D.2d 696, 709, 443 N.Y.S.2d 79, 87 (App. Div. 2d. Dep't 1981)).
376 See id.
377 88 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
378 428 F. Supp. 770 (C.D. Cal. 1977).




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The plaintiff in Castro v. Hinson brought suit on behalf of her-
self and her minor children, each of whom allegedly suffered
physically and mentally when an American Airlines flight took
off in bad weather. 82 The aircraft encountered severe turbu-
lence, and the flight crew warned of the possibility of making an
emergency landing on the water. After holding that the plain-
tiffs' state law claims were preempted by the Convention, the
next issue before the federal district court was whether the Con-
vention's two-year statute of limitations barred the suit, which
was brought nearly three years after the flight landed safely at its
destination.
As in Fishman, the plaintiffs argued that the two-year statute of
limitations should be tolled for the period of a minor child's
infancy. For the same reasons as Fishman, the court in Castro
rejected the tolling argument.383
The plaintiffs also argued that the two-year statute of limita-
tions should not apply because their damages were caused by
the carrier's willful misconduct. Article 25 provides that a car-
rier cannot avail itself of "the provisions of the convention which
exclude or limit his liability" if the damage is caused by willful
misconduct. 4 Plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations
contained in Article 29 of the Convention was precisely the type
of provision that excludes or limits liability referred to in Article
25; therefore, Article 29's statute of limitation must be lifted in
accordance with Article 25 since the plaintiffs' damages were al-
leged to have been caused by American Airlines' willful miscon-
duct. The court rejected this argument after noting that in the
case of In re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21,
1988,85 the Second Circuit stated that Article 25 does not oper-
ate to lift every limit on the carrier's liability, such as Article 29's
statute of limitations. 86
In Rhodes v. American Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff sought dam-
ages from American Airlines for injuries sustained when he swal-
lowed a fishbone while eating an in-flight meal. 87 The federal
district court granted the airline's summaryjudgment motion to
dismiss the action, which the plaintiff had brought more than
382 959 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
383 Castro, 959 F. Supp. at 163.
384 Warsaw Convention, supra note 210, art. 25.
385 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991).
386 See Castro, 959 F. Supp. at 164.
387 No. 96-CV-3383 (JG), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21052 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20,
1996).
AVIATION IJABILITY LAW
two years after the date his flight arrived at its destination.8 8
The court cited Article 29's requirement that suit be brought
within two years after the date of arrival. 89 Mr. Rhodes at-
tempted to avoid the Convention's two-year statute of limitations
by arguing that swallowing a fishbone does not constitute an "ac-
cident" under the Convention and therefore the Convention
did not apply. The court rejected this argument. 90
IV. NON-WARSAW LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS
A. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS BY THE ADA
Until 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulated the
airline industry under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(FAA). 9' The FAA empowered the CAB to regulate fares and
take administrative action against deceptive trade practices. In
section 1506 of the FAA, the "saving clause," Congress preserved
existing state law remedies against the airlines, stating in perti-
nent part: "Nothing ...in this chapter . . .shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies. 392
Subsequently, in 1978, without repealing the FAA in its en-
tirety, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA),
which substantially deregulated domestic air transport.3 93 The
ADA abolished the CAB and transferred its enforcement powers
to the Department of Transportation (DOT). 9 Section 105 of
the ADA, the "preemption clause," stated in relevant part that
states shall not enact or enforce "any law, rule, regulation, stan-
dard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relat-
ing to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier."3 95
38 See id. at *1.
389 See id. at *2.
390 See id. at *3-5.
39' Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1301-1557 (1998 & Supp. V 1993) and redesignated to 49 U.S.C. § 40101-
901).
392 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1994); see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.
219, 222 (1995) (discussing the FAA).
393 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
394 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992) (dis-
cussing the ADA).
395 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 § 105, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 41712 (b) (West 1998)).
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The scope of the ADA preemption clause remains the subject
of some debate. For example, whether certain state actions con-
stitute "enactments" or "enforcement," whether certain state
standards or rules "relate to rates, routes or services," and
whether the scope of the phrase "rates, routes or services" is ca-
pable of varying interpretations. Two recent Supreme Court
pronouncements on the scope of the ADA preemption clause
resolved some, but not all, aspects of these issues. For example,
in Morales, the Court ruled that the ADA preempted state en-
forcement of the Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines
(the Guidelines), which were adopted by the National Associa-
tion of [State] Attorneys General (NAAG).396
In Morales, the NAAG adopted the Guidelines in order to gov-
ern "the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding
of premiums to regular customers.... and the payment of com-
pensation to passengers who voluntarily yield [ed] their seats on
overbooked flights."39 7 The NAAG informed the airlines that it
intended to prosecute them for violations of the fair advertising
provisions of the Guidelines despite the fact that DOT and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) objected to the Guidelines on
preemption and policy grounds. 9 8 Subsequently, the airlines
sought and received a judgment declaring that the ADA pre-
empted the Guidelines and a preliminary injunction restraining
the states from taking "any enforcement action" that would re-
strict "any aspect" of the airlines' fare advertising or operations
relating to rates, routes, or services. 399 The Court found that the
ADA preempted the fare advertising provisions of the Guide-
lines and affirmed the award of declaratory and injunctive relief
with respect to those provisions. 40
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the ADA to have
a broad preemptive purpose because the ordinary meaning of
3 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 391.
397 Id. at 379.
3s See id. at 379-80.
399 See id. at 380.
400 See id. at 391. With respect to the injunction, the court reasoned that in-
junctive relief was available because the threatened enforcement actions were
imminent, and thus, the airlines maintained no adequate remedy at law. How-
ever, the Court restricted the scope of the injunction, as stated, finding it overly
broad. For example, the injunction preempted "any" state suit involving "any
aspect" of the airlines' rates, routes, and services. Thus, the Court vacated the
injunction to the extent that it restrained the operation of state laws related to
matters other than fare advertising, as the states threatened to enforce only those
provisions regarding fare advertising. See id. at 381-83.
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"relating to" was consistent with "having a connection with, or
reference to."40 The Court also reasoned that the Guidelines
related to rates, routes, or services by referring to airfares and by
virtue of the fact that restricting fare advertising would reduce
the airlines' incentive to price competitively and have an adverse
effect upon fares.4 °2 In addition, the Court found that the con-
templated enforcement actions clearly constituted "state en-
forcement," although the Court noted that "'[s]ome state
actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or pe-
ripheral a manner' to have pre-emptive effect."4 3
The Supreme Court next considered the preemptive effect of
the ADA in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.4 °4 In Wolens, the
plaintiffs, participants in American's frequent flyer program,
challenged the carrier's retroactive changes in program terms
and conditions, arguing that application of those changes to
previously accumulated mileage credits violated the Illinois Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and consti-
tuted a breach of contract.40 5
The Court found that the ADA preempted the plaintiffs' con-
sumer fraud claims but not the breach of contract action.406
The Court reasoned that the state fraud claims were preempted
because the claims were "paradigmatic of the consumer protec-
tion legislation" preempted in Morales.4"7 In addition, while the
Court accepted that all of the plaintiffs' claims "related to "serv-
ices" or "rates," it reasoned that adjudication of a state law
breach of contract claim did not constitute the type of "enact-
ment or enforcement" prohibited by section 1305(a) (1).4 08 As
the Court stated, "[w]e do not read the ADA's preemption
clause . .. to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of
state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the air-
line's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings. "409
The Court additionally stated that the ADA's preemption clause,
read together with the FAA's savings clause, permitted states to
adjudicate routine breach of contract actions because the Court
401 Id. at 383.
402 See id. at 387-89.
403 Id. at 390. (alteration in original) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
4- 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
405 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 225.
406 See id. at 228, 232.
407 Id. at 227.
408 See id. at 228-29.
409 Id. at 228.
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would be confined to the parties' bargain and would not be free
to enlarge or enhance the airlines' obligations concerning rates,
routes, or services by enforcing state laws or policies external to
the agreement.41 °
In the wake of Morales and Wolens, courts have had difficulty
delineating the scope of the ADA preemption clause and have
reached conflicting results where similar issues were
presented.41 ' The discussion that follows provides a small sam-
pling of cases on this topic and demonstrates the courts' uncer-
tainty in resolving the ADA preemption issue.
1. State Claims Preempted
In Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., the plaintiff utilized the
defendant's services to ship several items of jewelry, including a
gold Rolex watch, a diamond necklace, and enamel earrings,
from Texas to New York.412 The plaintiff completed an airbill
for each shipment that excluded the carrier from liability for
"gems or stones" and incorporated by reference a "service
guide," which provided that the carrier was not liable for the
loss of jewelry. The plaintiff brought suit under Texas law in
Texas state court, and the case was removed to federal court.4 1 3
The court first considered whether removal was proper.41 4
The court concluded that the amount in controversy was insuffi-
cient to support diversity jurisdiction.1 5 The court also found
that the cause of action did not arise under a federal statute and
that jurisdiction was not supported by complete preemption.41 6
The court reasoned that the plaintiff's cause of action did not
arise under a federal statute because there was no express or
implied private right of action under the FAA or ADA to recover
the value of damaged or lost cargo.417 In addition, the court
reasoned that the ADA did not "completely preempt" the plain-
tiffs claims, sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, be-
cause the defendant raised the ADA as a defense, and defenses
generally do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction.1 8
410 See id. at 232-33.
411 See infra notes 423-92 and accompanying text.
412 117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997).
413 See id. at 923-24.
414 See id. at 924.
415 See id.
416 See id. at 924-26.
417 See id. at 925.
418 See id.
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However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs cause of action
arose under federal common law.419 The court reasoned that
federal common law historically provided a basis for suits against
carriers for lost shipments and that the FAA "savings clause" pre-
served these suits.4 20 The court also read Wolens to permit a fed-
eral cause of action against a carrier for negligent loss of
cargo.42'
Second, the court considered whether the carrier was liable
for the lost shipments and concluded that it was not liable be-
cause the airbill limited its liability.422 The court reasoned that
the airbill, using sufficiently plain and conspicuous language,
expressly prohibited shipping jewelry, and the plaintiff, an ex-
perienced shipper, had notice of this.423
2. State Claims Not Preempted
In Barbakow v. USAir, Inc., the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida considered whether the ADA
preempted claims by private passengers to recover for injuries
proximately caused by an air carrier's breach of the duty of rea-
sonable care in providing cabin services. 2 In Barbakow, the
plaintiff passenger claimed that a flight attendant dropped a soft
drink on her foot, causing serious injuries.425 The plaintiff
brought state tort claims against the carrier who sought removal
to federal court by arguing that section 1305(a) (1) of the ADA
preempted the plaintiffs state law claims.4 26
The court concluded that the ADA did not preempt the plain-
tiff's claims. 427 The court began with the presumption that state
law should not be superseded by the ADA absent express Con-
gressional intent to the contrary because states have traditionally
occupied the field of common law tort.42" The court also rea-
soned that section 1305 (a) (1) did not completely preempt state
law because complete preemption would render other sections
of the ADA, such as the insurance requirements of Section
419 See id. at 929.
420 See id. at 927-28.
421 See id. at 929 n.15.
422 See id. at 929-30.
423 See id. at 930-31.
424 950 F. Supp. 1145, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
425 See id.
426 See id.
427 See id. at 1149.
428 See id. at 1146.
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1371 (q), 429 a nullity. In addition, the court reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend to affect the existing state common law
remedies for tortious conduct by a carrier in providing its choice
of services, but rather intended to regulate the type, quality, or
method of services provided. 3 '
In Haavistola v. Delta Airlines, the Delaware Superior Court
also considered the issue of whether the ADA preempted state
law tort claims.3 In Haavistola, the plaintiff brought state law
tort claims against the carrier for injuries sustained when an un-
ruly passenger kicked her in the abdomen and loosened a staple
inserted three weeks previously during surgery.43 2 The court
canvassed various conflicting authorities on the preemption is-
sue and concluded that the ADA did not preempt a state's en-
forcement of the duty of reasonable care under the factual
setting set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. 33 The court rea-
soned that the ADA preserved the FAA's savings clause and that
the ADA "left room" for state law negligence claims, as such
claims did not amount to state regulation under the ADA.43 4
Similarly, in Knopp v. American Airlines, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Tennessee considered whether the plaintiff's breach of
contract and negligence claims were preempted by the ADA.4"5
In Knopp, the plaintiff asserted these claims against the carrier
for its failure to provide her with a wheelchair while she was
changing planes and for the resulting injuries sustained when
she fell from the electric cart that the carrier provided.3 6 In
order to determine whether the ADA preempted the plaintiff's
claims, the court applied a two-part test gleaned from Morales
and Wolens, which required that: "(1) the claim must be related
to airline rates, routes, or services, either by expressly referring
to them or having a significant economic effect upon them; and
(2) the claim must involve the enactment or enforcement of a
429 49 U.S.C. app. § 13 7 1 (q) requires air carriers to maintain insurance that
covers "'amounts for which ... air carriers may become liable for bodily injuries
to or the death of any person, or for loss of or damage to property of others,
resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft."' Barbakow, 950 F. Supp.
at 1147.
430 See id. at 1148-49.
431 96C-06-047-JOH, 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 63 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28,
1997).
432 Id. at *1-2.
433 See id. at *4-29.
434 See id. at *11, *28-29.
435 938 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1996).
436 Id. at 358.
AVIATION LIABILITY LAW
state law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision. " "'
Utilizing this test, the court concluded that the ADA did not
preempt the plaintiff's breach of contract or negligence
claim.4 38 The court found that the breach of contract claim was
not preempted because, while the provision of a wheelchair may
relate to "services," the provision instead constituted the type of
"privately assumed obligation" contemplated in Wolens, which
may be enforced by state law.4"9 The court also found that the
negligence claim was not preempted because, although the
claim was related to "services" under section 1305(a)(1), al-
lowing a state law negligence claim did not impair federal regu-
lation of services under the ADA.4 °
The court also reasoned that Morales and Wolens dictated that
the ADA preemption clause did not "extend to personal injury
suits against carriers" "on the theory that such safety concerns
do not 'relate' to provisions of 'services' by carriers."441 In addi-
tion, the court opined that "Congress could not have intended
either to leave passengers injured through airline negligence
without a remedy or to turn the [DOT] into a forum for adjudi-
cation of personal injury claims. 442
In Peterson v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York considered
whether the FAA or the ADA preempted the plaintiff's state law
claims for breach of contract, negligence, assault and battery,
false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and defama-
tion.4413 In addition to compensatory damages, the plaintiff
sought punitive damages in the amount of $10 million.444 In
Peterson, during the confusion of boarding a seemingly
overbooked flight, the plaintiff and her niece and nephew were
asked to either sit in their assigned seats or to exit the airplane
and be booked on a subsequent flight. Apparently, the plaintiff
437 Id. at 360.
431 See id. at 362-63.
439 See id. at 362. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Wolens that the ADA's preemption clause does not
prevent state claims that seek to enforce contractual obligations voluntarily un-
dertaken by the airlines.
440 See id. at 362-63.
44, Id. at 361.
442 Id.
443 970 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
444 See id. at 248. The plaintiff presumably was able to bring her suit in federal
court because she also asserted a civil rights claim for violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994). See id. at 248-49.
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refused either option and the airline arranged for the police to
handcuff the plaintiff and escort her off the plane.445 The de-
fendant made a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h) (3) mo-
tion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
arguing that the FAA or the ADA preempted the plaintiff's state
law tort claims.446
The court concluded that the ADA did not preempt the plain-
tiffs state law claims and denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss.44 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the
following three-pronged test: (1) whether the activity at issue
constituted an airline "service" under the ADA; (2) whether the
plaintiffs claims affected the airline service directly as opposed
to tenuously, remotely, or peripherally; and (3) whether the un-
derlying tortious conduct was reasonably necessary to provision
of the service.448 The court reasoned that while the first prong
was satisfied, the second and third prongs were not met because
the airline acted outside the scope of its authority to provide
"services," thus not triggering the "services" inquiry, and because
the issue of whether the airline acted "reasonably" was still in
dispute.449 In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs state
law tort actions did not implicate the Congressional purposes
behind the ADA. Her suit neither frustrated the airline's eco-
nomic deregulation goal nor significantly affected the airline's
competitive posture.450
The defendant also argued that even if the plaintiff's tort
claims were not preempted, any claims for punitive damages
must be dismissed. The court denied the motion, however, as a
consequence of its earlier finding that the plaintiff's claims were
not clearly related to the provision of airline services. In dictum,
the court suggested that if the plaintiffs claims were so related,
"both her tort claims and her claim for punitive damages would
be preempted. 4 51
445 See id. at 247-48.
446 See id. at 247, 249.
447 See id. at 252.
448 See id. at 250 (relying on Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp.
214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
449 See id. at 250-51.
450 See id. at 251.
451 Id. at 252 n.5 (citing Travel All Over The World, Inc. v. Saudi Arabia, 73
F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying recovery for punitive damages for breach of
private contract for airline services because punitive damages are state law addi-
tion to a private contract or bargain)).
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Similarly, in Rivera v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,45 2 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania consid-
ered, among other things, whether the ADA or the Air Carriers
Access Act453 (ACAA) preempted the plaintiffs state law negli-
gence claim against defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.454 In Rivera
the plaintiffs, Rivera, Gambrell, and Jewell purchased tickets for
a Delta flight from Philadelphia to Atlanta. The plaintiffs al-
leged that at the time they purchased their tickets, they each
had a physical condition that required them to use a wheelchair.
They requested Delta to provide each of them with a wheelchair
in order to board the plane.455 Rivera claimed that she suffered
physical injuries when she tripped on a piece of metal in Delta's
terminal area,416 and each plaintiff asserted a claim against the
City of Philadelphia for violations of the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act,45 7 against Delta under the ACAA, 418 and Rivera as-
serted a state law negligence claim against both defendants. 459
452 No. 96-CV-1130, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14989 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1997).
453 The ACAA, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994), provides that airlines may not dis-
criminate against certain disabled individuals on the grounds listed therein.
454 See Rivera, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14989, at *7-17.
455 See id. at *2.
456 Gambrell and Jewell did not assert any injuries. See id.
457 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-213 (1994). The court granted the City's Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss the claims against it under the
Americans With Disabilities Act (the Disabilities Act) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Rivera, 197 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14989, at *6. The court reasoned that, under the
Disabilities Act, the City did not maintain a duty to provide the plaintiffs with
wheelchairs, the plaintiffs did not allege that the City had any involvement in, or
awareness of, Delta's policies or procedures with respect to requests for wheel-
chairs, and the City met its duty under the Disabilities Act to provide an accessi-
ble facility. See id. at *4-6. Consequently, the court also dismissed the plaintiffs'
§ 1983 claim against the City, as it was predicated on the Disabilities Act claim.
See id. at *6. Added to the unusual facts of this case is the fact that it involved the
interpretation of two statutes, each commonly referred to by their respective spe-
cialty practitioners as the "ADA."
458 Delta sought summary judgment on Jewell's ACAA claim, arguing that she
was not an individual with a disability entitled to protection under the ACAA. See
id. at *21. The court denied Delta's motion, finding thatJewell provided suffi-
cient evidence to allow ajury to conclude that her physical impairment, rheuma-
toid arthritis, substantially limited her in the major life activity of walking, under
49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994), as interpreted by 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2(j) (1) (1996). See
Rivera, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14989, at *23-26.
459 See id. at *2-3. The plaintiffs also asserted a punitive damages claim under
the ACAA. See id. at *18. The court noted that whether punitive damages were
available under the ACAA was "unclear" and reserved ruling on that issue, stating
that "[i]f the Plaintiffs establish a factual basis for their [ACAA] claim ... , the
court will then decide if the statute allows for recovery of punitive damages." See
id. at *19.
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The court concluded that the ADA did not preempt Rivera's
state law negligence claim.46 The court first noted that Con-
gress did not intend to shield airlines from common law negli-
gence claims and that cases reaching the opposite conclusion
focused too narrowly on the ADA's "ambiguous language."46'
Second, the court reasoned that "the proper focus is on whether
the state law action addresses matters about which airlines com-
pete" and that a "suit for damages arising from the tortious con-
duct of an airline does not impede the free market competition
of air carriers."462 Third, the court found support in the limited
meaning given to the term "services" by certain defunct CAB
regulations, which termed "services" as including, for example,
"bumping. . . , segregation of smoking passengers," and the pro-
vision of "headsets, alcoholic beverages, [and] entertain-
ment."46 Fourth, the court found that while states may not
regulate "services" in a way that affects airline competition,
states may require airlines to exercise ordinary care.4 64 Finally,
the court deduced that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law negligence claims because it did not include the term
"safety," or a similar term, in the ADA's preemption clause.46 "
The court also concluded that the ACAA did not preempt the
plaintiffs' state law negligence claim.466 The court reasoned that
the ADA's preemption clause applies to the ACAA, and thus, all
of the reasons that the ADA did not preempt the plaintiffs' neg-
ligence claim dictate that the ACAA did not preempt the claim
either.467
3. Certain State Claims Not Preempted, Others Preempted
In Gee v. Southwest Airlines, consolidated on appeal for argu-
ment, several plaintiffs "sought damages against various airlines
based on in-flight events ranging from loathsome behavior by
fellow passengers to objects dropping on them from overhead
bins."46 For example, in Gee, the plaintiffs brought tort actions
in a California state court against the carrier for its contribution
460o See id. at *17.
461 See id. at *13.
462 Id. at *13-14.
463 Id. at *14.
464 See id.
465 See id. at * 15.
466 See id. at *17-18.
467 See id. at *18.
468 110 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 301 (1997).
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to harassment perpetrated by fellow passengers. The action was
removed to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. 469 In addition, in Gadbuty v. Delta Airlines,
the plaintiff brought a state tort action in Oregon state court
against the carrier for injuries sustained when a service cart
swung open and struck him in the knee.4 70 This case was re-
moved to the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon.471  Further, in Rowley v. American Airlines, a paralyzed
plaintiff brought state tort actions in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon for injuries sustained when the
carrier failed to provide her with an aisle seat, return her
scooter to the door of the airplane, or reassemble her scooter
after the carrier had disassembled it for stowage.472 Finally, in
Costa v. American Airlines, the plaintiff brought state claims in
California state court against the carrier for injuries sustained
when another passenger opened the overhead bin, and a suit-
case fell on the plaintiffs head.473 That action was removed to
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California.4
74
In order to resolve whether the plaintiffs' claims were pre-
empted by the ADA, the court crafted a distinction between ac-
tions of an airline relating to "services," which the court found
were preempted by the ADA, and actions relating to "operation
and maintenance" of an aircraft, which the court found were
not preempted by the ADA.4 75 In creating this distinction, the
court reasoned that claims "relating to". "services" were clearly
preempted by the language of section 1305 (a) (1), while section
1371(q) demonstrated Congressional acceptance of state law
claims related to the "operation and maintenance" of an air-
469 See id. at 1403.
470 See id.
471 See id.
472 See id. Rowley was able to bring the action in federal court because she also
brought compensatory and punitive damage claims under the ACAA. See id. The
court below allowed Rowley's compensatory damage claims and the jury found
the carrier liable under the ACAA, but granted Rowley zero compensatory dam-
ages. See id. On appeal, as to Rowley's ACAA punitive damage claim, the court
concluded that, even if the ACAA allowed for the recovery of punitive damages,
Rowley did not allege the type of wanton and malicious conduct that is required
to recover punitive damages. See id. at 1408.
473 See id. at 1404.
474 See id.
475 See id. at 1406.
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craft, as that section requires airlines to maintain insurance to
cover liabilities arising out of "operation and maintenance."
The court concluded that the Gee (passenger harassment) and
Rowley (mishandling of transportation needs of a disabled pas-
senger) state tort claims were preempted by the ADA. 76 The
court reasoned that those claims were preempted because they
"related to" "services."4 7 7 Conversely, the court concluded that
the Gadbury (injury from service cart) and Costa (overhead bin
injury) claims were not preempted by the ADA.17' The court
reasoned that their state law claims related, at least in part, to
the "operation and maintenance" of the aircraft and, invoking
the presumption against preemption absent express Congres-
sional intent to the contrary, held that the ADA did not explic-
itly preempt such claims. 79
B. LIABILITY OF CARRIERS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH CHILD
CUSTODY
Where one parent maintains child custody and the other par-
ent violates a custody order through use of an airline carrier, an
issue arises as to whether, and to what extent, the carrier may be
held liable for its contribution to the violation. For example, in
Pittman v. Grayson, the plaintiffs ex-wife violated a court order
by boarding one of Icelandair's international flights with their
daughter, and the court considered whether Icelandair could be
held liable for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his right to
custody. 80
476 See id. at 1406. In reaching this conclusion, the court adhered to Iarris v.
American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that the ADA
preempted the plaintiffs state tort law claims alleging that the carrier intention-
ally inflicted emotional distress and negligently continued to serve an inebriated
passenger who harassed her, because they "related to" the provision of "services."
See Gee, 110 F.3d at 1404, 1406. Even though the court adhered to Harris, it criti-
cized the decision as no longer consonant with Wolens, stating that Wolens "signifi-
cantly backtracks from the expansive language of Morales." Id. at 1405.
According to the court, Wolens suggested that Morales should not be so broadly
construed as to preempt personal injury negligence claims brought under state
law. See id.
477 See id.
478 See id. at 1406-08. However, to the extent that Costa based his claim on the
California Civil Code, the court concluded that the ADA preempted his claim.
Thus, the court noted that, on remand, the lower court should evaluate Costa's
tort claims under the common law standard of care. See id. at 1408.
47, See id. at 1407-08.
480 No. 93 Civ. 3974, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9287, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1997).
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In Pittman, the plaintiff had obtained a court order prohibit-
ing his ex-wife from removing their daughter from Florida and
telephoned the defendant carrier to inquire into whether his ex-
wife had a reservation for a flight to Iceland and to inform the
carrier of his suspicion that his ex-wife planned to take their
daughter to Iceland on one of its flights.48' In violation of the
court order and consonant with the plaintiffs suspicions, the
plaintiffs ex-wife and daughter boarded one of the defendant's
flights to Iceland.482 The carrier allowed the pair to board the
flight, despite the fact that the names on their tickets did not
match the names on their passports, and the ticket agent also
made false entries on the weight and balance code to make it
appear that the party traveling consisted of a male, a female,
and a child, rather than a female and two children. 3
The court found, first, that Icelandair was entitled to a new
trial,484 at a minimum, because the court charged the jury in
error.485 The court noted that the trial court charged the jury as
follows: "[I]f an airline has actual notice that there is a court
order prohibiting the parent from transporting the child to the
place that is the plane's destination, it would be wrongful for the
airline to transport the child. 486 The court reasoned that this
charge was error because the corollary to the charge, that an
airline maintains a right to deny any individual the right to
travel because of a suspicion that there may be some court order
prohibiting that travel, violates not only the principle that a
common carrier is bound to receive all proper persons for car-
riage but also the spirit of the fundamental constitutional right
to travel. 48
7
Second, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to
justify imposing liability on Icelandair for its role in transporting
the plaintiffs daughter and granted Icelandair's motion for a
judgment as a matter of law.4 88 Recognizing the existence of the
tort of interference with parental custody rights and the fact that
those who aid a parent in removing a child from the country in
481 See id. at *2-3.
482 See id. at *3.
483 See id. at *3-4. The plaintiff's ex-wife was also traveling with her second
child.
484 At the original trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $15 million in compensa-
tory damages. See id. at *2.
485 See id. at *7-8.
486 Id. at *5.
487 See id. at *5-7.
488 See id. at * 16.
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order to frustrate the other parent's right to custody may also be
liable to the injured parent, the court delineated that a plaintiff
alleging such a tort must establish (1) that the defendant was
aware of the wrongful nature of the fleeing parent's conduct and
(2) that the defendant performed some act to further that un-
lawful purpose."8 9 The court reasoned that, while the ticket
agent may have been aware that the plaintiff's ex-wife was flee-
ing the country, the evidence was insufficient to establish that
the agent knew that she was fleeing in order to deprive her ex-
husband of his custody rights.49 °
Similarly, in Hyatt v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,4 91 the court con-
sidered whether Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) was liable for
failure to comply with an "Unaccompanied Minor Child Care
Service Request" (the form) and for releasing the plaintiff's mi-
nor children to the custody of their father, as opposed to the
custody of their grandfather, as the mother had requested in the
form.492 In Hyatt, the children were scheduled to visit their fa-
ther during the Christmas break consistent with a divorce de-
cree modification that granted him custody during that time. 493
However, the mother changed the flight plans so that the chil-
dren would arrive two days early and completed the form, re-
questing that TWA release the children into the custody of their
grandfather at the termination of the flight.494 The father, hav-
ing learned of the change in plans, greeted the flight along with
his new wife and two police officers, and the police directed the
grandfather to a waiting area while remanding the children to
the father's custody.495
The mother and grandfather (and, in certain causes of action,
the mother on behalf of the children, collectively "the plain-
tiffs") brought state law claims for compensatory and, where ap-
plicable, punitive damages against (1) TWA, for fraud and
breach of contract, (2) the new wife, for tortious interference
with the mother's contract with TWA and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, (3) the police, for tortious interference
with the mother's contract with TWA and the false imprison-
ment of the children and grandfather, and (4) the City of St.
489 See id. at *9-11.
490 See id. at *12-16.
491 943 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
492 See id. at 292.




Louis, as the employer of the police, for the false imprisonment
of the children and the grandfather.496
The court summarily disposed of all of the plaintiffs' claims. 497
First, as to the plaintiffs' fraud claim, the court held that the
plaintiffs' allegations were not sufficient to support a cause of
action for fraud because TWA's representations concerning the
identity of the person to whom it intended to release the chil-
dren were not false at the time that they were made.4 98 Second,
as to the plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, the court found
that no contract existed between the mother and TWA because
the father purchased the children's tickets, and, although the
mother paid fifty dollars to change the date of departure, she
did not allege in the trial court that this additional charge cre-
ated a separate contract between her and TWA.4 99 Third, as to
the plaintiffs' claims for tortious interference, the court rea-
soned that, as no contract existed between the mother and
TWA, no one could have tortiously interfered with such a con-
tract. 00 Fourth, as to the plaintiffs' claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court stated that the plaintiffs
failed to plead that the new wife's conduct in taking the chil-
dren from the airport to a place unknown to the plaintiffs was
"extreme and outrageous," an essential element of such a cause
of action. 50 1 Finally, as to the plaintiffs' claims for false impris-
onment, the court held that there was no evidence that the
grandfather was not free to leave the waiting area, and the po-
lice were legally justified in remanding the children to the fa-
ther's custody based upon the divorce decree modification.0 2
Moreover, the City of St. Louis was not liable under respondeat
superior because the police were not liable. 0 3
C. AIRLINE "PRODUCTS LIABILITY"
The court in Silva v. American Airlines, Inc., discussed the po-
tential liability of an airline under the products liability law of
Puerto Rico.50 4 In Silva, the United States District Court for the
496 See id. at 294-95.
497 See id. at 299.
498 See id. at 295-96.
499 See id. at 296-97.
5900 See id. at 297-98.
501 See id. at 298.
502 See id. at 298-99.
503 See id. at 299.
504 960 F. Supp. 528 (D.P.R. 1997).
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District of Puerto Rico considered whether the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence concerning her products liability
and general negligence claims to survive a motion for summary
judgment made by the defendant.5 "5 The plaintiff was injured
when, after sitting in seat 29F, a seat located immediately behind
one of the emergency exits and providing extra leg room, she
stood up at the conclusion of the flight to deplane and hit her
head on the overhead bin located over her seat. 06 In support of
her claim that the overhead bin was defectively designed, defec-
tively manufactured, or lacked a necessary warning, the plaintiff
introduced the testimony of a civil engineer and a former flight
attendant, as expert witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence
702 (Rule 702). 57
The court first concluded that neither witness qualified as an
expert witness under Rule 702 and the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.508
The court reasoned that the civil engineer had never served as
an expert witness with regard to aircraft design, had no experi-
ence in the design, manufacture, or operation of an aircraft,
and, even if he were qualified to testify regarding defective de-
sign, his opinions on aircraft safety measures and hazards were
purely speculative, as they lacked a scientific basis.5 °9 In addi-
tion, the court noted that "[t]o qualify to provide expert testi-
mony in this case, an expert must have specifically worked with,
tested or in some fashion studied aircraft interior safety hazards
and warnings."51 The court found that the former flight at-
tendant had neither specialized knowledge nor experience in
505 Id. at 529.
506 See id. at 530.
507 See id. at 530-32, 533. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." FED. R. Evi). 702.
508 See id. at 531-32; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). The following requirements are necessary to qualify an expert witness:
(1) the expert must be qualified to testify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education; (2) the expert's testimony must concern scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge; and (3) the proposed testimony must
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
See Silva, 960 F. Supp. at 530.




the design, manufacture, or operation of an aircraft, and found
that his testimony was purely speculative. 511
Second, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not provide suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate a material issue as to whether the
defendant violated Puerto Rico's products liability law and thus
granted the defendant's summary judgment motion.1 2 The
court noted that, under a defective design theory, a plaintiff
must show that (1) the product failed to behave in a safe man-
ner as an ordinary user would have expected in its intended or
foreseeable use; or (2) the design of the product was the proxi-
mate cause of the damages, and the defendant failed to prove
that, in the balance of interests, that the benefits of the design
outweighed the inherent risks of the product.513 In addition,
the court noted that a manufacturing defect is one in which the
product fails to match the average quality of like products.514
Furthermore, the court stated that a defendant provides inade-
quate warning where the defendant, knowing of a danger and a
need to warn in order to assure the safest use of its product,
including any use reasonably foreseen by the defendant, fails to
provide adequate warnings or instructions in light of that dan-
ger.51 5 The court reasoned that the plaintiff did not present any
competent scientific analysis of the overhead bin, the seating ar-
rangement, or how the bin and seat could be better designed.
In addition, the court noted that the bins were "low-hanging"
for easy access and the court put responsibility on the passen-
gers to avoid hitting the "obvious[ly]" placed bins.5 6 As the
court stated, "American Airlines is not liable for damages caused
511 See id. at 532. Although the plaintiff had not presented the former flight
attendant as a lay witness, the court noted that the former flight attendant could
have qualified as such because his opinion regarding the frequency with which
passengers hit their head on the overhead bin above seat 29F was well-founded
on personal knowledge and capable of cross-examination. See id. at 531-32. In so
noting, the court listed the following requirements necessary to admit the opin-
ion testimony of a lay person: (1) the witness must have personal knowledge of
the facts from which the opinion is derived; (2) there must be a rational connec-
tion between the opinion and the facts upon which it is based; and (3) the opin-
ion must be helpful in understanding the testimony or determining a fact in
issue. See id. at 531 (citing Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 916 F.2d 31, 36 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
512 See id. at 534.
513 See id.
514 See id.
515 See id. at 533.
516 Id.
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by a structure that is easily perceived at a glance every time one
boards an airplane. 517
D. Loss OF BAGGAGE
The proper measure of damages for the loss of personal prop-
erty is not always clear. The following case clarifies the proper
measure under Tennessee law. In Crawford v. Delta Airlines,
Inc.,518 the Court of Appeals of Tennessee considered the mea-
sure of damages for lost baggage. The plaintiff traveled from Ft.
Lauderdale to Atlanta on Trans World Airlines (TWA) and from
Atlanta to Memphis on Delta and checked four bags with TWA
in Ft. Lauderdale. The plaintiffs bags never arrived in Mem-
phis, and the plaintiff submitted a lost baggage claim form to
Delta. When Delta did not reimburse the plaintiff in the full
amount of her claim, she brought a claim for loss of personal
property in the Circuit Court of Shelby County and argued that
her damages were the "cost new" of the four pieces of luggage
and their contents.519 In the trial court, Delta moved for a di-
rected verdict on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
her damages. 520 However, the court denied Delta's motion, and
the jury awarded the plaintiff the entire "cost new" of her lost
property.52 ' On appeal, Delta contended that the trial court
should have entered a directed verdict in its favor as to
damages.522
The appeals court noted that, while the plaintiff presented ev-
idence of the "cost new" of the lost items, the proper measure of
damages for lost property was the "actual value" or "value to the
owner" of the property, taking into account the original cost,
the cost of replacement, the condition of the goods, the use to
517 Id. at 534.
518 No. 02A01-9612-CV-00296, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 18, 1997).
519 See id. at *2-3.
520 See id. at *2. In the trial court, Delta also argued that its liability, if any, was
limited to $1250, as established by domestic tariff rules adopted by the airlines
and incorporated by reference in its tickets. See id. at *1.
521 See id. at *2, 9. The jury also found that the plaintiff did not receive ade-
quate notice of the limitation of liability. See id. at *2.
522 See id. at *2. Delta also argued, on appeal, that the trial court erred (1) in
holding as a matter of law that TWA was acting as an agent for Delta and (2) in
refusing to limit Delta's liability to the sum of $1250, as provided by the tariff. As
the court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the trial court should
have directed a verdict in Delta's favor as to damages, the court did not resolve
these additional issues. See id.
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which they were being put, and all other relevant facts. 23 The
appeals court agreed that the trial court should have directed a
verdict in Delta's favor as to damages because the plaintiff did
not present evidence regarding any of these factors and dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint.524
E. LIABILITY OF MAINTENANCE SHOPS AND MECIANICS
In Fant v. Champion Aviation, Inc., the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama discussed the liability of maintenance shops and mechan-
ics for the negligent repair of an airplane.525 In Fant, Champion
Aviation, Inc. (Champion) sought out the plaintiff's business,
and the plaintiff hired Champion to remove, rebuild, and re-
place his airplane engine. 5 26 The parties agreed that a certain
experienced mechanic, who was also an authorized inspector,
would perform the work. However, Champion hired another
less experienced mechanic to perform the work, and that
mechanic improperly reused fiber locking nuts to attach the
propeller and failed to properly adjust the torque on the propel-
ler bolts. As a result, all but one of the bolts sheared off during
a flight, causing substantial damage to the airplane. The plain-
tiff brought claims of negligence, wantonness, fraud, and breach
of contract against Champion, alleging that Champion failed to
disclose that it had hired another less experienced mechanic to
perform the work and that the mechanic was negligent in con-
ducting the repairs. The jury reached a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, and the Jefferson Circuit Court granted the defend-
ant's motion for a new trial and denied its motion for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Both parties
appealed.527
The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant
of a new trial and affirmed the trial court's denial of the JNOV
motion, thereby affirming the jury's verdict.5 28 First, the court
found that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could have found that Champion maintained a duty to disclose
that it had substituted an unsupervised inexperienced mechanic
for an experienced one. The court reasoned that the plaintiff
523 See id. at *8-9.
524 See id. The court also taxed the costs of the appeal to the plaintiff. See id. at
*9.
525 689 So. 2d 32, 32 (Ala. 1997).
526 Id. at 34.
527 See id.
528 See id. at 37.
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relied upon the defendant to repair his airplane correctly and
that the defendant knew the repairman was inexperienced.529
Second, the court ruled that the jury could have found a breach
of contract, reasoning that although the plaintiff never paid the
contract price after the accident, the parties exchanged
promises and thereby established a contractY ° Third, the court
concluded that the jury could have found wantonness and fraud
because there was substantial evidence that the defendant knew
the repairman was inexperienced, that the accident was caused
by a loose propeller, and that the repairman failed to disclose
that he improperly reused fiber locking nuts to attach the
propeller.5 1
V. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS
In addition to the general cases immediately following, recent
cases in the broad area of manufacturers' and suppliers' liability
can be divided into three broad categories. The first category
concerns the General Aviation Revitalization Act's statute of re-
pose for certain claims relating to general aviation aircraft. The
government contractor's defense comprises the second cate-
gory, as courts continue to struggle with defining the elements
of this defense and setting its limits. The third group of cases
revisits the economic loss doctrine and its application to the
complex products that aviation manufacturers build and service.
A. GENERAL
The preemptive effect of airworthiness regulations was one is-
sue addressed by the court in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn,
Indiana on October 31, 1994.532 The case, consolidated by the Ju-
dicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, concerns the events sur-
rounding the crash of American Eagle Flight 4184. In a motion
for summary judgment, the airline defendants, including vari-
ous AMR entities, American Airlines, Inc. and Simmons Airlines,
Inc., argued that Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airwor-
529 See id. at 36.
53) See id. at 37.
531 See id. The court also found that, in stating to the jury that a portion of the
plaintiff's recovery would remit to the state of Alabama, the trial court had prop-
erly stated the law as it existed at the time under Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson,
Case No. 1940357, although that opinion was later withdrawn and a new opinion
released. See id. at 37 n.3 (discussing the disposition of Johnson).




thiness standards preempted state law product defect claims.
The defendants also argued that the regulatory scheme is exten-
sive and pervasive. Finally, the defendants claimed that in decid-
ing to purchase the plane they relied on the airworthiness
certificate issued by the FAA. -3 The court summarily dismissed
the argument, citing United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea
Rio Grandense (VARIG Airlines).131
The Alabama Supreme Court discussed the level of proof re-
quired to show "wanton misconduct" under the Alabama Ex-
tended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) in Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Trzcinski.53 5 A Cessna Aircraft Co. (Cessna) crop
duster, piloted by the plaintiff, crashed after coming in contact
with power lines. The shoulder harness failed at the time of im-
pact at a point where two shoulder straps joined a retracting
strap that was connected to an inertial reel-type locking mecha-
nism. The plaintiff suffered permanent blindness as a result of
the crash. Investigation showed that the shoulder harness was
defective in that it lacked two rows of stitching where the straps
overlapped. Because of that finding, Cessna admitted liability
under the AEMLD. The case went to trial solely on the issues of
the plaintiff's compensatory damages and the availability of pu-
nitive damages.
The touchstone of punitive damages in Alabama is "wanton-
ness," and the standard of proof is "clear and convincing evi-
dence. ' 536 The court noted that wantonness is not merely a
higher degree of negligence; rather, it is a "qualitatively differ-
ent tort concept of actionable culpability" that requires some
proof of conscious culpability.537 "Clear and convincing evi-
dence" is defined by statute in Alabama as "[e]vidence that,
when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in
the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential
element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness
of the conclusion."53 8
Notably, the plaintiff offered no proof that Cessna was aware
that its manufacturing process would create defective harnesses
533 See id. at *6-7.
534 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (holding that the United States is not liable, by opera-
tion of the discretionary function exception, under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
for the negligence of the FAA in certificating an aircraft type).
535 682 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1996).
536 Id. at 19 (citing AiA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1975)).
537 Id. at 20.
538 Id. at 19 (citing AIA. CODE § 6-11-20(b) (4) (1975)).
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or that it failed to undertake safety engineering with respect to
the shoulder harness. In fact, the evidence showed that Cessna
tested its harness to a standard in excess of that required by the
FAA. Finally, the FAA had previously issued a "production cer-
tificate to Cessna allowing them to produce the shoulder har-
nesses according to the manner in which the defective harness
had been produced."" 9 While this evidence did not impact
Cessna's liability for compensatory damages caused by the defec-
tive harness, it did persuade the Alabama Supreme Court to re-
verse the trial court's denial of Cessna's motion for judgment as
a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages.54
The reasonableness of the design of a helicopter seatbelt was
at issue in Pickett v. RTS Helicopter.54 ' The plaintiff's decedent, a
helicopter pilot, died in an arguably survivable helicopter acci-
dent. The plaintiff alleged that the pilot would have survived
the accident had his seatbelt not failed. When the belt failed,
the decedent was ejected from the helicopter into the rotor
blades.
The crash of the helicopter had been caused by a loss of cyclic
control immediately after takeoff due to alleged inadequate
maintenance. The seatbelt failed because a "take-up bar" had
been installed backward, allowing the belt to slip and come un-
done during the accident. The seatbelt had been originally
manufactured by Pacific Scientific Company (PSC), and the
plaintiff alleged that PSC's design was defective because it per-
mitted the belt to be disassembled and then reassembled with
the take-up bar in the reverse position. Better designs, the
plaintiff alleged, could not be reassembled backward or could
not be disassembled at all. There was no evidence of incorrect
original manufacture, and the take-up bar had been disassem-
bled and serviced prior to the accident. PSC had issued warn-
ings regarding the dangers of this improper installation. It was
not disputed that the owner and operator of the helicopter had
received these warnings. The district court granted summary
51 Id. at 22.
540 Although the court does not explicitly refer to its standard of review for a
denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or '"NOV," the
court describes its careful review of "all of the evidence pertaining to the wanton-
ness claim." Id. at 22. This language indicates a de novo standard of review, as is
common for issues of law.
541 128 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1997).
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judgment in favor of helicopter owner RTS and the belt manu-
facturer PSC under the Louisiana Product Liability Act.5 42
PSC's design of the belt was held not to have been a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Rather, the proximate and interven-
ing cause was held to have been the negligent reassembly of the
take-up bar. The actual misassembly, the court ruled, broke the
chain of causation from the design of the belt and precluded
any finding of liability against PSC.54 3 With regard to RTS, the
court held that its lack of any actual custody and control over
the helicopter precluded liability for the accident.544
B. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) es-
tablishes a federal statute of repose.4 Whereas a statute of limi-
tation operates to limit, primarily for reasons of fairness to
defendants and judicial economy, the number of years following
an injury during which suit may be brought, a statute of repose
limits the availability of tort actions against a manufacturer after
a specified number of years has passed since the product's man-
ufacture, sale, or delivery. Some of the policy considerations
that support a statute of repose are subsidizing manufacturing
industries, fairness to manufacturers, and facilitating markets
for the sale of used goods. GARA provides an eighteen-year stat-
ute of repose. If eighteen years have passed since the manufac-
ture or first delivery of the product, GARA preempts any state
law that would permit a tort action against the manufacturer of
a general aviation aircraft. GARA does contain some limited ex-
ceptions, such as when the manufacturer has misrepresented
safety information to the Federal Aviation Administration, when
the claimant is a passenger for purpose of receiving emergency
medical treatment, when the claimant is not aboard the aircraft,
and when a written warranty applies. GARA provides a "rolling,"
rather than an absolute, statute of repose. Specifically, the
eighteen-year period begins to run anew for a particular compo-
nent or part, as that part is replaced or added to the aircraft.
The court in Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd. held that GARA does not
so completely preempt state law as to support removal to federal
542 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.54 (West 1991).
548 See Picket, 128 F.3d at 929.
544 See id. at 933.
545 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1994).
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court.546 The underlying accident in the case occurred on Feb-
ruary 5, 1995, when the plaintiff's husband died in the crash of a
twin engine Model 310L aircraft he was piloting. The plane had
been manufactured and sold by Cessna in 1967.547
The plaintiff sued Cessna in state court alleging negligence
and breach of warranty claims. Cessna removed the case to fed-
eral court on the basis that the claims arose under federal law. 548
The federal court then granted the plaintiffs motion to re-
mand, finding that GARA does not create a federal cause of ac-
tion, GARA does not completely occupy the field of negligence
law, and GARA does not completely preempt state law negli-
gence and warranty claims.549
The court analyzed the removal by applying the "well-pleaded
complaint rule."5 5' The first inquiry is whether a federal law cre-
ates the cause of action. If so, then federal question jurisdiction
exists. If not, then the court must determine whether some sub-
stantial question of federal law is necessarily involved in resolv-
ing the plaintiffs state law claims. In Wright, Cessna conceded
that GARA does not create a cause of action, leaving the "sub-
stantial federal question" issue as the only ground for removal.
In determining whether a "substantial federal question" ex-
isted, the Wright court applied the test formulated by the
Supreme Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thomp-
son. 1 Specifically, courts required to determine whether a fed-
546 930 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
547 See id. at 301.
548 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (conferring federal question jurisdiction).
549 See Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 302.
550 See Louisiana & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (estab-
lishing the well-pleaded complaint rule for analyzing removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)). The court noted that only two exceptions exist to the rule: the artful
pleading doctrine and the complete preemption doctrine. The artful pleading
doctrine allows a defendant to argue that the plaintiff's complaint must be "re-
written" because the plaintiff attempted to craft the complaint to avoid raising
the federal question on its face. The complete preemption doctrine allows for
federal question removal when federal law so completely occupies the field at
issue that Congress has left no room for a state to regulate. Complete preemp-
tion has been found to exist only in two specific statutes: under § 502(a) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994),
and § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994). The
Wright court does not address the complete preemption argument but does re-
mark that GARA is "narrowly drafted" to preempt only certain state statutes of
limitation. See Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 305.
551 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (finding that suit alleging violation of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act presents an issue of federal law insufficiently "substantial" to
support federal question jurisdiction).
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eral issue is substantial enough to confer federal question
jurisdiction should consider "the nature of the federal interest
at stake, be sensitive with regard to judgments about congres-
sional intent, judicial power, and the federal system, and be cog-
nizant of the need for prudence and restraint in the
jurisdictional inquiry."552 After completing this analysis, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that a review by a fed-
eral trial court was the best way to preserve the strong federal
interest in uniformity. In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that its power of review over state court decisions on fed-
eral issues provided sufficient oversight.55 3
In analyzing the first factor, the nature of the federal interest,
the Wright court focused on three issues. GARA does not create
a federal cause of action and only serves to preempt a narrow
class of state statutes of limitation and repose. It does not pre-
empt a state's substantive negligence or warranty law. Indeed,
the court found no support for the notion that Congress in-
tended for federal courts to develop a body of federal common
law. 55
4
The applicability of GARA's statute of repose to United States
claims of defective design or marketing was considered by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in
Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.555 In Alter, two people died in
the crash of a Bell 206 helicopter in Israel on November 24,
1993. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Bell sub-
mitted proof that the helicopter was manufactured and deliv-
ered by August 30, 1975. Because of the proof submitted by Bell
that more than eighteen years had passed between the date the
aircraft was first delivered and the date of the accident, the
court held that GARA's statute of repose was triggered and the
plaintiffs claims for negligent design, manufacture, and testing
were barred.556
The plaintiffs also asserted a failure to warn claim. The heli-
copter was accompanied by maintenance manuals, which were
reissued and revised approximately twice per year since the sale
of the helicopter. The plaintiffs argued that each new manual
constituted a separate "component part" for which a new eight-
een-year period must pass before GARA will operate to bar a
552 Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 304 (internal quotation marks omitted).
553 See id.
554 See id. at 305.
555 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
556 See id. at 538, 541-42.
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claim. The district court followed the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp.557 and held that the manual
was not a "part". "originally in or added to" the helicopter.558
Accordingly, the court held that revisions of such manuals are
not replacement parts under GARA. The court also reviewed
federal decisions from other jurisdictions, supporting its hold-
ing, interpreting various state statutes of repose. 5 9
The Alter court also denied the plaintiffs' second argument
that even if GARA denied recovery for any design flaw in the
aircraft, the failure of the operator's manual to warn of such a
design flaw was not barred by GARA. The plaintiffs apparently
never explicitly made the claim that GARA does not bar actions
for failure to warn because the court never addressed that issue.
Instead, the court viewed the failure to warn claim as mere artful
pleading, phrased in such a way as to try to bring it within the
statutory exception for replacement parts. The court held that
the two claims were essentially identical, and the plaintiff could
not salvage the failure to warn claim simply by articulating it in
an apparently non-preempted manner.560
Finally, the plaintiffs questioned the applicability of GARA to
accidents that occur in a foreign country, citing cases such as
Boureslan v. ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Co.561 The court dis-
tinguished those cases by noting that they refer to statutes that
create claims whereas GARA eliminates certain claims. The
court opined that GARA did not seem to have been designed to
have a different effect solely on the basis of where an accident
occurred.62
C. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Although not all of the cases discussed below are aviation
cases per se, they are nevertheless relevant to the aviation practi-
tioner because of their treatment of the applicability of the gov-
ernment contractor defense in failure to warn cases and the
557 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that operator handbook was not a
replacement part under GARA).
558 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 538.
559 See id. at 538-40.
560 See id. at 541.
5f1 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that Title VII does not
apply to the actions of U.S. employers vis-d-vis U.S. citizens working outside the
United States), aff'd sub nom., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
-162 See Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 541.
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uniqueness of certain issues, such as the availability of the de-
fense where the United Nations is the governmental body.
The seminal case analyzing the military contractor defense is
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.563 In Boyle, the Supreme Court
held that when certain conditions are satisfied, a government
contractor could, in effect, share the immunity from suit en-
joyed by the federal government. 6 In order to avail itself of
this immunity, the contractor must be controlled by the govern-
ment to such an extent that the contractor functions primarily
as the government's instrument for manufacturing a product to
specifications set by the government. The Supreme Court in
Boyle established a three-pronged test to determine whether a
contractor may avail itself of the government contractor defense
in a case alleging defective design:
1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifi-
cations;
2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers
in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States.565
Issues related to both the extent of the government contrac-
tor defense and available damages were addressed in Gray v.
Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co.566 The plaintiffs in Gray were
the surviving relatives of three naval crew members who died
after ejecting from a Lockheed S-3 Viking Aircraft on October 7,
1989.567 On that date, in the course of a carrier catapult launch,
the aircraft suffered a hydraulic failure in one of two separate
engine-driven hydraulic systems. The pilot was unable to re-
cover from a banked turn, and the aircraft continued to roll to-
ward an inverted position. Due to the low altitude, the ejection
seat parachutes had insufficient time to deploy. All three crew
members died in their ejection seats when the seats impacted
the ocean at high speed.
When the first hydraulic system failed, all of the aircraft's hy-
draulic functions, including the actuation of the flight control
surfaces, were powered by the second of the two redundant hy-
563 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
5C, Id. at 511-13.
565 Id. at 512.
566 125 F.3d 1371 (l1th Cir. 1997).
567 The S-3 Viking is an antisubmarine aircraft capable of detecting submarines
through various electronic devices and then engaging submarines with onboard
weapons.
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draulic systems. The ailerons, which control the aircraft's longi-
tudinal stability and provide the pilot with the ability to roll the
aircraft, were designed so that in the event of hydraulic failure a
manual back-up system would engage, giving the pilot a direct
mechanical link-up with the ailerons. This shift from hydraulic
to mechanical control is accomplished by an Emergency Flight
Control System (EFCS). The EFCS was designed to engage
when hydraulic pressure in the system dropped below 800 psi.
At below 800 psi, a shut-off valve in the aileron servo should
"trip," reducing hydraulic pressure to the servo to zero psi, and
causing springs to expand and "latch-up" a direct hydraulic
linkage from the pilot's control stick to the ailerons. The aile-
ron servo had been manufactured by subcontractor Bertea
Corporation.
The post-accident investigation of the servo suggested that the
servo had begun to latch-up at 1400 psi, not the specified 800
psi. The pin that was supposed to move in and latch-up showed
signs of wear that indicated it had been fluctuating in and out of
the latch in the course of the latch-up process. Additionally, the
pin and latch were found to be beyond the ".0001 tolerance"
required by the specifications, a circumstance that the plaintiffs
argued would slow the speed of latch-up.
The district court found that the above conditions caused the
EFCS to "chatter" between the powered/hydraulic modes of op-
eration and ultimately to cause "free-stick," the situation in
which the movements of the control stick in the cockpit had no
effect on the position of the aileron. The servo failed to transi-
tion to manual mode, and the aileron remained frozen in a
right roll position from which the pilot could not recover. This
roll continued until the aircraft impacted the ocean. The dis-
trict court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, disallowing Lockheed's
government contractor defense under the Boyle test. 68
The Eleventh Circuit addressed all three prongs of Boyle,
notwithstanding the fact that the district court had never
reached prong three, the manufacturer's duty to warn. The ap-
plicable standard of review was abuse of discretion. With regard
to factor one, the government's approval of reasonably precise
specifications, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's
conclusion that the government had not provided reasonably
1-68 See Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 880 F. Supp. 1559, 1566-76,
1578 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
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precise specifications to Lockheed. 569  The government-ap-
proved specifications consisted of a general narrative descrip-
tion of the servo and the design requirements, such as
automatic reversion to manual control in the event of a dual
hydraulic failure. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the actual de-
sign process extended beyond these initial requirements to spe-
cific engineering analysis developed during actual
production.57 °
Although it apparently could have stopped with the first Boyle
prong, the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the district court's rul-
ing with respect to the second prong, compliance with precise
specifications.5 7 1 A noteworthy aspect of the circuit court's anal-
ysis of the second prong is its implicit link to the first. The court
noted that proof of compliance with specifications could consist
of evidence that the military was "actively involved throughout
the design, review, development and testing of the [equipment
at issue] .,,72 This is not unlike a situation described in the anal-
ysis of the first Boyle prong where there is a "continuous back
and forth" between the military and contractor. 57 Finding no
evidence of this continuous give and take, the circuit court af-
firmed the findings of the district court that Lockheed had not
complied with the limited specification approved by the military
because the servo did not meet the requirement that it revert to
manual operation without a hazardous lag.574 Other identified
failures to meet specifications were the failure of the pin and
latch to meet design size tolerances and the higher-than-speci-
fied pressure at which the servo attempted to transition to man-
ual operation.
Going yet one step further than the district court, the Elev-
enth Circuit undertook a brief analysis of the third Boyle prong,
adequate warnings of dangers known to the manufacturer but
not the government. The critical issue in this portion was the
unwritten operational requirement that the control stick be
569 See id. at 1578.
570 See id. The Eleventh Circuit also held that, notwithstanding the subcon-
tracting of the servo to Bertea, Lockheed nonetheless remained responsible for
the design and testing of the servo. See id. at 1379.
571 See id.
572 Id. at 1378 (quoting In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Germany on
Aug. 29, 1990, 81 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir.), amended, 88 F.3d 340 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Chase v. Lockheed Corp., 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996)).
573 See Gray, 125 F.3d at 1377-78 (quoting Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp.,
878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 1989)).
574 See id. at 1379.
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within sixty degrees of center for manual control to "latch-up."
The Eleventh Circuit held that some affirmative warning was re-
quired to advise pilots that they must act affirmatively to engage
the manual reversion system. 5
A second issue before the circuit court was the available
causes of action under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA).57h The court affirmed the ruling that the plaintiff
could bring a strict liability claim under DOHSA and that the
plaintiffs had proved this claim. The court applied Sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and held that
the chattering of the servo and the freeze of the ailerons in the
right-bank position constituted an unreasonably dangerous con-
dition. Because the design did not comply with contract re-
quirements and certain components did not meet design
specifications, the S-3 servo in the accident aircraft was held to
be defective in both design and manufacture.577
The district court's finding of negligence on the part of Lock-
heed was also affirmed. Lockheed's subcontractor Bertea had
developed the acceptance test protocol (ATP) for the S-3 aile-
ron servo. Notwithstanding this division of labor, and presuma-
bly based upon Lockheed's liability as the manufacturer of the
finished product, Lockheed was held liable under a negligence
theory for failing to develop an adequate ATP for the aileron
servo.
578
The Eleventh Circuit undertook an extensive analysis of the
damages available to plaintiff under applicable law. They are
summarized briefly below.
DOHSA Survival Damages. Acknowledging previous rulings by
the Supreme Court to the effect that survival damages were not
available under DOHSA, the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless held
that these damages were available under general maritime
law.5 79 Unlike Zicherman v. Korean Airlines,8 ° the issue faced did
not relate to an award of loss of society damages to the dece-
dent's DOHSA beneficiaries. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit ad-
dressed the possible availability of damages based upon the pain
and suffering of the decedent. The court viewed this claim as
575 See id. at 1380.
57 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1994).
577 See Gray, 125 F.3d at 1380.
57s Unlike the strict liability claims, the negligence claims were held to be avail-
able through general maritime law, not DOHSA. See Gray, 125 F.3d at 1379.
579 See Gray, 125 F.3d at 1381.
590 516 U.S. 217, 220 (1996).
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separate and distinct from that for wrongful death under
DOHSA and focused on whether DOHSA precluded such a
recovery.
The Eleventh Circuit in Gray first acknowledged that the
Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits had ruled differently in
cases that arose out of the downing of KAL 007.581 The Eleventh
Circuit expressly rejected the holding of the D.C. Circuit in
Dooley that the inclusion of a survival remedy in the contempora-
neously enacted Jones Act 8 2 evidenced an intention of Congress
to exclude such a recovery from DOHSA.58 3 Turning to the
wording of DOHSA and its legislative history, the court held that
Congress had expressed no intention with regard to the availa-
bility of survival damages in a DOHSA case. The court in Gray
ultimately sided with the First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
and recognized that a survival remedy "survived" under DOHSA
and could be pursued under general maritime law. 8" The Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the damages awards of the district
court.58 5
Gauthe v. Asbestos Corp. 86 is the first of four cases dealing with
the applicability of the government contractor defense in failure
to warn cases. The district court remanded a case that had been
removed under the Federal Officer Removal Statute.587 The
case involved a survival action based on the death of Earlven
Gauthe as a result of exposure to asbestos while employed at a
shipyard owned by Avondale Industries. The claims made by
581 The cases distinguished by the Eleventh Circuit were Saavedra v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 93 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 584 (1996) and Dooley v.
Korean Air Lines Co., 117 F.3d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997), affd, 118 S. Ct. 1890 (1998)
(both ruling that DOHSA effectively preempted claims for survival damages as an
exclusive remedy for all damages related to a death on the high seas). See Gray,
125 F.3d at 1381.
582 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).
583 See Gray, 125 F.3d at 1385.
584 See Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir.
1984); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller v. Thomas M.
Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); Kuntz v. Windjammer "Bare-
foot" Cruises, Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 738 F.2d 423 (3d Cir.
1984).
585 The Eleventh Circuit remanded for the determination of the award of pre-
judgment interest. Evidently, interest had not been awarded in the court below,
but the record was unclear as to the basis for refusing it. Although generally
available in a maritime case, the district court had the discretion to decline to
make such an award if the application for interest had been untimely. See Gray,
125 F.3d at 1386.
586 No. 96-2454, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112 (E.D. La. Jan. 2, 1997).
587 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994).
19981
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the plaintiff included three variations of the failure to warn the-
ory of liability. The plaintiff did not allege a design defect
claim.
The defendants alleged that the government contractor de-
fense applied to the case and served as a basis for removal under
28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1994). The Fifth Circuit recognizes the fed-
eral officer defense as a valid exception to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule. A person who can present a colorable government
contractor defense and meets the other requirements for fed-
eral officer removal can thus remove a case.
The court applied the three-pronged test for federal officer
removal formulated in Mesa v. Californiat88 but only examined
the third prong, the existence of a causal nexus between the
plaintiffs' claims and the acts performed by the defendant
under color of federal office. 58 9 The court found no evidence
that "the Government restricted or prohibited [the defendant's]
ability to notify individuals of the presence of asbestos in the
workplace." 59 °" The court found that the defendant's freedom to
provide warnings did not support its claim that the government
contract prevented it from warning the plaintiffs' decedent.
The court held that this freedom negated the causal nexus be-
tween the acts required by the government, of the defendant
and the plaintiff's claims.
Finally, the court addressed whether the government contrac-
tor defense was colorable in this case. Boyle v. United Technolo-
gies, Inc., the case in which the Supreme Court recognized the
government contractor defense, involved allegations of design
defect, not failure to warn.591 The Wright court distinguished
this case from Boyle on the basis of the Wright plaintiff's allega-
tions of failure to warn claims only. With no discussion, the
court simply opined that "stretching" the defense to include
warning claims was "not indicated. 5 9 2
McCormick v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc. is another government
contractor defense case that resulted in a grant of the plaintiffs'
motion to remand. 9 3 Paul C. Cochran was a Navy officer who
contracted fatal mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos during
588 489 U.S. 121, 127 (1989) (defining criteria necessary to establish § 1442
removal).
589 See Gauthe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112, at *9.
590 Id.
591 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
592 Gauthe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112, at *18.
593 977 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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a long period of service aboard the U.S.S. Nimitz. The court re-
marked that the location of his exposure was not clear. The
claims were brought in the circuit court for the City of Newport
News under the Jones Act,594 the Death on the High Seas Act,595
and the general maritime law. The defendant removed the case
to the Eastern District of Virginia under the Federal Officer Re-
moval Statute.596
While its preliminary analysis of the government contractor
defense followed that in Gauhe,597 the McCormick court's discus-
sion was barely longer. The court merely referenced a prior un-
published decision (from another case) of the Eastern District
of Virginia from October, 1988. In that decision, the court held
that "the government contractor defense is not available in 'fail-
ure to warn' cases."598 With that terse statement of the law, the
court remanded the case to state court.
This next case contradicts the prior two by holding that fail-
ure to warn claims are subject to the government contractor de-
fense and even expands the defense to encompass both service
contracts and goods or services provided to the United Nations.
In Askir v. Brown & Root Services Corp.,5 99 the plaintiff was the
owner of a large compound (over one million square meters) in
Mogadishu, Somalia that included offices, a hotel, restaurants,
and other facilities. His property, along with property in several
other locations, was occupied by elements of the United States
military in December 1992 following their deployment to
Mogadishu in support of Operation Provide Relief. The Ameri-
can troops then turned the facilities over to the United Nations
on May 4, 1993, after the American forces transitioned control
of the operation to the United Nations. The defendant Brown
& Root performed contractual logistical services, including re-
pairs and other services, for both the United States Army and
the United Nations. In performing those services, Brown &
Root occupied at least some portion of the plaintiffs property.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, along with the United
States and the United Nations, owed him for the rental value of
the property during the time the property was occupied.600
594 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994).
595 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1994).
596 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1994).
597 See 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112, at 18.
598 McCormick, 977 F. Supp. at 402 (citation omitted).
5- No. 95-C 11008, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14494 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997).
600 See id. at *5-10.
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Brown & Root argued that the plaintiff's claims were barred
by application of the government contractor defense. The court
analyzed the defense and focused on its historic relationship
with the principle of sovereign immunity. The court then found
that the defense applied not only to military procurement con-
tracts but also to performance contracts. 0'° The issue then be-
came whether the defense should be extended to include
performance contracts with the United Nations.
Under the United Nations Convention, the international
body has immunity from suit except where it has expressly
waived immunity. 602 The court held that reasons similar to
those that supported the extension of the sovereign immunity
umbrella to protect government contractors applied in the case
of UN contractors.0 3 In this particular case, the court found
the facts especially compelling because of the special province
of sovereigns in carrying out military operations.6 4
The court briefly applied the three prongs of the Boyle formu-
lation of the defense to the facts of the case. The first prong,
"reasonably precise specifications" from the government for the
defendant's activities, and the second prong, action undertaken
at the direction and control of the government, transfer easily to
the performance context. The court recognized that the third
prong, which requires the supplier to warn the government of
all the dangers of which it was aware, did not apply to the per-
formance contract in this case. The result would seem to estab-
lish an abbreviated test for analyzing the applicability of the
government contractor defense to performance contracts: the
first prong requires "reasonably precise specifications," and the
second requires that the defendant acted under the direction
and control of the governmental entity. With the increased use
of civilian maintenance and other contractors in support of avia-
tion-related operations, it will be interesting to see if this modi-
fied Boyle analysis is adopted elsewhere.
Failure to warn was treated more thoroughly in Yeroshefsky v.
Unisys Corp., which further expanded the government contrac-
tor defense in the District of Maryland. 60 5 The plaintiffs claims
arose out of a repetitive stress injury that he claimed he suffered
601 See id. at *16-17.
602 See id. at *18.
603 See id. at *19.
604 See id.
605 962 F. Supp. 710 (D. Md. 1997).
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while operating the multi-positional letter sorting machine as an
employee of the United States Postal Service.
First, the court determined that although the defense began
as the "military contractor defense," several courts had ex-
panded the doctrine to include non-military contractors. 6° 6 In-
deed, the court noted that the Supreme Court based its
recognition of the doctrine on the discretionary function ex-
emption 60 7 to the Federal Tort Claims Act.60 8
Second, the court addressed the applicability of the defense
to failure to warn claims. Finding no Fourth Circuit precedent
on point, the court examined the positions of the other circuits,
each of which applied different standards before the defense is
recognized.60 9 The court identified the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits as requiring that the government's specifica-
tions to the contractor specifically prohibit warnings. 6 "' The
Third Circuit was described as allowing the defense to succeed
as to warning if the manufacturer establishes the defense with
respect to a design defect claim and the specifications are silent
on the issue of warnings.611
After reviewing the above-noted decisions, the Yeroshefsky
court held that the Sixth Circuit's test stated in Tate v. Boeing
Helicopters"2 had the most compelling rationale.61 3 In that case,
the court refashioned the Boyle test and formed three similar
prongs. The first prong required that "the United States exer-
cised its discretion and approved the warnings, if any," the sec-
ond prong that "the contractor provided warnings that
conformed to the approved warnings," and the third prong that
"the contractor warned the United States of the dangers in the
equipment's use about which the contractor knew, but the
United States did not."614 The district court reasoned that the
government's approval of the warnings present on the product
should be more important in the analysis than whether the gov-
ernment specifically prohibited the relevant warning. This fo-
606 See id. at 715-17 (collecting cases).
-7 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
608 See Yeroshefsky, 962 F. Supp. at 716 (discussing Boyle).
609 See id., at 717-18 (collecting cases).
610 See id.
611 See id. at 718.
612 55 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1995).
613 See Yeroshefsky, 962 F. Supp. at 716.
614 Tate, 55 F.3d at 1157.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cus returns to the "essence of Boyle,'' 6 15 the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In applying the adopted Tale test to this case, the court found
that the government had issued exacting specifications, followed
by the defendant, and was perhaps even more cognizant of pos-
sible dangers than any of the manufacturers who participated in
the design of the machine. 61 6 Each step of the design, testing,
and production of the machine was carried out according to
procedures developed by the Postal Service and from which the
defendant could not deviate.
D. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
The economic loss doctrine in products liability cases oper-
ates to bar a suit in tort, relegating a potential plaintiff to a con-
tract remedy, most often based on warranty. Simply put, when a
product defect causes injury to the product only, the owner of
the product may not sue the manufacturer in tort. At the other
end of the spectrum of possible cases, when the product defect
causes a personal injury as a result of a "sudden occurrence,"
such as an explosion, the owner may sue in tort. Damage
caused to "other property" of the owner will often serve as a
sufficient basis to allow an action to proceed in tort. Thus, there
are two major issues that are raised in cases presenting facts in
between these extremes: where "the product" ends and "other
property" begins, and what effect the "sudden occurrence" has
on the right to bring an action in tort.
The doctrine has received much renewed attention following
the Supreme Court's decision in East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Deleval, Inc., which discussed both of the above is-
sues at length.617 In East River, engines on four identical super-
tankers suffered mechanical breakdowns causing damage to the
engines only. The resulting financial injury to each vessel oper-
ator, however, was substantial because the vessels were taken out
of operation. The court held that the doctrine applied in that
case to bar an action in tort because each engine failure only
damaged "the product itself."6 ' Some courts have applied an
exception to the doctrine that allows tort recovery if the product
1"5 Yeroshefsky, 962 F. Supp. at 718.
ti]6 See id.
17 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (adopting application of economic loss doctrine to
admiralty law).
618 See id. at 860.
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failure is sudden.619 The theory behind this exception is that
such a failure could easily cause injury to a person. The second
issue, "separate products," arose out of the plaintiffs argument
that the malfunctioning component of each engine and the en-
gine itself were two products. This theory would have allowed
the plaintiff to recover in tort under the majority rule. The
court adopted the majority rule but refused to accept this defini-
tion of "product."
In AIG Aviation, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,620 the Ninth
Circuit addressed the economic loss doctrine in the context of
Hawaii's state law. The plaintiff, Kenai Air Hawaii, Inc., ap-
pealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Bell
Helicopter. The case arose because a defective crosstube caused
damage to Kenai's Helicopter 67N. Sometime prior to the acci-
dent, Kenai switched identical crosstubes between two helicop-
ters, one of which was Helicopter 67N. Kenai argued that the
economic loss doctrine did not prevent it from recovering from
Bell in tort because the crosstube and the helicopter were sepa-
rate products. They were separate, the plaintiff argued, because
the crosstube on 67N at the time of the accident was not the
crosstube on the aircraft when it was purchased. The court re-
jected this argument, citing Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco
Corp.,621 and held that the exchange of identical parts among
several products does not create a "product and 'other prop-
erty.' '6 22 The alternative would allow buyers to circumvent the
economic loss doctrine and avoid limitations on a warranty rem-
edy. Instead, the court defined the product as "the object of the
bargain" between the parties.62S
Bell Helicopter again successfully applied the economic loss
defense in Gui Zhi v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 6 24 In Zhi the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled that,
under Texas law, the economic loss doctrine applied to both
negligence and strict liability claims. Gui Zhi arose out of a 1996
619 See id. at 869-70 (citing Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or.
1978)).
620 110 F.3d 67 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion reported in full at No.
95-16855, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5390 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 1997)).
621 930 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying economic loss doctrine to accident
caused by defective flotation device when buyer purchased several helicopters at
same time with identical flotation devices and later exchanged devices between
helicopters).
622 AIG, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5390, at *3.
623 Id.
624 No. CIV.A.97-CV-407-Y, 1997 WL 786494 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 1997).
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helicopter accident in which a Bell-manufactured helicopter was
destroyed, resulting in the loss of the helicopter and the future
revenue it might have generated. The accident had been
caused by a failure in the tail rotor shaft in the helicopter. The
aircraft's owner, China Southern Airlines, sought both compen-
satory and punitive damages under theories of negligence, strict
liability, and breach of contract.
The court noted that Texas had adopted the economic loss
rule 62 5 and that the rule extended to claims for strict product
liability. Damage to the product itself, the court held, "is essen-
tially a loss to the purchaser of the benefit of the bargain.... In
a transaction between a commercial buyer and a commercial
seller, when there has been no physical injury to persons or
other property, injury to the defective product itself is an eco-
nomic loss governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 62 6
The plaintiff argued that the loss of the entire helicopter satis-
fied the "other property" exception to the economic loss doc-
trine because the failed "product" was the helicopter's shaft
assembly, which had damaged other property consisting of the
helicopter itself. The district court rejected this argument and
ruled that the finished product for purposes of the economic
loss doctrine was the entire helicopter.
China Southern also asserted a negligent misrepresentation
claim. Although the Texas Supreme Court had not addressed
the application of the economic loss doctrine to that specific
cause of action, the Fifth Circuit had held that there was no ma-
terial difference between claims of negligent misrepresentation
and those for negligent design or manufacture for economic
loss purposes. 627 In light of Texas's general rule that the con-
tract exclusively governs in cases of pure economic loss and to
further the policies underlying the economic loss doctrine, the
court ruled that the doctrine extended to claims for negligent
misrepresentation. China Southern's sole claim for exemplary
damages was also excluded on the ground that they are not re-
coverable in contract.
Relegated exclusively to contract claims for breach of war-
ranty, the court ruled that China Southern's claims were barred
by the applicable four year contract/warranty limitations period
625 Seefim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986).
626 Gui Zhi, 1997 WL 786494, at *3 (citations omitted).
627 See id. (citing Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 844 F.2d 1174, 1178 n.8 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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and rejected plaintiffs argument that a discovery tolling
applied.
In Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., the Illi-
nois Supreme Court answered three questions certified to it by
the Seventh Circuit.628 In the underlying case, Pratt & Whitney
manufactured a PW120 engine in 1988 that was sold to Aerospa-
tiale, who then mounted it on an ATR 42-300 airplane. That
plane was sold, leased, and subleased to the plaintiff. The en-
gine warranty ran directly to the plaintiff as a result of specific
assignment language in each intermediate contract. The sales
contract made the warranty the exclusive remedy of the buyer.
According to the sublease agreement, the airplane had to be
returned with two PW120 engines, but the plaintiff need not re-
turn the original engines as long as replacements were certified
for use on the plane. In 1991, the original engine suffered a
malfunction and caught fire, damaging both the engine and the
aircraft.
The plaintiff filed suit and raised three theories of recovery:
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. The plaintiff
sought costs of repair to the engine and the airframe, lost reve-
nues, and recovery of the amounts of the passengers' claims,
which had been settled by the plaintiff, as damages. The de-
fendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to the eco-
nomic loss doctrine. Because the Seventh Circuit found Illinois
tort law uncertain, it certified the following three questions to
the Illinois Supreme Court: (1) For purposes of the economic
loss doctrine, does Illinois recognize a "sudden and calamitous
occurrence" exception?; (2) Can a product and one of its com-
ponent parts ever constitute two separate products?; and (3) Did
the airframe and the engine in this case constitute a single prod-
uct or two products?6 29
The Illinois Supreme Court first noted that it did not recog-
nize a "sudden and calamitous" exception.63 ° When the damage
is confined to the product itself, the mere fact that the damage
occurred in a sudden and calamitous manner will not create the
basis of an action in tort.
In examining the "separate products" questions, the plaintiff
suggested that the court should treat the products as the parties
628 682 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. 1997).
629 See Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 86 F.3d 725, 726-
27. (7th Cir. 1996).
630 Trans States, 682 N.E.2d at 54-55.
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treated them. The defendant instead advanced the "basis of the
bargain" theory. The court rejected the plaintiff's interchangea-
bility argument, noting that the engine in this case was the ac-
tual engine sold with the airplane and not a replacement. After
reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, the court settled on the
"product bargained for" approach. The court opined that this
approach was the most logical, fairest, and easiest for a court to
apply.63 1
In answering the third question, relating to the status of the
products in this case, the court looked to the definitions section
of the sublease agreement governing the plaintiff's possession of
the airplane. In that document, the term "aircraft" was defined
as both airframe and engines. The court thus held that the en-
gine and airframe in this case constituted a single product.
63 2
VI. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. REQUIREMENT OF ANALOGOUS STATE CLAIM
The scope of claims covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) was at issue in Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. United States.633
The issue before the court in Sea Airwas whether Sea Air Shuttle
Corporation (Sea Air) could assert a viable claim under the
FTCA for the alleged unlawful deprivation of the "right" to use
seaplane ramps in the Virgin Islands. Sea Air alleged that a
competing carrier had wrongfully been given a right of exclusive
use of the seaplane facilities in St. Thomas and St. Croix. The
district court dismissed Sea Air's complaint on the ground that
the First Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction to review orders of
the FAA and DOT pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act.6 34 The
district court held that the FTCA action was an improper collat-
eral attack on the administrative process.
The First Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The ultimate
issue before the circuit court in Sea Air was whether Sea Air
could assert a claim under the FTCA for the alleged negligent
failure of the FAA to enforce the Federal Aviation Act's prohibi-
tion against exclusive lease agreements for the use of air naviga-
tion facilities.
63, See id. at 58.
632 See id.
633 112 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1997).
634 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a) (1988) (rccodified at 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)
(1994)).
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Sea Air had been an unsuccessful bidder to a Virgin Islands
Port Authority 1990 tender for lease proposals to operate inter-
island air services.6"5 The winning bidder was Caribbean
Airboats, Inc. (CAI).
Sea Air objected to the award of exclusive use of certain facili-
ties to CAI, claiming that it was in violation of 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1349.636 Sea Air continued their efforts to acquire an Air Car-
rier Certificate while filing an unsuccessful action in Virgin Is-
lands Federal Court against the Port Authority and CA. In the
meantime, Sea Air sank into financial difficulties, attempted to
resolve its dispute through informal channels with the Depart-
ment of Transportation and eventually declared Chapter Eleven
Bankruptcy. On June 29, 1992, Sea Air's Chapter Eleven Bank-
ruptcy was converted to Chapter Seven Liquidation. Sea Air
then filed an administrative complaint with the Department of
Transportation and the FAA alleging that it had suffered nearly
$13 million in damages because of the FAA's failure to act on
Sea Air's administrative complaint and prevent CAI's exclusive
use.
After that claim was denied, Sea Air instituted the instant ac-
tion pursuant to the FTCA. Although the district court dis-
missed this action on jurisdictional grounds, it also noted that
the FAA's failure to comply with a federal statute did not create
a basis for a suit under the FTCA and that the alleged failure of
the FAA to enforce the prohibition against exclusive leases was a
"discretionary function." Thus, an appeal ensued.
The first issue before the First Circuit was whether the Federal
Aviation Act precluded simultaneous administrative and FTCA
claims. The district court had ruled solely on this basis and held
that no FTCA claim was sustainable. The First Circuit declined
to expressly affirm this finding. Although the court noted that it
was unlikely that an FTCA claim based upon the alleged FAA
inaction could be maintained, it nonetheless found some logic
to Sea Air's argument that an IFTCA action was its only recourse
for damages in the event of negligent conduct by FAA
employees.3 7
635 The previous operator was literally wiped out of existence by Hurricane
Hugo in 1989.
636 Recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 40103(c) (1994).
637 See Sea Air, 112 F.3d at 537. The relevant provision on judicial review of
orders from the FAA and DOT is 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (1994), formerly 49 U.S.C.
§ 1486. This provision affords an opportunity for review of administrative orders,
not an award of money damages.
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However, the circuit court ruled that Sea Air's claim failed a
fundamental threshold requirement under the FTCA in that
there was no existing analogous claim under which a private
person could be liable under similar circumstances." 8 To reach
this conclusion, the circuit court first had to distinguish the sem-
inal case of Indian Towing Co. v. United States.6" 9 In Indian Tow-
ing, the Supreme Court held that there was no "purely
governmental function" exception to the FTCA. Rather, under
traditional tort theory, when the government undertakes a func-
tion or duty (even one outside of those typically performed by a
private person) and induces the reliance of others, the govern-
ment has a duty to perform this duty non-negligently.640 The
First Circuit in Sea Air held that unlike the "Good Samaritan"
rule applied in Indian Towing, there was no analogous duty in
the private sector to the FAA's regulatory duty to enforce the
exclusive lease prohibition by cutting off federal funding to the
offending airport facility.64'
Sea Air attempted to craft an argument based upon its reli-
ance on the terms of its Air Carrier Certificate, which listed
CAI's bases as authorized points of origin and departure. The
court rejected Sea Air's argument that by including these bases
on the certificate, the FAA had undertaken a duty to ensure Sea
Air access to these facilities. Granting of this certificate, the
court held, imposed no duty on the FAA to secure access to any
of the approved routes or facilities. Rather, the certification is
nothing "more than a green light to fly, if and when the ar-
rangements are made with the necessary air facilities. '642 Ac-
cordingly, it would not have been reasonable for Sea Air to rely
upon the FAA to secure access to the seaplane ramps simply be-
cause Sea Air was authorized to use the ramps identified on its
certificate.
In conclusion, the First Circuit noted that although money
damages would not have been available, Sea Air was not without
a remedy. It could have pursued a writ of mandamus on the
administrative order from the court of appeals. If meritorious, a
timely mandamus petition could have alleviated the loss. In a
brief concluding paragraph, the circuit court also noted its
agreement with the district court that Sea Air's FTCA action was
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
639 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
640 See id. at 64-65.
641 Sea Air, 112 F.3d at 536-37.
642 Id. at 537.
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also subject to dismissal under the discretionary function excep-
tion. According to the First Circuit, the exclusive penalty for
violating exclusive lease provisions is the loss of federal funds.
Any additional remedy would be subject to the discretion of the
FAA. Accordingly, the FAA's failure or refusal to exercise this
discretion was not actionable.
B. LIABILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF AIR TRAFFIc CONTROLLERS
The alleged negligence of air traffic controllers was at issue in
U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States (USAU) 643 and
Hunter v. United States.s44 USA U arose from a June 14, 1989, acci-
dent at Columbus, Ohio, International Airport. This action in-
volved certain principals and their subrogated insurers and
related only to property damage caused by the accident. USAU
sued as the insurer of USAir, Inc., and Avemco Insurance Co.
sued as the insurer of CMH Fliers.
On the date of the accident, a CMH Fliers-owned Grumman
AA5 aircraft, Reg. No. N6506L (06L) collided with a USAir 737
after a wake turbulence encounter. The Grumman was on a
training flight. An American Airlines 737 had landed forty
seconds prior to the landing of 06L, generating the wake
vortices.
The tower at Columbus was manned by two FAA employees
and was in positive control of all aircraft in the pattern. With a
Falcon business jet approximately six miles from the airport, air
traffic control (ATC) instructed 06L to land on runway 28R and
specifically instructed the aircraft to "keep it in tight" to avoid a
conflict with the inbound jet. The student pilot at the controls
of 06L testified that he interpreted this as an instruction to land
on the runway as soon as possible. In complying with this in-
struction, the student shortened the expected length of time be-
tween his landing and that of the American 737 in front of him.
In its findings of fact, the district court noted that forty seconds
elapsed between the "keep it in tight" instruction and 06L's en-
counter with the 737 wake turbulence. After the wake turbu-
lence encounter, the pilots of 06L lost control of the aircraft,
which ultimately skidded to rest beneath the left wing of a USAir
737. Fire erupted, damaging the USAir aircraft. The court con-
cluded in its findings of fact that the crew of 06L failed to exe-
cute proper procedures for the avoidance of wake turbulence
643 25 Av. Cas.(CCH) 18,089 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
44 961 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
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and that the wake turbulence, once encountered, was beyond
the recovery capabilities of "a reasonable pilot of average
skill."645
The court ruled that Ohio substantive law applied to the
claim and that both ATC and the pilots of 06L were legally re-
sponsible for the accident. Because the risks of wake turbulence
were known to ATC, the court found the accident to be a fore-
seeable consequence of the following conduct on the part of
ATC: (a) the close sequencing of 06L behind the American 737;
and (b) the instruction to 06L to "keep it in tight." Similarly,
the pilots of 06L were also held to have known of the dangers
relating to wake turbulence and found to have failed to execute
the proper procedures to stay above the turbulence generated
by the 737. The negligence of the 06L pilots was also held to be
a proximate cause of the accident. However, the negligence of
the pilots was held not to have been an intervening superseding
cause that broke the chain of causation from that of ATC's negli-
gence. The court ultimately apportioned liability seventy per-
cent to the government and thirty percent to the pilots. of
06L.646
Air traffic controller negligence and wake turbulence were
also at issue in Hunter.64 7 However, in Hunter, the government
prevailed on its summary judgment motion. In this wrongful
death action, the representative of decedent Neil Hunter al-
leged that the negligence of an air traffic controller at Orlando
International Airport, consisting of failing to mandate adequate
separation of aircraft, caused Hunter to lose control and crash
his airplane after a wake turbulence encounter in October 1992.
Unlike the typical wake turbulence scenario, this wake turbu-
lence encounter occurred outside of the traffic pattern and at
relatively high altitude.
Prior to the encounter, Hunter was piloting his experimental
"Velocity" aircraft under visual flight rules en route to Meritt
Island, Florida. After receiving instructions as to the location of
a Delta Airlines 727 aircraft flying a parallel course and ac-
cepting an avoidance vector from ATC at Orlando, Hunter re-
sumed his southeast course to Meritt Island. At the time he
resumed his course, Hunter is reported to have been approxi-
mately 1000 feet below the 727 with one mile of horizontal sepa-
645 USAU, 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,093.
646 See id. at 18,094.
647 961 F. Supp. at 266.
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ration. Approximately 3.25 minutes after crossing the 727's
flight path, Hunter transmitted a Mayday call to ATC. He appar-
ently never recovered from an inverted flat spin and perished in
the aircraft.
Florida negligence law applied. Both parties stipulated that at
no time were the two aircraft either outside of visual separation
or closer to each other than the 1.5 miles lateral separation and
the five hundred feet vertical separation required by the ATC
manual. Thus, at least insofar as the separation of the aircraft
themselves was concerned, ATC had complied with published
standards. However, the plaintiff alleged that ATC nonetheless
could have exercised greater care in separating the aircraft in
compliance with some of the more general standards from the
ATC manual, such as those requiring controllers to issue safety
alerts when, in their judgment, an aircraft is in unsafe proximity
to terrain, obstacles, and other aircraft. The manual also re-
quires ATC, "to the extent practical," to clear large turbine en-
gine-powered aircraft from areas of VFR activity.648 The plaintiff
also alleged that the government's assumption of duties relating
to the separation of aircraft, other than those specified in the
ATC manual, induced reliance and gave rise to a higher duty of
care.
The government argued that ATC had complied with all ap-
plicable standards and that it was ultimately the pilot's duty to
"see and avoid" other aircraft. On the factual side, the govern-
ment contended that Hunter modified the aircraft in such a way
as to adversely affect its center of gravity and cause aerodynamic
instability. This instability, the government claimed, rendered
Hunter's Velocity aircraft more susceptible to the effects of wake
turbulence.
The court's order granting summary judgment for the gov-
ernment, although not divided into distinct findings of fact and
law, is easily divisible as such. As a matter of law, the court held
that it was the ultimate responsibility of the pilot in command to
see and avoid other aircraft, including the effects of their wake
vortices. Although Hunter, after requesting a lower altitude, ac-
cepted a recommendation from ATC to descend to 7500 feet, he
was not required to comply with this recommendation if he felt
itjeopardized his flight. In addition, Hunter's change of course
to resume his heading to Meritt Island, which took him across
the 727's flight path, was completely autonomous. The court
648 Id. at 268 (citing FAA Air Traffic Control Handbook 1-1, 2-6, 7-112).
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held that, as a matter of law, ATC has no duty to warn a pilot of
that which he should ordinarily know and that of which he
should already be aware.649
In its factual review, the court found that Hunter had modi-
fied the aircraft by enlarging the fuel tanks, which rendered it
unstable. Based upon the length of time between the Mayday
call and the Velocity's crossing of the jet's flight path, the court
concluded that the aft center of gravity (CG) of the aircraft (for
which Hunter had not compensated by adding forward ballast)
caused it to go out of control after the wake turbulence of the
727 had dissipated to a point that would not have disrupted the
flight of a safely balanced aircraft. Thus, Hunter had failed to
exercise due care because he flew "an aircraft with an aft CG
into wake turbulence caused by a much larger commercial air-
craft."6 5 In conclusion, the court held that there was no breach
of duty by ATC to Hunter and, even assuming a breach, there
was no proximate causation. Summary judgment was entered
for the defendant, the United States.
C. PROXIMATE CAUSE
The United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire relied upon more traditional tort concepts in grant-
ing the government's motion to dismiss in McGrath v. United
States.6 5 ' McGrath arose from the issuance of an FAA waiver for
the holding of an air show at Lebanon Municipal Airport, New
Hampshire. The waiver permitted certain otherwise prohibited
flight activities to be performed below 1500 feet for air show
purposes. As the holders of the certificate, the air show spon-
sors were primarily responsible for the safety of the event and
assuring compliance with applicable Federal Aviation Regula-
tions (FARs). In addition, an FAA inspector was present for pur-
poses of surveillance and ensuring compliance with the waiver.
The air show opening festivities consisted of a sky jump where
members of the "Pond Family Skydivers" would link in a skydive
and later deploy an American flag along with their parachutes.
While the sky jump proceeded, two biplanes were to circle the
skydivers. In the course of this performance, a biplane piloted
641 See id. at 270 (citing Worthington v. United States, 807 F. Supp. 1545, 1568
(S.D. Ga. 1992) and Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
650 USAU, 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18,093.
65, 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,040 (D.N.H. 1997).
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by Mary Jane McGrath collided with skydiver Scott Pond. Both
died in the accident.
John P. McGrath, as executor of the estate of Mary Jane Mc-
Grath, instituted an FTCA action, alleging that the accident was
due to the FAA's failure to adequately perform its duties relating
to the air show, in particular the issuance of the certificate. Mc-
Grath alleged that Scott Pond was not expected to jump from
the airplane nor was he properly licensed for the demonstration
or approved to participate in the air show. He claimed that the
FAA was required to insist that the Pond family list all show par-
ticipants. If this had been done, McGrath would have antici-
pated the additional sky diver and the accident would not have
occurred. McGrath also alleged that the application for the Air
Show Certificate had been incorrectly and inadequately com-
pleted and that proper supervision by the FAA would have re-
sulted either in a certificate listing all of the sky divers or the
disqualification of Scott Pond. In either case, he argued, the
accident would have been prevented.
The district court's opinion focused on proximate causation.
Although the court noted that the accident would not have oc-
curred had the FAA not certified the air show, "there was no
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that
the FAA's conduct was the legal or proximate cause of the
accident. 652
In granting the United States' motion to dismiss, the district
court held that under New Hampshire's common law, proxi-
mate cause required foreseeability on the part of the alleged
tortfeasor. "Thus, in order to establish the existence of proxi-
mate cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injury
was the natural and probable result of the negligent act and that
it was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent
act."
653
McGrath alleged that the FAA's failure to prohibit parachut-
ists who did not have a Class C or Class D USPA license from
participating, which allowed Scott Pond to take part in the
jump, was a proximate cause of the accident. Had Pond been
refused permission to jump, McGrath argued, the accident
would not have happened. The district court ruled that the ac-
cident was not in any way attributable to the qualifications of
Scott Pond. Rather, the accident was attributable to a failure in
652 Id. at 18,042.
653 Id. at 18,043.
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communication between McGrath and the Pond family
skydivers relating to the number of participating parachutists.
Similarly, the FAA's alleged negligence in failing to require
more detail in the application before issuing the Air Show Cer-
tificate was held not to be a proximate cause of the accident.6"4
Although the granting of the certificate satisfied the "but for"
test as the refusal to issue the certificate would have prevented
the accident, foreseeability presented an insurmountable obsta-
cle. Notwithstanding the incomplete application, the court
ruled that it was not foreseeable to the government that either:
(1) McGrath would be affirmatively misled at the pre-show brief-
ing with regard to the number of parachutists expected to par-
ticipate in the flag jump; or (2) "if she had been told that the
jump would involve three parachutists, McGrath would begin
circling the performers after only two had exited the jump
plane. ' 655 In closing, the court noted that any number of events
could be listed, the elimination of which might have broken the
"chain of causation." However, plaintiffs failed to establish that
any alleged conduct on the part of the FAA passed the necessary
legal threshold to be a proximate or legal cause of the
accident.6 6
VII. INSURANCE
A. QUALIFICATIONS OF PILOTS
In Schneider Leasing, Inc. v. United States Aviation Underwriters,
Inc., the plaintiff, Schneider Leasing, Inc. (Schneider), brought
suit against the defendant, United States Aircraft Insurance
Group (USAIG) seeking to recover under the physical damage
coverage of an insurance policy (Policy) for the loss of a twin-
engine Beechcraft Baron airplane (Aircraft) that crashed on
June 11, 1993, shortly after take-off from the Fort Madison, Iowa
airport.657 At the time of the crash, 651 the Aircraft was owned by
Schneider and was being operated by Phillip Heimbecker
(Heimbecker), a Woodbury County sheriffs deputy. Also on
board were another sheriff's deputy, Jon Hermann, and a pris-
654 See id. at 18,045.
655 Id.
656 See id. at 18,046.
657 555 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Iowa 1996).
658 The cause of the crash was disputed by the parties. Various explanations
were offered, including pilot error, mechanical malfunction, and interference by
Cardenas, who had a fear of flying. See id.
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oner, Armondo Cardenas, who was being transported from the
prison in Fort Madison to Sioux City. Both Heimbecker and
Hermann were killed in the crash, and Cardenas was seriously
injured.659
On August 10, 1993, Schneider submitted a proof of loss to
USAIG.66 ° USAIG declined coverage stating that it was not liable
because Heimbecker did not meet the minimum pilot experi-
ence and certification provisions set forth in the Policy. 661
Schneider then brought suit against USAIG.
USAIG moved for summary judgment claiming that the loss
was not covered by the Policy because the Aircraft was being op-
erated by a pilot who lacked the qualifications required by the
Policy. In support of its motion, USAIG offered unrefuted evi-
dence that Heimbecker failed to meet three of the Policy's seven
criteria for "rental uses." First, he lacked a commercial pilot cer-
tificate. Second, Heimbecker did not have an instrument rat-
ing. Finally, Heimbecker was well short of logging the flight
hours required by the Policy.66 2
Schneider argued that USAIG's motion should be denied for
several reasons. First, he claimed that there was a genuine issue
of fact as to the cause of the crash, which was relevant because
USAIG's denial of coverage was regulated by Iowa's antitechni-
cality statute,663 and such denial could be overcome if the condi-
659 See id.
- See id.
661 USAIG's policy contained the following exclusion under the heading "Limi-
tations on Use": "To be covered under this policy the aircraft must be owned,
maintained or used only for the purpose shown on the Coverage Summary page
and described below and flown only by a pilot or pilots described on the Cover-
age Summary page." Id.
The relevant portions of the pilot description read:
WITH RESPECT TO RENTAL USES:
C.) MULTI-ENGINE AIRCRAFT
Any pilot holding an FAA Commercial Pilot Certificate with FAA
Multi-Engine and Instrument Rating who has flown a minimum of
1500 hours as Pilot In Command, at least 350 hours of which shall
have been in multi-engine aircraft and at least 25 hours in make
and model being flown and a checkout by a Certified Flight
Instructor.
WITH RESPECT TO CHARTER USES:
[Any] pilot holding an FAA Pilot Certificate with proper ratings
for the flight involved who has been approved by George Prescott.
Id. at 839-40.
662 See id.
663 Section 515.101 of the Iowa Code states as follows:
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tion that made the policy inapplicable was not a cause of the
loss. 664 Second, Schneider asserted that certain terms in the Pol-
icy's "pilot qualification" provision were ambiguous. Specifi-
cally, the Policy did not define the terms "rental use" or "charter
use." Schneider argued that Heimbecker's use of the Aircraft
on the day of the accident could be considered a "charter flight"
in which case the qualifications required for "rental use" were
not applicable. Finally, Schneider contended that USAIG was
estopped from asserting its policy defenses because USAIG alleg-
edly informed Schneider that it would notify Schneider if cover-
age for Heimbecker became problematic, and it never did so.665
The district court denied USAIG's motion for summary judg-
ment. In doing so, it ruled that section 515.101 was applicable
and that there was no "change in use" within the meaning of
§ 515.102(8) of the Iowa Code.666 The district court, however,
did not consider Schneider's waiver and estoppel argument in
denying the motion. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted
USAIG permission to appeal in advance of final judgment.66 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa rejected Schneider's
argument that an ambiguity existed in the Policy because it did
not define the terms "rental" and "charter" uses. The court held
that Schneider, as an aircraft lessor, was deemed to be familiar
with the industry meaning of the term "rental" use as contrasted
with "charter" use. Relying on certain extrinsic 668 evidence of-
fered by USAIG, the court found that a "charter" use refers to
providing an aircraft and flight crew, whereas a "rental" use re-
fers to providing only the plane. The court then determined
Any condition or stipulation in an application, policy, or contract
of insurance, making the policy void before the loss occurs, shall
not prevent recovery thereon by the insured, if it shall be shown by
the plaintiff that the failure to observe such provision or the viola-
tion thereof did not contribute to the loss.
64 See Schneider, 555 N.W.2d at 840.
665 See id.
666 This statute limits the effect of § 515.101, as follows: "Any condition or
stipulation referring: (8) To a change in the occupancy or use of the property
insured, if such change or use makes the risk more hazardous .. .shall not be
changed or affected by the provision of section 515.101."
667 See Schneider, 555 N.W.2d at 839-41.
668 The Court stated that it was appropriate for it to consider extrinsic evidence
to become familiar with the commercial aviation industry's specialized vocabulary
because the terms used may have meanings, unknown to the general population,
which are well-settled in the aviation industry. See id. at 841.
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Heimbecker's use of the Aircraft was governed by the "rental"
use provisions of the physical damage coverage.66 9
The court also held that section 515.101 was inapplicable be-
cause USAIG's policy defense was not based upon an abrogation
of the policy but on the limits placed on the coverage afforded
thereunder. In other words, the court found that the limitation
on which USAIG relied did not void any existing coverage under
its Policy but simply placed the loss outside the coverages af-
forded from the inception of the contract. Accordingly, the
court held that Heimbecker's failure to meet the conditions set
out in the policy precluded Schneider from obtaining physical
damage coverage under the Policy.670
Nevertheless, the court found that the record presented a
genuine issue of material fact concerning Schneider's claims of
waiver and estoppel. As a result, the court affirmed the district
court's order denying summary judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings in light of its decision. 671
In North American Specialty Insurance Co. v. Myers,67 2 the issue of
pilot qualifications was addressed by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. On December 19, 1992, John Myers (Myers) and Ar-
thur Huffman (Huffman), a certified flight instructor (CFI),
were flying a 1959 single-engine Piper Comanche airplane (Air-
craft) from Otsego County Airport in Michigan to North Caro-
lina. Shortly after take-off, the Aircraft crashed and both men
were killed.673 Myers' estate brought suit against Huffman's es-
tate. Huffman's estate brought suit against Myers' estate and
Clare Colwell (Colwell), one of the owners of the Aircraft.
At the time of the accident, the Aircraft was covered by an
insurance policy (Policy) issued by North American Specialty In-
surance Company (Insurer) to Myers and Colwell. The binder
of insurance that was issued to Myers and Colwell prior to the
issuance of the Policy contained two critical provisions: (1)
"Open Pilot Provisions: PVT/750TT/250RG/25M&M," and (2)
- See id. at 841.
670 See id. at 842.
671 See id. at 843.
672 111 F.3d 1273 (6th Cir. 1997).
673 See id. at 1276. Although it is unclear which man was flying the Aircraft at
the time of the crash, all parties assumed that Huffman was piloting the craft.
The Huffman estate, however, also proceeded on the alternative theory that the
Insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify the Myers estate and Colwell against
its claims if Myers was piloting the Aircraft during the accident.
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"Special Pilot Requirements: 15 DUAL W/CFI PRIOR TO
SOLO. 674
The "Special Pilot Requirements" provision required Colwell
and Myers to have fifteen hours of flight instruction with a CFI
before either of them flew the Aircraft alone. The "Open Pilot
Provisions" required that pilots subject to its conditions have a
private pilot's license, 750 hours of total flying time, 250 hours
of flying an airplane with retractable gear, and 25 hours of flying
time in the same make and model aircraft as the insured
Aircraft.67 5
Colwell and Myers signed the binder on November 23, 1992.
On November 28, 1992, the Insurer signed the Policy and issued
the pilot requirements on December 1, 1992. Colwell did not
receive the Policy until January 7, 1993. "The Policy contained a
section entitled 'pilot requirements endorsement', which stated
in part that 'this policy is not in effect while the aircraft is in
flight or in motion unless the pilot of the aircraft meets all the
requirements specified herein.' 6 76 The section described, in
relevant part, persons permitted to fly the aircraft as:
John Myers, a private or commercial, single-engine land rated pi-
lot to receive 15 hours of dual instruction in the insured aircraft
by a FAA certified single-engine land flight instructor prior to
solo in the insured aircraft.
Any FAA certified single-engine land flight instructor who has
flown and logged at least 25 hours in the same make and model
as the insured aircraft, only while instructing a named pilot listed
above in the insured aircraft.
6 77
The Insurer sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the
Policy did not provide coverage for the accident because
Huffman did not satisfy the requirement of having flown and
logged twenty-five hours in the same make and model aircraft as
the insured Aircraft. The district court granted the Insurer's
two separate motions for partial summary judgment and the ac-
tion was eventually dismissed.
On appeal, the representatives of the Myers and Huffman es-
tates and Colwell (collectively, the Appellants) asserted that
there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the Policy re-




677 Id. at 1276-77.
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the same make and model as the insured Aircraft. 78 Specifi-
cally, the Appellants argued that the "Open Pilot Provisions" of
the binder, which required pilots other than Myers and Colwell
to have logged twenty-five hours in the same make and model of
aircraft, did not apply to CFIs. Although the Policy explicitly
required CFIs to possess these qualifications, the Appellants as-
serted that the Policy imposed new conditions that were not
present in the binder and therefore were unenforceable.7 9
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Appellants' argument stating
that the Policy clarified the binder to make clear that the re-
quirements for CFIs were less than those imposed upon other
pilots. The court reasoned that, because the binder contained
no special section explicitly designating CFIs as proper opera-
tors and the "Special Pilot Provisions" clearly did not apply to
CFIs, coverage existed when a CFI was piloting the Aircraft only
if the CFI met the requirements of the "Open Pilot Provisions."
The court then found that the record contained no evidence680
that Huffman had logged twenty-five hours in an airplane that
qualified as the same make and model as the Aircraft.681 Ac-
cordingly, it held that coverage did not exist for the accident if
Huffman was piloting the Aircraft.
The Sixth Circuit also held that coverage would not exist if
Myers had been piloting the Aircraft at the time of the accident.
The court reached this conclusion after finding that the Policy
required Myers "to receive 15 hours of dual instruction in the
insured aircraft by a FAA certified single-engine land flight in-
structor."68 2 The court determined that although the Policy did
not expressly require the CFI who was training Myers to satisfy
the twenty-five hour requirement, it would be unreasonable to
conclude that the Policy might provide coverage if Myers was
piloting the Aircraft while receiving training from a CFI who
would not have been a qualified trainer if he himself had been
678 The Myers Estate and Colwell also argued that Huffman satisfied the re-
quirements of the Policy and that the Insurer was estopped from denying that the
crash is an insured loss. See id. at 1277.
679 See id. at 1277-78.
680 The court rejected the arguments by the Myers Estate and Colwell that
Huffman actually logged twenty-five hours in the same "make and model" of air-
craft. The court noted that the Appellants did not introduce a written log of
hours flown. See id. at 1280. The court also found that there was no evidence
that the log books were altered. See id. at 1282-83.
681 See id. at 1278-80.
682 Id. at 1279.
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piloting the Aircraft. Accordingly, because Huffman did not sat-
isfy the Policy's requirements, neither could Myers.683
B. SCOPE OF COVERAGE PROVIDED TO AN "INSURED"
The issue in Insurance Co. of North America v. Baughman68 4 was
the scope of coverage provided under the policies' definition of
"insured."6"5
On October 12, 1992, an aircraft (Aircraft) owned by Gas Sys-
tems & Services, Inc. (Gas Systems) crashed in East Point, Geor-
gia. At the time of the crash, the Aircraft was piloted by Nils
Anderson (Anderson) and was being used by the Belk-Hudson
Company (Belk-Hudson) for a business trip. Belk-Hudson hired
Anderson to operate the Aircraft on its behalf. Anderson and
three passengers died from injuries sustained in the crash and a
fourth passenger sustained personal injuries. The four passen-
gers all were employees of Belk-Hudson.686
Personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits were filed in
South Carolina state court by the surviving passenger and by the
representatives of the decedents' estates (collectively, Plaintiffs)
against, among others, Anderson's estate and Belk-Hudson.
Belk-Hudson's insurers, Insurance Company of North America
and United States Fire Insurance Company (collectively, Insur-
ers) subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
seeking a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties
under two aviation insurance polices (Policies) issued to Belk-
68 See id.
684 122 F.3d 1061, 1997 WL 565842 (4th Cir. 1997). Please note that the Rules
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may limit citation to unpublished
opinions.
685 The Policy defined the term "Insured" as follows:
The unqualified word Insured wherever used in the policy includes
not only the Named Insured but also includes any executive officer,
director, stockholder, employee or agent thereof while acting in
the scope of his duties as such ....
The insurance with respect to any person other than the Named Insured does
not apply to:
1. Any partner, executive officer, director, stockholder, employee
or agent with respect to injury or death of another partner, exec-
utive officer, director, stockholder, employee or agent of the
same employer insured in the course of his duties or
employment.
Id.
686 See Baughman, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23957, at *2.
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Hudson. 68 7 The Policies covered, among other things, the use
of "non-owned" airplanes like the one involved in the crash.688
The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against the Insur-
ers on the ground that Anderson's estate was covered under the
Policies as an "insured." The Insurers filed a cross-motion for
summaryjudgment. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' mo-
tion and granted the Insurers' cross-motion. In doing so, the
district court held that the Policies did not cover Anderson's es-
tate for the claims of the victims, regardless of whether Ander-
son was an employee of Belk-Hudson or an independent
contractor. The district court found that the Policies' definition
of "insured" unambiguously excluded from coverage claims
made by Belk-Hudson employees against co-employees. In addi-
tion, the district court found that the definition of "insured" did
not cover independent contractors.689
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's de-
cision.69 ° In doing so, the court noted that the district court
correctly determined that the Policies' definition of "insured"
was unambiguous and that Anderson was not covered under
that definition, regardless of whether he was an employee of
Belk-Hudson or an independent contractor. The court agreed
with the district court that the Policies unambiguously excluded
independent contractors from coverage. Similarly, the court
found that the Policies limited coverage to "the Named Insured
[and] any executive officer, director, stockholder, employee or.
agent thereof... .691 The court also noted that, even if Ander-
son were an employee of Belk-Hudson, he still would not be cov-
ered under the Policies because the second sentence 692 of the
687 The only compensation at issue in this case was whether the victims could
recover from Belk-Hudson's insurers. The victims already had received worker's
compensation benefits and were compensated under an insurance policy held by
Gas Systems.
688 See id. at *2-3.
689 See id. at *5-6.
690 The Fourth Circuit also denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Questions
of Law to the South Carolina Supreme Court and a Renewed Motion to Certify
Issues to the South Carolina Supreme Court because it found that there was suffi-
cient controlling precedent in the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme
Court to make such certification unnecessary.
691 Id. at *6-7. The Plaintiffs conceded that Anderson must have been an em-
ployee of Belk-Hudson to qualify as an "insured" under the definition.
692 The second sentence states that "the insurance with respect to any person
other than the Named Insured does not apply to: (1) any employee or agent
with respect to injury or death of another . . . employee or agent of the same
employer injured in the course of his duties of employment." Id. at 7.
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definition unambiguously excluded coverage of suits by co-
employees.693
C. ABSTENTION
The issue in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v.
Karp was whether the district court properly abstained from de-
ciding whether an insurer was required to indemnify and de-
fend the estate of a person killed in an airplane crash." 4
On April 12, 1993, a small airplane (Aircraft) en route from
Groton, Connecticut crashed near Cortland, New York. Robert
Freeman (Freeman) was piloting the Aircraft and providing
flight instruction to a student pilot, Ethel Karp (Karp). Free-
man, Karp, and Freeman's daughter, Stephanie, died in the
crash. Two other persons on board, Matthew Massaro (Mas-
saro) and Kerrie Rogers (Rogers), survived.
At the time of the crash, the Aircraft was insured by a liability
insurance policy (Policy) issued by National Union Fire Insur-
ance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Insurer) to the Aircraft's own-
ers. The Policy excluded from coverage those persons "engaged
in . . . the operation of [a] . . . commercial flying service or
flying school with respect to any occurrence arising out of
such . . . operations." 695
After the crash, various lawsuits were commenced in Connect-
icut state court on behalf of the estates of the persons killed and
injured in the crash (Victims). After some dispute, the Insurer
agreed to defend the pilot's estate but reserved its rights. It be-
lieved the loss was not covered because the pilot was operating a
commercial flying service or flying school at the time of the
accident.
Following jury verdicts in favor of the Victims, one of the rep-
resentatives of a decedent's estate commenced a direct action
against the Insurer in Connecticut state court (the Direct Ac-
tion). The Insurer then filed an interpleader action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York, naming as defendants all potential claimants (Defendants)
to the Policy.696 The Insurer's complaint sought (1) a declara-
tion that the Insurer did not have a duty to indemnify or defend
the pilot's estate under the Policy, and (2) in the event that
-3 See id. at *7.
-J4 108 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1997).
611 Id. at 19.
696 See id. at 19-20.
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some of the Defendants were entitled to coverage, that they be
required to interplead their claims up to the Policy limit, with
the insurer discharged from further liability on the Policy. The
complaint also sought to restrain the prosecution of the Direct
Action and to enjoin all other parties from instituting actions
concerning the Policy during the pendency of the interpleader
action.697
The Defendants moved, among other things, to dismiss the
Insurer's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The De-
fendants also argued that the district court should abstain from
adjudicating the declaratory claim in the Insurer's complaint
and allow the issue of coverage to be determined in the Direct
Action.
Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co.,6 9 8 the district court determined that, although it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the Insurer's action because it
was in the nature of an interpleader, it would exercise its discre-
tion and abstain from adjudicating the coverage issues. 699 The
district court reasoned that because the Direct Action was a con-
current state proceeding and the state court was better adapted
to resolve the coverage issues, it should abstain from adjudicat-
ing Insurer's claim for declaratory relief.700 The district court
also declined to enjoin the Direct Action. The district court,
however, retained jurisdiction to rule on the interpleader issues
raised in the Insurer's complaint and enjoined the other de-
fendants from prosecuting any actions against the Insurer. 0
On appeal, the Insurer argued that the district court erred in
abstaining from ruling on the coverage issues because "Wilton's
holding is limited to actions exclusively brought under the De-
claratory Judgment Act ("DJA")."7 °2 As such, the Insurer as-
serted that because its action was brought under the
interpleader statute, the district court was bound to apply the
"exceptional circumstances" standard governing abstention set
forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.7 °3 The Insurer also argued that the district court erred in
697 See id. at 20.
698 515 U.S. 277 (1955).
- See Karp, 108 F.3d at 20.
700 See id.
701 See id. at 21.
702 See id.
703 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (defining the "exceptional circumstances" standard for
federal court abstention).
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concluding that the Direct Action was a concurrent state
proceeding."'
The Second Circuit noted that the issues presented in this
case were ones of first impression for the court. The court then
affirmed the district court's decision to abstain from adjudicat-
ing the coverage issues. In doing so, the court rejected the In-
surer's contention that Wilton's holding is limited to actions
exclusively brought under the DJA and is not applicable to
claims for declaratory relief raised in other contexts such as stat-
utory interpleader. In this regard, the court noted that the In-
surer's action was not a typical interpleader action. The court
also noted that the availability of interpleader jurisdiction does
not require its exercise if the action can be "fairly adjudicated"
in state court. The court then stated that the coverage issues
would be adequately and fairly adjudicated in the Direct
Action. 05
The Second Circuit also rejected the insurer's contention that
the Direct Action was not a concurrent proceeding to the fed-
eral action. The court noted that federal and state proceedings
are "concurrent" or "parallel" for purposes of abstention when
there is an identity of parties and the issues and relief sought are
the same. The court then held that because the primary claim
for declaratory relief raised by the Insurer would be raised and
decided in the Direct Action, and the Insurer and the estate
were parties in both suits, the Direct Action was a "concurrent"
proceeding. The court therefore held that the district court did
not err as a matter of law in applying the discretionary standard
enunciated in Wilton when deciding to abstain from adjudicat-
ing the coverage issues.70 6
The court, however, reversed the portion of the district
court's decision that enjoined other parties from joining in the
Direct Action. The court concluded that restraining other par-
ties would be unjust because the claims to be asserted were iden-
tical to the ones already asserted against the Insurer. In
addition, prohibiting these parties from joining in the Direct Ac-
tion may have the unjust effect of binding them to a determina-
tion of crucial coverage issues without allowing them the
707
opportunity to participate in litigating the issue.
704 See Karp, 108 F.3d at 21.
705 See id. at 20-21.
706 See id. at 22-23.
707 See id. at 23.
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VIII. LIABILITY OF AIRPORT OWNERS AND OPERATORS
A. PERSONAL INJURY
The underlying facts of Boyette v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. are
both tragic and bizarre.7 °8 The case touches upon the overlap-
ping boundaries of passenger safety liability that exist between
common carriers and airport operators. In Boyette, the dece-
dent, Rutherford, became severely intoxicated before and dur-
ing a flight from Memphis, Tennessee to Sioux City, Iowa. The
flight had an intermediate stop to change aircraft at Lambert
International Airport in St. Louis, Missouri. After the stop at
Lambert International, Rutherford and three of his co-workers
intended to continue on the carrier's same flight to Sioux City.
After the flight arrived in St. Louis, Rutherford deplaned,
walked under a yellow rope and climbed onto a luggage tug ve-
hicle that was idling on the tarmac. When he was advised that
the carrier's boarding agent had called airport security, Ruther-
ford slid off of the luggage tug and walked into the terminal,
where he commandeered an electric golf cart. Rutherford then
began joy-riding around the gate area. When the carrier's
boarding agent gave chase and stated that Rutherford was "go-
ing to jail," Rutherford took flight. Eventually cornered in a
large alcove area of the terminal, Rutherford and a co-worker
concealed themselves in an unlocked cleaning room, with no
other avenue of exit except for a small door in the wall.
Rutherford's co-worker helped him climb through the door.
The door opened into a trash chute, which led to a mechanical
trash compactor ten feet below. Rutherford fell into the com-
pactor where he laid injured and unresponsive. Before the car-
rier's boarding agent and security personnel removed
Rutherford, the machine automatically cycled, fatally injuring
Rutherford.
Rutherford's estate brought a wrongful death action against
the carrier and the City of St. Louis. The estate claimed the
carrier acted negligently by chasing Rutherford through the
concourse and failing to timely remove him from the com-
pactor. The estate claimed the city was negligent for failing to
have an emergency deactivation switch in the cleaning room,
failing to have warning signs disclosing that the small door led
to a trash compactor, and failing to timely remove Rutherford
from the machine.
708 954 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order
of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
The first issue considered by the appellate court was whether
the chase by the carrier's employees through the terminal ex-
tended the duty of care owed by the carrier to its "passenger."
Rutherford and his co-workers were ticketed for a single flight
from Memphis to Sioux City (which they had not yet com-
pleted), and Rutherford had consumed a large portion of his
intoxicating alcohol onboard the first leg of the flight.
The Court held:
Missouri has long recognized a special relationship exists be-
tween a common carrier, like TWE [sic], and its passengers. "A
common carrier has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care
to safely transport its passengers and protect them while in
transit." . . . But this duty exists only so long as the special rela-
tionship of passenger and carrier exists. . . The carrier dis-
charges its duty once the passenger reaches a reasonably safe
place .... In the instant case it is without dispute Rutherford
safely reached the airport. Thus, TWE [sic] fulfilled the duty it
owed Rutherford as a common carrier once he reached the air-
port terminal. At that point TWE's [sic] duty as a common car-
rier was discharged.
At oral arguments the appellant suggested that even if TWE's
[sic] duty as a common carrier was discharged once Rutherford
reached the airport terminal, a new duty arose once TWE [sic]
initiated pursuit of Rutherford. We disagree. Even if we were to
assume, arguendo, that a new duty arose once TWE [sic] initi-
ated a pursuit of Rutherford while he was still on the golf cart,
TWE [sic] showed facts demonstrating the final element neces-
sary for a negligence cause of action-proximate cause-cannot
be met.7
0 9
The court found that the decedent's act of climbing into the
trash chute to be the intervening proximate cause of his
injury.710
As to the airport's owner and operator, the City of St. Louis,
the court concluded that Rutherford was in the legal status of a
trespasser and held:
The appellant contends that once the City discovered Rutherford
in the dumpster and saw that he was injured the City owed Ruth-
erford a duty to rescue him from the compactor, and its failure
7011 Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
710 See id.
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to do so breached the duty of ordinary care that the City owed
him. We disagree.
Missouri does not require the exercise of ordinary care to in-
clude a duty to rescue. ... Thus, it cannot be said that the failure
of [City personnel] to rescue Rutherford from the dumpster
breached the duty to use ordinary care.711
As to the City's failure to have an emergency deactivation
switch in the cleaning room, the court held:
Trespassers take the premises, for better or worse, as they find
them, assuming the risk of injury from their condition, "the
owner being liable only for hidden dangers intentionally placed
to injure them or for any willful, illegal force used against them."
This is the rule whether the trespasser is known or unknown. 71 2
B. AIRCRAFT-PROPERTY DAMAGE
In Knowles v. City of Granbuy,71 3 the plaintiff stored his general
aviation aircraft in a large, locked hangar, access to which was
controlled by its owner, the City of Granbury. Without the
plaintiffs knowledge, Granbury permitted children to enter the
hangar as part of an exhibition, (the EAA Young Eagles Fly-In)
during which the airport's manager permitted the plaintiffs air-
craft to be used for demonstration purposes. A child was ob-
served sitting on the aircraft's tail section, and the aircraft was
thereafter found to be damaged.
The plaintiff sued the airport manager, in his individual ca-
pacity as a sub-contractor, as well as the City. The plaintiff as-
serted causes of action against both defendants sounding in
negligence, gross negligence, conversion, and the taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation. Bail-
ment and breach of contract were also asserted against the City.
The City claimed that it was entitled to the protection of sov-
ereign immunity for its acts and that the manager was protected
by official immunity as an employee. Applying Texas law to the
facts, the court held that the rental contract evidenced a waiver
of sovereign immunity by the City and that the manager failed
to satisfy all of the elements of the affirmative defense of official
immunity. 714
71 Id. at 355.
712 Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
71- 953 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
714 See id.
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Alpha Alpha, Inc. v. Southland Aviation involved the liability of
an airport operator for third-party vandalism.715 Alpha Alpha,
Inc. (Alpha) was the owner of a general aviation aircraft severely
damaged by vandals while parked overnight on a common area
ramp of a public-use airport. The airport security consisted of
fencing and lighting, but because the runway was open twenty-
four hours a day, there was around-the-clock pedestrian access
to the ramp. The plaintiff brought a cause of action based upon
a "deposit" theory, which is analogous to that of common-law
bailment. Existing case law in Louisiana held that under similar
circumstances involving a commercial fixed base operator, a de-
posit cause of action was well stated.7"
The defendants, all of whom apparently were quasi-govern-
mental entities, argued that the case law was distinguishable be-
cause the airport was a public use airport that had been built
with public use funds, and defendants could not refuse the
plaintiff use of the airport. Therefore, defendants contended,
the requisite element of "mutual intent" to create a deposit was
not satisfied.
The court discussed the issue of "tie-down fees" and whether
they were customarily charged by the airport. The court recog-
nized the practice of fixed-base operators to not charge tie-down
fees where it is anticipated that the aircraft will purchase fuel
and will otherwise be a repeat customer. 17 The court also re-
lied upon testimony that the "purpose of the airport was eco-
nomic development. . . . Since the defendants received an
economic advantage as part of the consideration for accepting
the [aircraft], the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding
that the defendants were compensated depositaries. " 1
The defendants also claimed airport security issues were pre-
empted by federal legislation. The court distinguished the de-
pository cause of action from that of negligence, and held that
preemption applied to the negligence, but not to the deposit
claim. 1 9 Interestingly, the court did not address the fact that
one of the elements of a deposit cause of action is "lack of due
care.
715 697 So. 2d 1364 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
716 See id.
717 See id.




In Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority,
the plaintiff was a sub-tenant of an airport hangar and lost thir-
teen aircraft when the hangar burned. 720 The fire was started by
construction contractors hired by the defendant, who were us-
ing propane torches. The defendant leased the hangar to "Mil-
lion-Air," who in turn leased the space to Cessna. Cessna
asserted a claim directly against the defendant landlord under a
theory described by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 324(A), duty to third parties.
The court upheld Cessna's cause of action under the Restate-
ment and rejected defendant's argument that a Kansas sover-
eign immunity statute applied:
A second important point from [relevant case law] is that the
provision for immunity for fire and police protection under the
tort claims act grows out of the old rule of sovereign immunity
for carrying out governmental functions .... What separates this
case from those which address immunity for governmental func-
tions is that [Defendant], as a landowner, undertook to provide
certain security measures to its tenant and the occupant of the
hangar. Once [Defendant] undertook to become a landlord and
to provide such security measures, it became subject to the same
rules which apply to private landlords who undertake to perform
the same type of service. 72 1
The applicability of res ipsa loquitur was examined in Carrio v.
Denson.72 2 The aircraft owned by the plaintiff suffered a prop
strike and other damage when it collided on a taxiway with a
scaffold. The scaffold belonged to the defendant contractor,
who testified that the evening before he had left it wired to the
side of a construction site approximately 150 to 200 yards away
from the scene of the accident. The defendant further testified
that he had no idea how the scaffold came to be located in the
middle of the taxiway.
The court held that on these facts, and in the absence of any
other evidence, the plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory failed:
In the question of control lies the problem. While there is no
dispute that [defendant] owned the scaffold and that the scaffold
lying in the taxiway is what caused the accident, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the scaffold could not have been on the taxiway
without the negligence on [defendant's] part. [Plaintiff] argues
that there was no evidence that the construction project had
720 940 P.2d 84 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
721 Id. at 95.
722 689 So. 2d 121 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
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been vandalized in the past, so, he says, there is no reason to
think vandals moved the scaffold to the taxiway, as theorized by
[defendant]. However, there was also no evidence that in the
three months the scaffold had been in use at the construction
site, it had ever come loose from the building and rolled away.
Therefore, there is no reason to think that the night before the
accident, the scaffold rolled around a pile of bricks and across
150 yards to end up in the middle of the taxiway. In fact, [de-
fendant's] theory seems more plausible .... The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur does not require that a defendant be held liable
merely because no explanation exists for how an accident oc-
curred. There must be some indication that the defendant was
negligent and that the accident occurred as a result of the
negligence.723
IX. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
A. ERRONEOUS COLLECTION OF TAXES BY AIRLINES
In late 1995, Southwest Airlines continued to collect a ten per-
cent ticket excise tax for flights booked in early 1996, under the
expectation that the tax, which was set to lapse at the end of
1995, would be re-authorized by Congress. However, it was not
reauthorized until February 1997, and two similar suits were
brought against Southwest as a result. In Sigmon v. Southwest Air-
lines Co., several plaintiffs sued Southwest to recover the ticket
excise tax, attorney's fees, and exemplary damages.724 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed that there was no independent private cause of
action for a party to recover taxes erroneously collected by an
airline. v25 Although the plaintiffs were correct that no law au-
thorized collection of the taxes726 and that an IRS refund was
due, plaintiffs could not show that Southwest lacked a "colorable
basis" for collecting the taxes in late 1995. Further, the court
held that the exclusive remedy for erroneous or illegal collec-
tions must be sought against the United States and must begin
with the filing of an administrative claim with the IRS for a re-
fund.7 2 7 A similar decision was rendered in Kaucky v. Southwest
723 Id. at 123.
724 110 F.3d 1200 (5th Cir. 1997).
725 See id.
726; When the taxes were reimposed in February 1997, the government solved
the refund issue by providing that the excise tax applied to tickets purchased
before the expiration of the tax for transportation beginning after the expiration
date. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4261 (g) (1994); Id. 4271(d) (1994).
727 See id. at 1206.
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Airlines, where the Seventh Circuit opined that allowing a private
cause of action against the airlines would "throw a monkey
wrench into machinery designed to confine suits for the refund
of federal taxes to suits in the federal courts against the
government.
7 28
B. DEFAMATION OF TRAVEL AGENT BY AIRLINE
In Gaeta v. Delta Airlines, a travel agency terminated by Delta
Airlines after an agency employee sent ajoke/threat facsimile to
the airline brought suit, inter alia, for breach of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation, and inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 729 The
court granted summary judgment dismissing all the agency's
claims on the grounds that no cause of action was stated for
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for
termination in instances where the contract expressly permitted
the airline to cancel the agreement at any time for any reason. 3 °
The libel and slander claims were dismissed because, having
contacted the press, the travel agency had injected itself into the
public eye becoming a "limited public figure."731 Hence, it
would have to show "actual malice" to state a claim. Finally, the
court dismissed both claims for intentional and negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress because there was no evidence of "out-
rageous" conduct or severe emotional distress.732
C. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In United Technologies Corp. v. FAA,7 33 United Technologies
(Pratt & Whitney) sought documents used by the FAA in author-
izing several companies to manufacture replacement parts for
Pratt & Whitney engines. The court affirmed the FAA's denial
of the request under Exemption Four of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA),7 which protects disclosure of trade secrets
and commercial or financial information from disclosure to
728 109 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct. 368 (7th Cir.
1997).




733 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,095 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2497
(1997).
734 See5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994).
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third-parties.735 Pratt & Whitney argued on appeal that the con-
fidentiality of the documents should be examined on a reques-
tor-specific basis, and hence it should have access to design
drawings for parts to be used in its engines. However, the Sec-
ond Circuit reaffirmed prior jurisprudence to the effect that all
requestors have equal rights of access under FOIA, and a partic-
ular requestor's greater interest in particular documents gives
that party no greater right of access than the general public.736
The court also found that Pratt & Whitney had no special access
under the line of cases allowing a party greater access to reports
or investigations where that party is the subject of the report or
investigation.737
73 See United Technologies Corp., 25 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,095.
736 See id.
737 See id.
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